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Abstract  
This thesis is a comparative examination of the impacts of two so-called ‘Digital Platforms 
for Political Participation’ (DPPPs) — Decide Madrid and vTaiwan — on urban 
policymaking and citizen empowerment. DPPPs are a novel subset of digital platforms which 
are focused on facilitating online political participation and are designed and implemented by 
governmental institutions: the two cases under study here are designed by Madrid City 
Council and the Taiwanese government respectively.  
 
This thesis utilises what I term a situated lens, which fuses the idea of relational comparative 
urbanism, Deleuzian assemblage thinking and theories of empowerment. This situated lens 
allows me to evaluate, compare and identify the similarities in the forms of digital political 
participation provided by the two DPPPs under study. It does this by breaking each DPPP 
down into three sets of assemblages: (1) the design process; (2) the dynamic User Interface 
(UI); and (3) the process of algorithmic decision-making. The term ‘situated’ is coined to 
highlight the dynamic and mutating nature of digital political participation. Via this situated 
lens, I stress that digital empowerment is highly changeable, constrained and opened up by 
rules set at design stage, the dynamic UI, contingencies introduced by algorithmic 
interactions with users, and the changing human/institutional contexts in which these 
processes are embedded.      
 
This thesis demonstrates that my comparative study of the two DPPPs can enrich existing 
studies in digital urbanism and digital participation.  
 
Firstly, drawing from theories of empowerment, the situated lens allows me to indicate the 
level of empowerment a DPPP provides should not be seen just as the provision of a fixed 
static set of participatory capacities. Rather, a DPPP should be seen as a fluid space in which 
empowerment is present to a greater or lesser extent, affected by a fast-moving environment 
in which a user can be disabled or enabled in making informed and collective decisions due 
to various contingencies (such as the dynamic UI and the processes of user data interacting 
with algorithms to produce decisions). The wider institutional context also drives this fluidity: 
the citizen/user’s ability to impact on policymaking through reaching collective decisions 
through DPPPs is constrained or promoted by subsequent processes of governmental 
allocation of political legitimacy and resources.  
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Secondly, the situated lens offers a new view in digital urbanism, by deploying an innovative 
hybrid method to produce ‘flashbacks’ on specific processes of digital political participation. 
In doing so it reveals and question the ways in which political decisions on legitimating urban 
issues are mutably (re)configured by algorithmic interactions with users and by subsequent 
human interpretation in institutional policymaking processes. This serves to question what 
constitutes fairer and more empowered political decisions by pointing out exclusions which 
emerge during the decision-making processes of DPPPs.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
People decide to conduct a PhD project for different reasons. I think it is worthwhile to start 
the introduction of this thesis by explaining my reasons for beginning it; mine are tightly 
bound to my previous experiences of studying Urban Planning at University College London 
(UCL) and subsequently working as an urban planner in the Deputy Mayor’s Office at Taipei 
City Hall. This guided my choice of doing a comparative study of alternative smart urbanism, 
which became a study of two innovative digital platforms which I have termed ‘Digital 
Platforms for Political Participation’ (hereafter referred to as DPPPs): Decide Madrid, 
developed by Ayuntamiento de Madrid (hereafter referred to as Madrid City Council) and 
vTaiwan, developed by the Taiwanese government’s Cabinet Office.  
 
It was when I was working for Taipei City Hall that I decided to pursue PhD research on the 
general topic of alternative forms of smart cities. In 2015, I returned to Taipei from UCL with 
an MSc in urban regeneration and a six-month internship as a research assistant. I was young, 
naïve, and full of energy and enthusiasm to put what I had learned into practice. What I 
encountered was much frustration, confusion and unspoken disagreements between myself 
and Taipei City Hall on various strands of work related to urban policymaking and public 
participation. To cut a long story short, in contrast to the British academic environment — 
where individual and critical thought is appreciated and valued — in Taipei, I quickly found 
that having very little original ideas and almost no criticality was the way to get along with 
civil servants.  
 
In Taipei, I found that I terribly missed the experiences I had had at UCL and my life in 
London more generally: in particular, the freedom and challenges that I was given and trusted 
with. Whilst life in London for a poor international student is not easy, there is always 
something new to learn and think about! At Taipei City Hall, I deeply felt that I could not 
learn enough, especially regarding how to face down ‘myths’ surrounding the deployment of 
ICT and digital technologies in Smart City initiatives, which day by day I found to be a 
greater and greater problem for urban governance, both in Taipei and the wider world. I will 
never forget several meetings I attended with ICT providers and experts on the subjects of 
smart meters/grids for social housing, where I watched the Deputy Mayor, his urban planners 
and other civil servants become pretty much speechless, overwhelmed and even ‘lost’ when 
technical experts began to ‘explain’ the technical operation of smart meters. It was at this 
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decisive moment that I felt a great urge to learn more about the entanglement between 
ICT/digital technologies and cities: to unpack ‘unknown’ aspects of digital technologies 
within a PhD project, and in the process carve an identity as an urban planner/geographer on 
the cutting edge of urban research.  
  
Besides, whilst working in Taipei City Hall, I became increasingly concerned about the 
top-down approach to smart cities and urban development which I observed there, whereby 
even though many forms of public participation were launched and executed, the voices of 
citizens and wider controversies were often either sidelined or ‘covered up’ by political 
propaganda. It became clear that such an approach to urban development would end up 
inflaming controversy rather than avoiding it. A strong feeling arose in me that I wanted to 
learn from places where the smart city concept was implemented in a better way. Whilst this 
was not possible in Taipei at the municipal level, I was fortunate to have the example of 
vTaiwan on my doorstep, which was also located in Taipei, but at the level of national 
government rather than local government and consequently operating within a different set of 
institutions and stakeholders. Under the direction of Taiwanese Minister for Digital Affairs, 
Audrey Tang, vTaiwan was an example of a new type of digital platform focused on urban 
governance which was carving out a reputation as a world leader in the application of digital 
solutions to democratic governance. It focused on digital issues which affect everyday 
practices, such as e-learning, e-clinics, Uber and Airbnb.  
 
I decided to pursue the idea of launching a study which compared vTaiwan with another 
DPPP which was also considered to be a leader in terms of digital political innovation. Both 
cases have been making waves at a global level as exemplary cases of innovation in practices 
of digital democracy (Simon et al., 2017; Miller, 2019; Tang, 2019a). Digital democracy, 
despite having a number of different models ranging from consensus-based to adversarial 
(Dahlberg, 2011), can be seen in general terms as: 
the usage of information and communication technology and 
computer-mediated communication in all kinds of media (e.g. the Internet, 
interactive broadcasting and digital telephony) for purposes of enhancing 
political democracy or the participation of citizens in democratic 
communication (Hacker and VanDijk, 2000, p. 1). 
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Building on Hacker and VanDijk’s (2000) understanding of digital democracy as an addition 
to traditional ‘analogue’ political practices, in my thesis I will specify such practices as 
‘digital political participation’: this can mean, for instance, giving opinions, making proposals, 
making comments on the opinions or proposals of others, and voting in participatory 
processes such as participatory budgets and petitions. I hoped to conduct in-depth research to 
explore whether it was true that such platforms could driver increased citizen empowerment 
and improve (urban) policymaking processes: these were the ‘major claims’ which were 
typically being made about the DPPPs (Simon et al., 2017; Miller, 2019; Tang, 2019a). I 
would do this through empirical research, which would focus on an examination of technical 
and ‘hidden’ details which had been hitherto ignored within the literature on smart cities, and 
in the process create a comparative study which would be able to make a significant 
contribution to urban research.     
 
In addition to the focus on whether the DPPPs actually performed the functions they set 
themselves in terms of achieving better civic empowerment and urban policymaking, this 
PhD thesis should also be read as reflecting the concerns of a geographer who wished to see 
how a comparative study of two cases of digital political participation platform considered to 
be leaders in the field could inform those wider theories of digital empowerment and digital 
urbanism which are currently in use within academic contexts. Thus, informed by my 
personal experiences as an urban planner and researcher, I aim to push forward current 
studies of digital urbanism and digital participation by critically examining the effects of 
technical details within the DPPPs — logics embedded at design phase, effects of the 
visualisations produced via the User Interface (UI) and the processes of algorithmic 
calculation which produce political decisions based on user data — and in the context 
develop an explanatory theory allowing me to make sense of my empirical findings.  
 
Here, I state four contributions my thesis will make to studies of digital political participation 
and digital urbanism.  
 
Firstly, researching DPPPs can be seen as a timely and critical response to calls in geography 
and urban studies for research aimed at examining digital technologies. Over the past five 
years, digital geography and urban studies have shown increased interest towards studying 
the effects of digital technologies and algorithm-powered systems. In calling for a ‘digital 
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turn’ in geography, Ash, Kitchin and Leszczynski (2018) have sought for geographers to take 
serious and critical account of digital technologies: this is because digital technologies are 
working at pace to (re)shape new spatial relations, powers and regimes of algorithmic 
governance. The concept of algorithmic governance refers to a new model of governance in 
which algorithms actively ‘search, collate, sort, categorise, group, match, analyse, profile, 
model, simulate, visualise and regulate people, processes and places’ (Coletta and Kitchin, 
2017, p. 4; Kitchin, 2017, p. 18). Algorithms are seen as increasingly becoming ‘agents’ or 
‘actors’ within political processes; they appear to possess attributes which allow them to act 
autonomously, particularly where they are informed by types of Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
such as Machine Learning. Issues related to how to study algorithms — particularly their 
ontological status, their autonomy (or otherwise) and their increased salience within 
contemporary modes of governance — will only become more important as the 21st Century 
progresses (Amoore, 2009, 2013; Steiner, 2012).  
 
Secondly, my usage of a hybrid method — which integrates participatory observation, 
interviews and the ‘digital flashback’ method — aims to contribute to solving long-term 
methodological problems in approaching how to investigate software and digital technologies 
within both urban studies (see Graham 2005) and, more recently, digital geography (Kitchin, 
2017; Leszczynski, 2018). My hybrid method, particularly due to the use of digital flashbacks, 
has allowed me (with the help of data scientists) to directly or indirectly analyse data archives 
of DPPPs in terms of how users’ online activities relate to algorithmic operations. The digital 
flashback recreates, simulates and visualises specific cases of online participation — such a 
daily section of vTaiwan online participation in relation to the case of Uber — which can be 
seen as similar to the use of the ‘digital twin’ approach (Guo et al., 2019, p. 1189; Zohdi, 
2020). The flashback method offers a partial view on the ‘black-boxed’ processes by creating 
and visualising flashbacks of instances of issue-based digital political participation. The 
importance of understanding how algorithms work ‘behind the scenes’ has been noted by 
Amoore and Piotukh (2015a, pp. 4, 14), who critically note that without ‘careful attention to 
how it [data] is analysed, and to what can be said about the data on the basis of that analysis’, 
researchers face risks when pressed to make claims about the impacts of data and digital 
technologies on governance of contemporary life; without focusing on processes of internal 
algorithmic calculation, such claims run the risk of being insufficient and therefore 
misleading. To provide a way through this problem, my hybrid method offers a way to collect 
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empirical evidence on which I ground my comparative study of the two DPPPs by viewing 
the platforms as three sets of assemblages, and on which I produce my overall theoretical 
framework — a situated lens.   
 
Thirdly, my development of a situated lens — which is informed by relational comparative 
urbanism and fuses assemblage thinking with theories of empowerment — contributes to the 
field of digital political participation and smart/digital urbanism in several ways. Following 
the relational comparative urbanism which encourages researchers to discern similarities 
from cities that are very different in geography, culture or society (McFarlane and Robinson, 
2012; Robinson, 2015), the situated lens is able to trace the genesis of Decide Madrid and 
vTaiwan in terms of how they both evolved from digitally-facilitated social movements 
through progressive institutionalisation; by doing so it is able to grounds both DPPPs within 
wider processes of democratisation in Spain and Taiwan. The genetic similarity between the 
two DPPPs I am studying (despite their apparent political, social and cultural differences) 
justifies my choice of taking a comparative approach to Decide Madrid and vTaiwan. The 
comparative approach in my thesis can potentially open up current studies of smart urbanism, 
which largely focus on single case studies located in Anglosphere, European or Latin 
American contexts. In particular, both the two DPPPs have not been investigated before 
within smart and platform urbanism, where there has been a prioritisation on 
‘directed/automated data’ (Kitchin, 2014) and ‘digital platform enterprises’ such as Twitter, 
Uber, Airbnb and Google Maps (M.Graham and Zook, 2013; Leszczynski, 2016, 2019).  
 
Fourthly, drawing on Deleuzian assemblage thinking, the situated lens pushes forward recent 
work to understand digital participation by going beyond viewing the capacity to participate 
digitally as being dependent on the possession of a fixed set of capacities such as familiarity 
with technology and the ability of the user to apply skills such as literacy and numeracy in 
digital contexts (Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal, 2008; Isin and Ruppert, 2015, pp. 81–84). 
The situated lens highlights a contextual, open-ended and ‘on-the-move’ understanding of 
digital political participation which sees the DPPP as a constellation of assemblages (design, 
UI and algorithmic decision-making) that are respectively constituted and reconstituted by 
users, policymakers, software engineers and algorithms. In particular, a situated lens is able to 
grapple with the contingent and multifarious nature of algorithms (Kitchin, 2017; Amoore, 
2019), seeing their in situ operation in DPPPs as an ongoing and mutable set of 
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human-algorithmic interactions located within wider political contexts which are locatable 
via the use of empirical case studies such as those I have conducted.  
 
In the following sections, I will begin my initial comparative analysis on the two DPPPs by 
providing some introductory information which highlights the significance of Decide Madrid 
and vTaiwan by locating their inception in specific local and global contexts.  
 
 
1.1 A relational comparison of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan  
 
I draw my comparative method primarily from Robinson’s (2015, p. 16) comparative 
urbanism in which she specifies a ‘relational’ comparative method, which aims to uncover 
‘genetic interconnections’ between different cities. Robinson (2015, p. 16) enriches this 
relational comparative method with a ‘generative’ aspect which builds on the relational 
comparison to produce new theories to explain similarities between cities. In Robinson’s 
(2015, p.16) own words, ‘genetics’ is defined as tracing ‘the strongly interconnected genesis 
of often-repeated urban phenomena’ across different cities. It is through this ‘genetic’ 
comparative method that I am able to find relationships between the two DPPPs — which are 
located in the divergent geographies of Taipei and Madrid City — by tracing the similarities 
in the trajectories which the two DPPP have developed along. By bringing out the relational 
contexts of the two DPPPs, I aim at demonstrating the strength and power of doing a 
comparative study. As I argue, the genetic differences and similarities between Decide 
Madrid and vTaiwan have important impacts on how the two DPPPs are shaped, designed 
and constrained in the context of citizen empowerment.  
 
As I will detail in the following section, both Decide Madrid and vTaiwan evolved from what 
some have termed ‘decentralised/horizontal’ forms of digitally-aided social movements 
(Castañeda, 2012; Gibson, 2013; Fominaya, 2015; Tufekci, 2017) to being institutionally 
grounded in the apparatuses of governance within Madrid and Taipei City. Both trajectories 
can be traced back to the 1970s/80s, when social movements against authoritarian state 
structures in Spain and Taiwan were organised by pro-democracy elements in Spain and 
Taiwan (Bustelo, 1991); whilst these differed from each other because of cultural and 
political factors, they shared important similarities.  
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1.1.1 Similar trajectories in moving from authoritarianism to democracy  
Taiwan and Spain share notable similarities in their historical trajectories; in both countries, 
long periods of authoritarian rule with ‘strongmen’ leaders — led by General Francisco 
Franco and his Falange party and Chiang Kai-Shek’s KMT party in Taiwan — gave way to 
largely peaceful transitions to democratic rule in the 1970s and 1980s. In his comparative 
study of Taiwanese and Spanish democratisation, Bustelo (1991, p. 2) argues that the key 
drivers for these transitions were a combination of rapid economic growth, dramatic social 
change and a ‘trend’ toward democracy both within and without each authoritarian regime. 
Following fast economic growth in 1950s, well-educated middle classes emerged in Spanish 
and Taiwanese society (Bustelo, 1991, p.9-10); these middle classes then began to expect and 
demand democratic rights from the respective governments (Bustelo, 1991, p.9). In Taiwan, 
several social movements — such as the ‘zhongli incident’ (in 1977) and the ‘Formosa 
incident’ (in 1979) — were mobilized by political elites outside of the KMT party (also 
known as ‘Dangwai’ in Mandarin). In Spain, alongside a growing and vibrant citizen 
‘associational milieu’ which empowered Spanish citizens to advocate for democracy in the 
1960s (Radcliff, 2011, p. 3), a strong student activist movement emerged with international 
influences (especially from the USA); these have been considered to be ‘substantial stimulus’ 
encouraging dissent to Franco’s regime (Tejada, 2014). 
 
Despite this similarity, Taiwan’s democratisation was slower than its Spanish counterpart. It 
was not until 1996 that Taiwan had its first direct general election, though martial law was 
lifted in 1987. By contrast the first general election in Spain was held in June 1977, shortly 
after Franco’s death in November 1975 (Bustelo, 1991, p. 2). I note at least three factors that 
contribute this slow democratic transition in Taiwan: (1) ‘the traditional Chinese authoritarian 
political culture’; (2) the existence of an authoritarian one-party state structure (rooted in 
Leninist organisational theory) which exerted stronger hegemonic power than its Spanish 
counterpart (Bustelo (1991, p. 11, 17); and (3) a relatively weak civil associational society 
(Lin et al., 2005). Firstly, due to the lack of democratic tradition and culture in Taiwan, most 
social movements from 1970s made relatively weak claims for democratic reforms (Bustelo, 
1991, p. 17-18). Secondly, being heavily influence by theories of Leninist-style hegemonic 
governance, the KMT regime vanquished any political dissent expressed in various social 
movements in 1960 and 70s and presented itself as a strong, all-encompassing and 
paternalistic state (Bustelo, 1999). Thirdly, in contrast to a civil society in Spain which 
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remained relatively vibrant under Francoism (Racliff, 2011), Taiwanese civil society was 
weak, as ‘the extent and depth of citizen participation [was] limited to certain CSO[civil 
social organisation] or certain social groups, and, on the whole, various forms of civic 
engagement [were] relatively weak’ (Lin et al., 2005, pp. 8–9). In particular, the influence of 
civil society actions on informing and educating citizens about democratic values and 
political issues was limited in Taiwan (Lin et al., 2005, p. 84): 
 although today Taiwan is a democracy, with free access to all kinds of 
information, the public is still used to having a strong state as its source of 
education and information and it has only been within the past decade that 
civil society has been able to break into the state’s monopoly on the 
dissemination of information. 
Via this comparative approach, we start to see how Spain and Taiwan are related to each 
other in their democratisation processes, with important similarities and differences. The 
works of Bustelo (1991), Rancliff (2011) and Lin et al. (2005) offer us a quick glimpse into 
Spain’s rapid and solid democratisation, which appears to benefit from a civil society which 
has stronger consciousness of democratic claims and culture than Taiwanese society. From 
here, we can used the shared experience of democratisation in Spain and Taiwan in the past 
as grounds for comparing Decide Madrid and vTaiwan.  
 
Moving forward to the 2010s, I track down the more recent relations between the inception of 
Decide Madrid and vTaiwan in terms of their evolution in the context of a global popular 
social movement, the Occupy Movement. I will note how the pre-existing cultural, political 
and social differences which have shaped Spanish and Taiwanese democratisation over the 
past 40 years continue to shape contemporary practices of political participation in the 
present.  
 
1.1.2 From ‘decentralised’ social movements in Madrid and Taipei to institutionalisation 
In tracing the trajectories from which Decide Madrid and vTaiwan were born, it is clear that 
both can be seen as specific offshoots of the global Occupy movement; more specifically, 
they can be seen as responses to economic crisis and various other forms of injustice 
(Financial Times, 2012) which take into account the local contexts of Taipei and Madrid. In 
the case of Taiwan, the protests were known as the Sunflower Movement: they were 
associated with opposition to a trade deal with China which was seen as a harbinger of 
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political union with China and the increased authoritarianism this implied. In Madrid, the 
movement known as 15M, composed of the so-called ‘Indignados’, began in early 2011 as a 
result of the austerity policies of the-then Spanish government, which was later the first 
movement to attach the ‘Occupy’ moniker to this set of protests (Castañeda, 2012). Crucially, 
the creation of both DPPPs exemplifies the integration of forms of resistance in the Occupy 
Movement into political institutions. Monterde et al. (2015, p. 934) state that ‘15M was born 
in 2011 and continued to evolve through 2014, in continuous transformation and development 
of new forms of collective action and identity, which currently appears to be veering towards 
institutional politics’. In Taiwan, in the wake of the Sunflower Movement, the Taiwanese 
government came under huge public demand to reform their mechanism of public 
participation; this included calls to meaningfully incorporate the use digital platforms into 
governance (Kuan, 2015). 
 
The Occupy movement, either being facilitated or enabled by digital technologies and social 
media, is famous for its advocacy of ‘decentralized/horizonal’ forms of organisation (Hughes, 
2011; Castañeda, 2012; Gibson, 2013; Fominaya, 2015; Tufekci, 2017). Heavily influenced 
by anarchism, the idea of decentralisation connotes a collective process of decision-making 
where citizens’ are able to directly participate and thus become autonomous from the 
centralised state (Gibson, 2013, p. 342). This idea of decentralisation is often used to 
illustrate a ‘leaderless’ and ‘horizontal’ organisation where ‘preexisting organisations 
whether formal or informal played little role’ (Tufekci, 2017, p. 51, 78). The use of 
decentralised forms of social movement seems to be a characteristic of both Indignados in 
Madrid and the Sunflower movement in Taiwan (Fominaya, 2015; Gibson, 2013; Ho, 2018; 
Fenton, 2016). Based on the example of 15M, Fenton (2016, p. 36-37) also illustrates this 
horizontal form of social movement as ‘a networked politics’ which are ‘leaderless, 
non-hierarchical, with open protocols, open communication, and self-generating information 
and identities’.  
 
However, it is important to note that, in contrast to Tufekci’s (2017) work in Turkey, which 
identified of an entirely ‘decentralised/horizontal’ Occupy movement, the Spanish and 
Taiwanese cases both involve greater elements of centralisation from the outset. Firstly, 
whilst Tufekci’s work in Turkey noted there were no extant organisations prior to its Occupy 
movement; in the Spanish context, there was a lot of work and effort put into establishing 
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informal organisations such as ‘the democratia ya’ and ‘hacklab’; similarly, in Taiwan, a 
formal organisation called ‘island in progression’ had already been established in the case of 
Taipei before the outbreak of the Taiwanese Occupy Movement. Secondly, the Taiwanese 
Occupy Movement did not entirely utilise a decentralised form of social movement. In what 
Ho (2018, p. 189) theorises as ‘improvisation’, the Sunflower Movement is considered as ‘an 
intermediate pattern of movement participation’ which involves some elements of 
decentralised decision-making yet proceeds towards a clear and consensus-defined goal. It 
‘was emphatically not a “leaderless movement” empowered alone by the mass participants 
who followed the principle of horizontality’ (Ho, 2018, p. 199).  
 
The similarity and difference between how the idea of a decentralised social movement is 
organised across Spain and Taiwan can be explained by further exploring the different culture 
and history of specific democratic movements in the context of wider democratisation in the 
early 1970s and 1980s. From here, we can see the strength of using relational comparison to 
unpack and challenge what has been termed as ‘decentralised social movements’. The 
comparative lens notes how different cultural and historical contexts shape the specific levels 
of decentralisation that digital technologies were used for whilst organising the Occupy 
movement; these trends continue to influence the development of the two DPPPs and their 
impacts on democratic empowerment. This suggests a more critical and contextual analysis 
of digitally-facilitated social movement, as Juris (2012, p. 260) critically reminds researchers 
‘of the importance of deeply sedimented histories and politics of place for understanding the 
dynamics of protest in concrete locales or of the tendency for social movements to organize 
through decentralized, diffuse, and leaderless networks since at least the 1960s’.  
 
Secondly, in line with Spanish anarchist-influenced culture — which organised autonomous 
and horizontal grassroots social movements against the Franco regime from 1960s 
onwards — (Hughes, 2011, p. 411; Alberola, Millan and Zambrana, 2000; Fominaya, 2009, p. 
336, Juris, 2012), before the 15m movement in Madrid there were already several 
associations/centres created which gathered squatters and hackers for the purposes of 
developing, educating and using digital technologies for social movements. Fominaya (2015, 
p. 146) notes that such autonomous and horizontal form of social movement have ‘become a 
more widespread feature of Madrid’s and Spain’s social movement culture’ prior to 15M. 
Indeed, during my fieldwork, David, one of the ‘digital guerrillas (hackers/squatters)’ who 
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organized Hacklab and its associated Hackademy workshop in Madrid, expressed that: 
 ….we give a lot of courses…when the movement [15M] came we are 
ready…anarchists, researchers, squatters, students, business who have 
been to our workshop which we gave them for free….[hacklab was able] 
create new ways of fighting that can be reached through a connection 
between that kind of people, high-tech people with social love and social 
warriors that have been already doing that in the street 
Therefore, with a strong pre-existing culture in anarchism and autonomous 
associations, Madrid in some ways was ‘well-prepared’ when the opportunity same 
for activists to call out a large scale social movement. 
 
 (  
Figure 1 Hackademy Workshop organised by Hacklab (Source: provided by David) 
 
Such an anarchistic and autonomous culture in Madrid can be contrasted to Taiwan where 
Sunflower Movement was the starting point when digital technologies were used specifically 
by tech-savvy activists for organising social movements. Vichy, an activist who was involved 
in live stream and logistics team during the Sunflower Movement, expresses that:  
actually most social movement organisations are not very familiar with new 
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technologies, such as google spreadsheet, live-stream and other digital 
tools…it is during Sunflower Movement that some developers from g0v 
have exchanged their knowledge with activists, to reuse some digital tools 
for a social movement... [traditional]Activists are very good at organising 
an offline social movement, such as press conference.  
 
Moreover, being culturally different from Spanish anarchist-influenced autonomous social 
movements — which stress leaderless and direct forms of participation and decision-making 
(Castañeda, 2012; Fominaya, 2015) — the culture of social movements in Taiwan during the 
1990s and 2000s can be seen as deploying highly-localised, grassroots-oriented, experimental 
yet professionalised organisations of specific academic scholars, activists and non-profit 
organisations (Chuang, 2013, pp. 47–48). In Taiwan, there has not been an emphasis on 
decentralisation, nor on direct democracy, as has been the case in the anarchist-influenced 
Spanish context. This was evidenced later on in the Sunflower Movement, when a power 
division emerged between a few participants who became members of the Taiwanese 
Parliament — and thus came to the centre of decision-making in Taiwan — and colleagues 
who remained outside of formal governmental institutions (Ho, 2018; BBC Chinese News, 
2019). Such a division amongst participants suggests a less decentralised and direct form of 
decision-making process than in the Indignados.  
 
Recognising these differences between the Spanish and Taiwanese Occupy movements thus 
provides me with an important and situated perspective to compare the development and 
invention of the two DPPPs within each’s own cultural and political contexts. It is these 
cultural and political contexts that influence the ways in which participants from Occupy 
Movement approached institutionalisation. This is exemplified in both Spanish and 
Taiwanese cases, where activists and civic hackers not generally considered as 
‘politicians’ — such as software engineers and political activists — began to ‘occupy’ and 
influence institutional politics in various ways, from launching a new political party to taking 
part as moderators or technical providers in numerous forms of public participation. Here, 
Decide Madrid and vTaiwan are seen as specific instances of the institutionalisation of the 
Occupy Movement. As I am going to illustrate, the cultural-political differences between 
Madrid and Taipei continued to shape how DPPPs were embedded and developed by 
different levels of government and designed for users with different functions and levels of 
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accessibility.  
 
1.1.3 From the decentralised 15M movement to Decide Madrid   
In the aftermath of 15M, a citizen organisation connected to the Madrid protests known as 
Movimiento Por La Democracia (Movement for Democracy) produced a Charter for 
Democracy (2011). It noted that the ethos of 15M had mutated and diffused, driving new 
possibilities, activities, and spaces in everyday life and political systems. The Charter claimed 
that:  
the movement [15M] undeniably lives. Its form has been mutated, 
re-imagined, distributed, and coalesced into a swarm of activity and hacks 
to the system. We live here; we see it every day. These initiatives are not as 
easily seen, defined —or, for that matter, targeted —as a physical 
occupation may be; yet they permeate the hegemony, creating new 
possibilities and spaces (Movement for the Democracy, 2011, p. 1). 
 
One of the many trajectories that emerged from 15M was a journey which ultimately led to 
the development of Decide Madrid, which stemmed from the activity of so-called ‘civic 
hackers’ associated with the protest movement. Civic hacker is a loose term meaning 
software engineers who volunteer to code for various ‘good causes’ in societies. As I 
explained earlier, civic hackers were associated with anarchism in Madrid City due to a 
specific culture and history of social movements which existed there. After 15M, an’electoral 
shift’ (Ordóñez, Feenstra and Franks, 2018, p. 85) took place within some Spanish 
anarchist/civic hacking colelctives; they decided to ‘get their hands dirty’ by entering into 
governmental institutions to make changes. In Madrid, some civic hackers decided to 
establish a laboratory called ‘labodemos’ (loosely translated as ‘our laboratories’ in English 
but also having a connotation of the Greek ‘Demos’, i.e. the people in a democracy) with the 
intended purpose of continuing the ethos of 15M by inventing a new digital mechanism for 
conducting what they term ‘direct democracy’. Here, we can see how the Spanish anarchist 
culture influenced how these civic hackers developed Decide Madrid to enable citizens to 
make direct decisions on policy-making processes.  
 
In a twist of fate, Decide Madrid ended up in Madrid Ctiy Council rather than the Spanish 
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government; this was related to internal conflicts and division within the politics of the 
Spanish left. Civic hackers originally plannned and worked with Podemos (a new political 
party in Spain which also emerged a consequence of the 15M movement), experimenting 
with the application of digital tools such as Loomio and Reddit within the internal 
decision-making processes of Podemos. However, this collaboration ultimately went sour, as 
the leaders of Podemos did not see eye to eye with hackers in regards to extending the usage 
of digital platforms for a wider scale of political participation-related activities involving the 
general public. Peter bemoaned that ‘[the collaboration with Podemos] didn’t work out as we 
expected, the political party became a bit more vertical than we expected because it is 
difficult and subject to the electoral fight’. Vincent also lamented that:  
we had the goal of pushing direct democracy with that tool [Loomio], but 
that was the difficult part to make them accept our idea of direct democracy 
were not very interesting [to Podemos].  
 
After the setback with Podemos, Spanish civic hackers turned to another newly-established 
political party, Ahora Madrid, which had been established in 2015 with the more limited goal 
of fielding a range of left candidates to stand in Madrid municipal elections. In this they were 
more successful: the civic hackers, in conjunction with Ahora Madrid, were granted a high 
degree of autonomy and were able to actualise their ideas into a new digital platform which 
could be used for large-scale and decentralised political participation in what they term as 
direct democracy: Decide Madrid. In 2015, Ahora Madrid, led by Manuela Carmena, was 
able to take control of Madrid City Council when Carmena was elected as the new Mayor of 
Madrid, putting an end to the 24 years-old Popular Party conservative administration. It was 
under the Carmena administration that civic hackers were able to enter Madrid City Council 
in a newly-established department of citizen participation, and created the digital platform of 
Decide Madrid. Medero and Alabaladejo (2018) praised Carmera’s left-wing administration 
for adopting an inclusive and extensive system of citizen participation. In particular, this was 
done by extending participatory processes to the sector of urban redevelopment for the first 
time.  
 
Based on the ethos of using decentralised forms of participation and decision-making (also 
termed as direct democracy), the Carmena administration attempted to articulate a 
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participatory-oriented ‘smart city’, which was contrasted with the previous neo-liberal model 
of the ‘entrepreneurial city’ (Pérez et al., 2016, p. 163). Carmena’s approach called to mind 
Hollands’ (2008, p. 316) advocacy of a smart city which ‘take[s] much greater risks with 
technology, devolve[s] power, tackle[s] inequalities and redefine[s] what they mean by smart 
itself’; his ideas were contrasted with predominant views of the smart city proposed by large 
multinational companies such as IBM, which are seen as facilitating corporate profit-making 
activities and providing limited capacity for civic participation and democratic 
decision-making (Hollands, 2015, pp. 62, 74). A senior officer in Madrid City Council 
strongly expressed to me that though IBM’s idea of a smart city was a ‘cool idea’, their 
software did not provide any real way of either ‘making a city smart’ or ‘making a city better’. 
To the Carmena administration, it was more desirable to implement a platform which 
empowered citizens to make decisions in urban policy: as the senior officer expressed, ‘the 
idea is not to have a great control panel which shows the location of every public fountain, 
but to let people decide where to put a new fountain’. 
 
Decide Madrid was developed to be an open-source participatory platform which embodies 
five different participatory processes: (1) debates (Debates); (2) citizen proposals 
(Propuestas); (3) votes (Votaciones); (4) collaborative processes (Procesos); and (5) the 
‘participatory budget’ (presupuestos participativos). Each participatory process has its own 
scope and time period of participation. My research will focus on the participatory processes 
of ‘citizen proposals’, ‘votes’ and the ‘participatory budget’, as they are the ones which were 
more active and which have been considered as successful cases by Madrid City Council. 
Regarding the process of ‘citizen proposals’: Madrid City Council committed itself to holding 
referenda on any urban issue addressed in a proposal made by citizens via Decide Madrid 
which reached a minimum support threshold of 1% of the population (27662 votes). 
Regarding the participatory process of ‘votes’: Madrid City Council committed to turning a 
certain proportion of pre-selected urban regeneration projects —those which were supported 
by a simple majority of votes inputted via the Decide Madrid system —into actual urban 
developments. With regard to the participatory budget, an annual budget of 100 million Euros 
(approx. 2.5% of the total budget for Madrid City Council) was allocated. This budget was 
made available through what was essentially an ‘open competition’: successful proposals 
made by users within Decide Madrid —those which gained majority support from Decide 
Madrid users —were able to access funding from this budget, which turned citizen proposals 
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from ideas into reality in a way expressly intended to be unmediated by ‘traditional’ political 
actors such as politicians and local planners. The ability to participate in these three 
participatory processes was reserved for residents who were registered within Madrid City 
Council and over 16 years old: as of 2017, there were approximately 300,000 residents 
registered (Decide Madrid, 2017).  
 
1.1.4 From the Sunflower Movement to vTaiwan  
On the other side of the world, in late 2014 the Taiwanese Government in Taipei was coming 
under pressure from the Sunflower Movement, also considered to be a subset of the Occupy 
Movement (Castañeda, 2012). The Sunflower Movement strongly opposed deeper economic 
integration with China, viewing a new trade deal as a harbinger of a coming political union 
with China which entailed a future without democracy for Taiwan. It demanded that the 
conservative KMT-run Taiwanese Government retract its plan to sign the Cross-Strait Service 
Trade Agreement with China, and to this end performed various protests, including an 
occupation of the Taiwanese Parliament in March 2014 (Wang, 2017). The protests 
successfully pressurised the Taiwanese Government into accepting part of the demands of the 
Sunflower Movement, including those related to advocacy of new mechanisms for public 
participation.  
 
The huge success of the Sunflower Movement forced the KMT-ruled Taiwanese government 
to review its communication with the public on policy-making processes in two ways. Firstly, 
in a public speech at TEDxTaipei, the former chief of the Ministry of Development, Kuan 
Chung-ming, regretfully pointed out that the forms of public participation conducted by the 
Taiwanese government regarding China-Taiwan trade treaty (which was the main conflict 
point for the Sunflower Movement) fell short of meaningful consultation and were instead a 
form of ‘paternalism’ (Kuan, 2015). By paternalistic public participation, he meant that 
we [the Taiwanese Government] are doing this for the sake of citizens, so 
citizens only have to listen to what we said….. [such a mechanism] does 
not work because it is top-down…, it is more propaganda than listening to 
what citizens say.  
Clearly, he confessed to the public that this ‘paternalistic’ mechanism did not work, because 
large sections of the public did not accept it and went on the street to express their concerns 
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as the Sunflower Movement. Thus the Sunflower Movement problematised the paternalistic, 
top-down mechanisms of public participation previously adopted by the Taiwanese 
government.   
 
Another facet of the success of Sunflower Movement was that it demonstrated and performed 
the successful deployment of various digital technologies for political ends (such as social 
media, open-source participatory platforms and communication applications), which were 
re-appropriated, mobilised and deployed by civic hackers and participants. In this context, 
g0v, a civic hacking community consisting of software engineers, journalists and active 
citizens, became famous for providing crucial technical support for the Sunflower Movement. 
The particular alignment the Sunflower Movement used, whereby it harnessed digital 
technologies for political participation, was observed from aside by a Taiwanese government 
desperate to improve its mechanisms of public participation. A senior officer from the 
Taiwanese government, Derek, noted that  
… technologies are evolving [through the Sunflower Movement] and have 
reached to direct democracy. This allows the Government to collect more 
diverse voices from the outside world…well as you can see, the new 
mechanism for public participation has to do with technologies.  
Derek believed that creating a digital mechanism for public participation could improve 
current mechanisms of public participation by enabling more citizens to take part in 
policy-making processes. By the same token, the former chief of the Ministry of 
Development, in a public speech at TEDxTaipei, also emphasised that digital technologies 
can not only make information more transparent but could also gather more citizens to 
discuss legislative issues: he referred to this as ‘crowd-sourced intelligence’ (Kuan, 2015).  
 
In short, in 2014, the Taiwanese Government witnessed the power of digital technologies to 
recruit ‘the crowd’ to attend demonstrations and disseminate protest-related information and 
subsequently attempted to translate what it saw into an officially-sanctioned digital platform 
for political participation (Kuan, 2015; O’Flaherty, 2018). This DPPP became known as 
vTaiwan, a digital platform which fused previously existing open-source1 software —Pol.is, 
invented and designed by a start-up in Seattle in the United States —with additional inputs 
from g0v, the native civic hacking community, who began working in collaboration with the 
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Taiwanese government in Taipei City. In late 2014, g0v was approached by the Taiwanese 
government because of its expertise in developing and using digital technologies for civic 
engagement and democratic discussion, in particular during the Sunflower Movement1. In 
2016, Audrey Tang, a key actor of g0v, was appointed by the newly elected Taiwanese 
government (ruled by the Democratic Progressive Party, a centre-left political party) as 
‘digital minister’ of the Cabinet Office; she continues to oversee the operations of vTaiwan at 
the time this thesis was written (early 2020). 
 
Whilst Decide Madrid as a platform is focused on using one piece of bespoke software to 
facilitate civic participation, vTaiwan is actually a collection of five different pieces of 
software aimed at facilitating different aspects of civic participation, such as online forums 
and surveys. For the purposes of this research, I only focus on the functions which are 
conducted via one of these pieces of software, Pol.is, which I chose as an object of study 
because it deploys sophisticated Machine Learning algorithms which are able to identify 
similar opinions through the creation of clusters of so-called Opinion Groups, from which 
Common Opinions can be identified both within and between Opinion Groups. Thus, when I 
speak of vTaiwan, I am speaking of vTaiwan-Pol.is. 
 
In the case of vTaiwan, technically anybody can be a user, Taiwanese citizen or not. However, 
in practice, the fact vTaiwan is only available in Mandarin using the Traditional Chinese 
script (the combination of which is used in Taiwan but not in China or Hong Kong) will tend 
to limit the user group to Taiwanese citizens and a limited group of foreign residents in 
Taiwan who understand both Mandarin and the Traditional Chinese script. Enable by Pol.is, 
users are able to vote and comment on digitally-related issues, such as Airbnb, Uber, and 
digitally-enabled sexual harassment and bullying via vTaiwan; however, users cannot propose 
new issues for political participation. Additionally, similar to Decide Madrid, vTaiwan was 
design to be embedded within wider policymaking processes, including those involved with 
the drawing up or revision of legislation. That is to say, after the online participation process 
has ended, the Taiwanese government pledged to draft a bill based on the results of the whole 
process, which would then be sent over to Parliament.  
 
In addition to their online functionality, both Decide Madrid and vTaiwan also provide more 
 
1 Interview with Derek on 22/03/2018 
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‘traditional’ (i.e. physically-located and non-digital) means of public 
participation —including the provision of facilities for physical voting on various issues 
raised within the platform, face-to-face consultations and forums —the results of which are 
then integrated (in different ways) into both DPPPs. Decide Madrid offers physical ways for 
users to act to vote and propose on specific parts of various participatory processes which 
take place via the platform. Citizens have the ability to vote physically on pre-selected urban 
regeneration projects or on citizen proposals which obtain a minimum support threshold (1% 
of the population registered in Madrid City council, 27662) via polling stations or via the post. 
In addition, citizens have the ability to propose participatory budgeting projects via local 
forums or with the help of civil servants in local district offices. vTaiwan provides a more 
limited face-to-face consultation process which is limited to selected key stakeholders, which 
allows them to further discuss those pre-selected issues which have gone through the digital 
participation processes on the vTaiwan platform. Due to the scope and this thesis being 
largely confined to examining the impacts of digital technologies on processes of civic public 
participation, I will not focus on the physical means of public participation in this thesis. I 
will, however, mention them whenever they can serve to further explain the unique character 
of digital forms of political participation.  
  
To sum up, in this section I have outlined the similar trajectories that are shared by Decide 
Madrid and vTaiwan; despite some significant political and cultural differences in processes 
of democratisation and the organisation of social movements in Spain and Taiwan, the 
similarities between them mean that this is a reasonable focus for a comparative study in 
terms of the relational approach to urban comparison. The differences do not render my 
comparison of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan ‘incommensurable’ (Robinson, 2015); it is 
precisely the shared similar trajectory from digitally-mediated Occupy Movements to 
institutionalisation (within a broader context of democratisation) which the two DPPPs 
exemplify that makes them relatable and comparable, despite each of them being located 
within different levels of governmental institutions. It is worth noting that there is another 
DPPP —Join —which was created by the Taiwanese government; however, Join did not 
follow the same trajectory as vTaiwan. Join was not part of the legacy of the Sunflower 
Movement; its development and design were not based on open-source software and did not 
involve civic hackers and programmers from g0v and Sunflower Movement. Therefore, it 
makes more sense for me to compare Decide Madrid with vTaiwan rather than Join. 
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On another note, what makes my comparison important is its ability to point to significant 
cultural, social and political differences in processes of democratisation and social movement 
organisation between Madrid and Taipei. These differences have influenced the ways in 
which digital technologies for political participation were integrated and institutionalised as 
Decide Madrid and vTaiwan. Following what anarchist-hackers viewed as a decentralised 
form of direct democracy, Decide Madrid promises to give political legitimacy — meaning 
more empowering capacities, institutional reorganisation and participatory powers 
devolution — to citizens; in this, it goes further than vTaiwan (Fung and Wright, 2001; 
Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014) (see more detail in Chapter 4).  
 
In contrast to Decide Madrid, the design and development of vTaiwan has constrained its 
ability to empower citizens, because of a lack of political will to devolve wide participatory 
powers to users. The absence of a democratic tradition and culture in Taiwanese society and 
the continuing reliance on leadership-based politics continues to influence the empowering 
capacities of vTaiwan. In contrast to Decide Madrid, which allows for both non-defined and 
pre-selected issues to be commented and voted upon, vTaiwan is limited to issues which have 
been pre-selected by civic hackers, civil servants and policymakers. Such variation regarding 
user ability/capacity has important effects on expanding/limiting the empowering capacity of 
a user to perform specific political acts (Fung and Wright, 2001; Pateman, 2012). 
 
1.2 The significance of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan  
Both DPPPs under study are definitely within the purview of studies of platform urbanism, 
the aim of which is to examine the political impacts of profit-driven participatory platforms in 
urban politics and everyday practice (Rodgers and Moore, 2018; Leszczynski, 2019; Fields, 
Bissell and Macrorie, 2020). DPPPs can be understood as a subset of digital participatory 
platforms, such as Trip Advisor, Airbnb, Amazon and Facebook because they all can be seen 
to epitomise a model of value-generation which creates and extracts (economic) value from 
data that are inputted by users either unconsciously or consciously (VanDijck, 2013; 
Orlikowski and Scott, 2015; Morozov, 2016; Langley and Leyshon, 2017). Decide Madrid 
and vTaiwan do this by relying on participants to assist them in generating value through 
providing data such as comments, proposals and votes on various issues.  
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Despite this similarity, there are notable differences between DPPPs and other digital 
participatory platforms. These differences make it important for researchers to study DPPPs 
as DPPPs rather than simply as digital platforms. Firstly, the most striking difference 
between DPPPs and digital platforms is the fact that the two DPPPs are purposefully 
designed for improving political participation. This purpose can be seen in their promises and 
claims of providing a more democratic model (consensus or direct) of public participation in 
urban policies through affording new forms of empowerment to citizens. As a result of this 
different purpose, they have been praised as pioneers in digital democracy by various groups, 
such as Nesta, a British research foundation (Simon et al., 2017). 
 
Secondly, the ‘business model’ for both of the two DPPPs is non-profit and based on the 
desire to export the DPPP to other political communities at municipal/national levels. This 
focus has been accompanied by claims surrounding the potential of these new technologies to 
tackle the widespread perception that modern democracies increasingly exhibit what has been 
termed a ‘democratic deficit’ (Simon et al., 2017; Miller, 2019; Tang, 2019). Since 2015, 
Decide Madrid has been installed and used mainly by various governmental and third-sector 
institutions and has quickly gained in popularity around the world (Madrid City Council, 
2018). Considering their growing popularity and influence around the world, there is an 
urgent need to scrutinize their implications for citizen empowerment and the urban 
policymaking process. 
 
Thirdly, DPPPs differ from larger platforms in that they manifest a high degree of 
transparency around their coding and algorithms, which are open to the public. This reflects 
the fact that these platforms are designed by software engineers who share a culture of ‘civic 
hacking’ and thus are keen to unleash the democratic potential of digital technologies. The 
civic hackers self-identify as adhering to the open ethos of the Open-Source Software (OSS) 
movement, which requires them to publish their coding and algorithms on the GitHub 
website. GitHub users can modify code in various ways to optimise it and potentially add 
new functions (although this would require the consent of the key software engineers). This 
openness towards code makes the DPPPs under study here different from other dominant 
participatory platforms such as Facebook and Google, which keep their algorithms as 
commercial secrets. Importantly, because of this openness in algorithms, those algorithmic 
calculations which have often understood as ‘black-boxed’ in other contexts within urban 
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studies (Graham, 2005; Kitchin, 2017; Fields, Bissell and Macrorie, 2020) are rendered 
visible and publicly available due to their availability on the website of GitHub (Madrid City 
Council, no date; Pol.is, no date). By opening up their algorithms on the GitHub website, the 
two DPPPs present a rare opportunity for researchers to unpack processes which remain 
‘black-boxed’ elsewhere. 
 
Fourthly, DPPPs foreground the key role of custom algorithms which have specifically been 
designed to interact with user-generated data to produce political decisions, i.e. decisions 
which allocate some public resource or bring a subject to the concern of policymakers in 
some way, such as being the subject of new legislation or a modification or addition to 
existing policy. As has already been noted above, in the case of vTaiwan, complex Machine 
Learning techniques are employed which claim to be able to identify different Opinion 
Groups and issues of consensus within and between these groups (as opposed to forums such 
as Facebook and Twitter which are said to cause division). This is an important difference 
with other forms of platforms. However, it is important to note that DPPPs remain inherently 
tied to existing forms of civic governance. Whilst DPPPs have the ability to produce 
‘decisions’ about civic issues, these decisions remain the ‘raw output’ of the DPPP to a 
greater or lesser extent: ultimately, the degree to which these decisions are 
binding/nonbinding is dependent on the level of ‘post-filtering’ they undergo by traditional 
political actors located within the wider political ecosystems in which the DPPPs inhabit. 26  
 
Lastly, as I have illustrated in the previous section, the rise and development of both DPPPs 
are deeply connected to social movements in Taipei and Madrid City; this has given them a 
different trajectory to other participatory platforms.  
 
1.3 Defining Research Questions 
As I have illustrated in the previous section, as a frustrated urban planner in Taipei City Hall, 
I became interested in how new forms of digital participation might be developed that were 
better-suited to the modern age than traditional approaches. I have introduced how both 
Decide Madrid and vTaiwan were related to the context of Occupy Movements in Madrid 
and Taipei and more broadly to different cultures in democratic movements and 
democratization between Spain and Taiwan in 1970s and 1990s. It became clear to me that 
conducting an in-depth analysis of the implications of this phenomenon on wider issues of 
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policymaking and democratic practice would be a key research issue which I would like to 
pursue within my thesis. 
 
With the aforementioned contextual information in mind, I would now like to specify in 
detail what research questions will pursue within this thesis. At the top level, I am seeking to 
answer four questions. These questions arise from my dual positionality, that of an urban 
planner, and that of a geographer: 
 
1) What are the effects of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan on urban policymaking (in terms 
of making political decisions) and citizen empowerment? 
2) How do Decide Madrid and vTaiwan differ in terms of potential for citizen 
empowerment and approaches to making political decisions? 
3) How can the study of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan inform wider research on digital 
empowerment and on political impacts of algorithmically-powered devices in urban 
governance?  
4) How can we develop an analytical lens which allows for an understanding of DPPPs 
at the various levels they operate and facilitates us in making meaningful judgments 
on impacts on political decision-making and issues of citizen empowerment? 
 
The focus of this thesis, then, is to provide a comparative critical study on the effects and 
implications of DPPPs on citizen empowerment and politics and identify how such a study of 
DPPPs can inform wider research into digital urbanism and digital empowerment.  
 
  
1.4 The structure of this thesis  
In this introductory chapter, I have introduced the topic of my thesis whilst situating it in the 
perspective of personal, local and wider academic contexts, whilst also outlining my research 
questions, which are a reflection of my twin positionalities as urban planner and geographer. 
At the outset, I have delineated my contributions to the studies of digital participation, 
digital/platform urbanism and digital geography. I, then, portrayed the subject/object of this 
thesis —two DPPPs, Decide Madrid and vTaiwan —by delineating the contours of each in 
relation to the Occupy Movement and the governmental reforms it produced in Madrid and 
Taipei. I also explained the general functions of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan. I then 
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introduced my research questions. Now I will address how I am going to develop my 
argument on a chapter-by-chapter basis, paying attention to how each chapter will enable me 
to answer my main research questions.  
 
In Chapter 2, I describe how I developed an approach to collecting data in regard to Decide 
Madrid and vTaiwan by conducting a hybrid method of participatory observation, interviews 
and ‘digital flashback’. I aim to show how I conducted participatory research practices of 
observation and interview in order to collect relevant contextual information on both DPPPs 
in terms of their development and deployment within different policymaking processes in 
Madrid City Council and the Taiwanese government. I will explain how I employed specific 
method of ‘digital flashback’, to better capture the contingent and on-going algorithmic 
calculations and their inter-relationships with users’ actions and dynamic UI visualisations. 
Also, I reflect upon my own dual positionality of researcher/intern within two governments 
and discuss the main ethical conflicts that arise from such dual positionality.  
 
In Chapter 3, I will describe in detail how my chosen topic of investigating the political 
effects of two DPPPs, Decide Madrid and vTaiwan, is relevant to driving forward debate in 
the fields of critical studies of ‘algorithmic governance’, ‘smart urbanism’, and the ‘digital 
citizen’. Within each study, I critically point out the key issues and challenges in 
understanding algorithm-driven technologies. Key issues include: (1) correcting the present 
focus of studies in algorithmic governance and smart urbanism, in particular the views of 
users as passive in the face of algorithms operating in automated systems; and (2) 
contributing to the methodological challenge of studying the invisible, inaccessible, 
contingent and heterogeneous nature of algorithms (Kitchin, 2017; Graham 2005). In 
response to these issues in studying algorithm-driven technologies, I will show how a fusion 
of relational comparative urbanism, assemblage thinking and theories of empowerment 
(relying particularly on theories of participatory democracy and the digital citizen can be used 
to develop a theoretical framework — which I term the situated lens — which has the ability 
to compare and contrast the two DPPPs by viewing each of them as a set of three 
assemblages: the assemblage of design, the assemblage of the dynamic UI and the 
assemblage of algorithmic decision-making.  
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In Chapter 4, I will begin the process of applying the situated lens to my empirical data. 
Guided by this notion, I compare and contrast the effects and ramifications of the design 
assemblages of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan, using as a main point of comparison the relative 
degrees of empowerment each DPPP grants to the user in terms of two key metrics, the level 
of political legitimacy and the capacity for empowerment. I will show that the degree of 
empowerment of the two DPPPs is both stabilised and destabilised through the (re)creation of 
majoritarian forms of future democracy and participatory calculus.   
 
In Chapter 5, I examine the effects of the UI assemblage —which in both cases utilise 
dynamic systems which are co-constituted by users and algorithms —on digital 
empowerment. Through the situated lens, I am able to evaluate and compare the effects of the 
dynamic UI assemblage against a definition of empowerment which focuses on whether the 
DPPP provides an enabling environment where users feel engaged and capable of making 
informed and collective actions of political participation. Here, I will indicate how the 
dynamic UI creates a ‘vacillating’ state of digital empowerment. On the one hand, users are 
enabled to learn to conduct collective and informed actions in voting and proposing via the 
dynamic UI. On the other hand, users are disengaged and deprived of their capacity to vote, 
comment or propose due to an over-convoluted UI design (Decide Madrid) or a glitchy and 
ever-changing situation in vTaiwan’s UI. Lastly, I also illustrate how the dynamic UI results 
in the rise of ‘princelings’, a group of users who gain more participatory power over the 
policymaking processes than other users. 
 
In Chapter 6, I compare and contrast the ways in which political decisions on which urban 
issues can receive political resources (and thus receive legitimation in the public realm) 
through each DPPP are (re)configured by algorithmic interactions with users within the 
systems and by human (re)interpretation via ‘post-filtering’ within wider policymaking 
processes in which Decide Madrid and vTaiwan. In other words, I compare and contrast the 
assemblages of algorithmic decision-making which exist within the two DPPPs. I reveal how 
such assemblages exclude other urban issues from being considered as part of urban 
policymaking and show how despite this these tend to reappear within urban environments in 
later stages in unpredictable ways. I do so to raise the question whether such algorithmic 
decision-making produce fairer and more empowered political decisions.  
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In Chapter 7, I conclude this thesis with a summary of how the two DPPPs’ impact on citizen 
empowerment within the political contexts in which they operate. I revisit key arguments 
made earlier which sees the capacity for digital empowerment of DPPPs not as predefined but 
as emerging from mutable human-algorithm relationships situated in broader political 
contexts, a situation which I term the situated lens. I then highlight the potentialities emerging 
from the changeable and ongoing human-algorithm relationship within these two 
assemblages in ways which suggest the need to rethink ethics and policymaking in digital age. 
Finally, learning from my PhD thesis, I identify areas of future studies in the field of digital 
urbanism and digital democracy.   
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Chapter 2 Engaging with the ephemeral world of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan 
   
2.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I describe how I designed and conducted a set of participatory research 
practices which flowed logically from these initial assumptions and enabled me to collect 
adequate empirical data on Decide Madrid and vTaiwan. This process followed a broadly 
three-step approach: (1) building a new positionality as a ‘learner’; (2) conducting 
observation of everyday institutional practices; and (3) unfolding algorithmic calculations and 
configurations of the dynamic UI through creating and visualising flashbacks of digital 
political participation. I will focus on explaining how I employed this set of participatory 
research practices with the aims of firstly obtaining access and secondly collecting two levels 
of data on both Decide Madrid and vTaiwan: (1) institutional data, i.e. on where 
policymaking, face-to-face consultation and usability testing take place (2) technical data on 
the operation of the internal algorithms of DPPPs and their interaction with user-generated 
data/users and on the configuration of their UIs. Institutional data provides contextual data 
regarding policymaking and user-interface relationships. Technical data offers information 
about how algorithms configure and visualise UIs through which users engage and interact 
and also opens up ‘black-boxed’ processes of internal algorithmic calculation.  
 
It is important to note that these participatory research practices do not solely rely on a pure 
‘non-digital-centric’ perspective, which can be said to employ a variety of participatory 
observation and visual methods to understand the digital’s impacts in everyday life without 
using digital methods (Pink et al., 2016). Instead, I employed a hybrid method which entails 
participatory observation, interview and a set of purposely-developed digital methods in order 
to examine algorithmic processes of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan in detail. Digital methods 
are defined by Leszczynski (2018, p. 473) as ‘techniques for identifying, capturing, managing, 
analysing, and theorizing materialities, social praxes, and implications of socio-technical 
shifts associated with the proliferation of digital computing technologies’. Importantly, 
Leszczynski (2018, p. 473) highlight that digital methods/techniques should be ‘developed 
and deployed within the broader context of approaches for knowing and making sense of the 
world’ (see also a similar viewpoint in Pink et al., 2016). That said, understanding the 
purposes of using digital methods matters more than the digital methods themselves.  
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For my research, I developed and deployed a method of ‘digital flashback’. This can be seen 
as a form of analysis which uses simulation and visualisation of digital archives of users’ 
online activities within the DPPPs. I use this method to better capture what has happened in 
digital political participation at a given time, with particular focus on trying to (1) get inside 
‘black-boxed’ processes of algorithmic interaction with user data and (2) investigate how 
algorithms configure the User Interface (UI) of the two DPPPs. The digital flashback method 
can offer a partial yet important view on the invisible, unfolding and transformative nature of 
the algorithms (Kitchin, 2017) which are embedded within DPPPs. In short, one contribution 
this thesis makes is to develop and deploy digital flashback method which can offer empirical 
information about the algorithmic processes in digital political participation. 
 
What follows serves to explain firstly how I built a learning position to assist my selection of 
comparative cases. In doing so it also describes how I used my on-the-ground identity and 
ethical ‘statement’ to gain access to the closed worlds in which the two governmental 
institutions in which the DPPPs under study are located. Secondly, I move on detailing how I 
conducted participatory observation with the Spanish and Taiwanese governments and 
discuss some of the emerging challenges and ethical concerns relevant to conducting a 
comparative study on DPPPs. Thirdly, I describe how I utilised a set of purpose-built digital 
methods to understand specific algorithmic calculations within DPPPS, both with respect to 
their users and towards their interfaces; this enabled me to flag ethical concerns regarding 
algorithms and user-generated data.  
 
2.2 Building a positionality of a ‘learner’ 
Why bother thinking about how your on-the-ground positionality will appear to those you are 
researching before conducting fieldwork? The main reason for building a new positionality of 
a ‘learner’ for myselt is to enable me to collect in-depth information from the political 
institutions and communities surrounding the DPPPs under study. If we understand that 
conducting any type of participatory observation is inherently political - involving different 
levels of impacts on local communities - it is crucial for us to decide which role we should 
play (Cook, 2005, p. 177). Taking the positionality of a learner assists me in forging an initial 
ethical partnership with gatekeepers within the two governmental institutions under study 
(Madrid City Hall and the Taiwanese government). It allows me to start to gain their trust and 
build interest in my PhD project. Obtaining such access to a community under study is 
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considered as one of the essential practices for practitioners of research in various contexts, 
such as participatory observation (Cook, 2005; Kesby, Kindon and Pain, 2005), focus groups 
(Conradson, 2005) and interviews (Valetine, 2005). The process of obtaining access is further 
complicated when the community under study is an elite institution, such as a governmental 
institution, access to which has long been considered as one of the biggest challenges facing 
ethnographers (Harrington, 2016, p. 135). Therefore, it is crucial for me to be strategic about 
planning in which ways am I going to get access and to forge an ethical partnership with the 
Spanish and Taiwanese governments before I conduct participatory observation.  
 
2.2.1 Getting access to the Spanish and Taiwanese governments 
 
After selecting my two case studies, I adopted a positionality of a learner in order to gain 
access to the Spanish and Taiwanese governments; in practice, this learning positionality 
meant adopting the role of a researcher/intern. It was adopted to strongly foreground and 
conveys my ethical stance to Spanish and Taiwanese officials: to indicate my desire of 
learning from them rather than patronising/judging them and thus holding less power than 
gatekeepers and practitioners. Ultimately, this learning position assisted me in getting access 
to these two governmental institutions.   
 
I harnessed my understanding of the genetic bond that I had discovered between Decide 
Madrid and vTaiwan to show my ethical stance was essentially that of a learning 
researcher/intern, who not only already knows Decide Madrid and vTaiwan but wants to 
learn more from the two governments. During an interview with two gatekeepers in Madrid 
City Council, I introduced my comparative study with an emphasis on my interest in and 
commitment to learning from Madrid City Council. They were both pleased and highly 
surprised, not only by my choice of a rare comparison of Spanish and Taiwanese cases but 
also by my knowledge of Decide Madrid. By demonstrating the fact that I had knowledge of 
both Decide Madrid and its ‘counterpart’ (vTaiwan), I showed what I had already learned 
about Decide Madrid and what I wanted to learn more of. I remember one of the senior 
officers in Madrid City Council told me at the end of the interview in a tone of some delight 
that ‘well, you found us’.   
 
After establishing initial contact, I was able to use my learning positionality to obtain direct 
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working access to two governments. This is significant, as obtaining such access has been 
considered as one of the biggest challenges facing ethnographers studying elite institutions 
(Harrington, 2016, p. 135). In the case of Madrid, after noticing the interviewees ‘liking’ of 
my idea of conducting a comparative study during our conversation, I was able to identify an 
opportune moment to request an internship within the team of Decide Madrid. I received an 
oral agreement on the spot, which was followed up with a formal official document accepting 
me as an intern in Madrid City Council. In doing so, I de-emphasised my role as an external 
researcher and created a new identity for myself: an intern in Madrid City Council. Whilst 
this suggested I held less power than the practitioners, the new position created an 
expectation I would be able to gain more access to valuable informants. By contrast, in the 
case of vTaiwan, the process of approaching the relevant gatekeeper in the Cabinet Office of 
the Taiwanese government was more straightforward and largely involved sending an email. I 
correctly assumed that I would encounter fewer barriers to access because as a native 
Taiwanese I had no problem in speaking Mandarin and reading Traditional Chinese. I 
received an official confirmation from the relevant gatekeeper, which accepted me via email 
as an intern in the Cabinet Office without the need for any further ‘physical contact’ as a 
preliminary.  
 
To recap, it is evident to see that building a learning positionality has at least two implications 
for my PhD study.Firstly, this ‘learning position’ aids my ethical stance in negotiating and 
forging an initial partnership with the Spanish and Taiwanese governments. In recognising 
that conducting participatory observation, especially with elite governments, is highly 
political and infused with complicated power relations (Cook, 2005, p. 177), such a learning 
positionality clearly conveys a message to practitioners not only that I, as intern/researcher, 
were going to learn from them rather than patronising them.  
 
Secondly, this learning positionality assisted me to get past elite gatekeepers because it 
equipped me with what Harrington calls (2016, p. 139) ‘cultural and social capital’ (seen as 
the pre-existing knowledge and background of a researcher) which is particularly crucial for 
researchers seeking to gain access to elite institutions2.  
2.3 Observing everyday practices within the Spanish and Taiwanese governments as a 
 
2 One can see in detail how a lack of pre-existing connection with the researched communities can cause real 
problems for researchers to get access to them in Cook 2005, p.172. 
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semi-insider  
 
As a result of my efforts, I acquired an internship with Madrid City Council’s department of 
citizen participation (Participación Ciudadana del Ayuntamiento de Madrid) and the 
Taiwanese Government’s Public Digital Innovation Service (PDIS), located in the Executive 
Yuan in Taipei (the Taiwanese Cabinet Office). I would be embedded in both of these 
institutions whilst conducting my fieldwork, which meant I would work there full-time as an 
intern. I stayed with Madrid City Council from 25th September to 22nd December 2017 (12 
weeks, excluding two weeks leave in December) and with the Taiwanese Government from 
3rd January to 30th March 2018 (12 weeks).  
 
The main commonality I relied on whilst conducting my studies within the Spanish and 
Taiwanese governments was my dual identity, which fused the roles of researcher and intern. 
This dual identity allowed me to assume the role of a ‘semi-insider’: on the one hand I had 
given a commitment to work for both governments, and on the other hand as a researcher, I 
was at the same time collecting information via practices of participatory observation and 
interviewing. Interviewing and participatory observation have been considered as two of the 
six methods which Kitchin (2017, p. 24) recommends for providing ‘a means of uncovering 
the story behind the production of an algorithm and to interrogate its purpose and 
assumptions’. He also notes the two techniques offer:  
a wider understanding of algorithms… [allowing] their full socio-technical 
assemblage to be examined, including an analysis of the reasons for 
subjecting the system to the logic of computation in the first place (Kitchin, 
2017, p. 24). 
  
In Spain, every day I went to my ‘office’ in Madrid City Council at 9:00 a.m. sharp, where I 
started my day by saying ‘Hola, Buenos Dias’ to the security guard and my Spanish 
colleagues. In Taiwan, every morning I passed through the wired security barrier to the 
Cabinet Office where I had been granted temporary access, after which I greeted my 
Taiwanese colleagues and was informed of daily meetings and events. Performing these 
practices became a routine part of my everyday life as an intern; in Madrid, as a semi-insider 
in both governments, I had an ID card and an individual desk inside the Madrid City Council 
(see Figure 2), and in Taipei, I was given access to the heavily-restricted Cabinet Office (see 
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Figure 3).  
 
It was my dual identity of researcher/intern, which sprang from adopting the positionality of a 
learner, which allowed me to conduct participatory observation with access to both Madrid 
City and the Taiwanese Government. I played the role of an ‘overt participant’ (Cook, 2005, p. 
177) who did not hide the fact to my colleagues that I had another identity as a researcher. 
Most of the time I was taking notes in various meetings and events, and sometimes I helped 
both institutions to deal with some tasks, such as observing off-line public participation (in 
the Taiwanese Government) and helping Decide Madrid to market themselves in Taiwan and 
Japan by phoning the relevant local authorities. During the internships, I also conducted 
on-site interviews, speaking to about 50 practitioners (software engineers, politicians, civil 
servants, activists, civic hackers and data scientists). With the follow-up interviews with 
former or off-site software engineers, policymakers and activists, this came to a total of 60 
interviews (see the full lists of interviewees in Appendix 2). 
 
Figure 2: my own desk in Madrid City Council (Source: owned by myself) 
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Figure 3: the Taiwanese Cabinet Office surrounded by a crowd control barrier (source: owned by myself) 
 
Being ‘a semi-insider’ allowed me to make a closer observation of everyday institutional 
practices, such as meetings with authors of participatory budgeting proposals, with civil 
servants and volunteers in preparation for physical voting polls (see a full list of meetings and 
events that I took part in Appendix 1). These everyday institutional practices are important 
because they can be seen as what Pink et al. (2016, p. 15) call ‘comings-together’ of different 
material/digital devices, public, politicians, civil servants in the context of the overall 
policymaking process. To follow key actors wherever they went, from face-to-face 
consultations to international conferences, is to capture the two DPPPs in-the-making as 
being constitutive of policymakers, volunteers, software engineers, political documents, 
polling stations, voting papers, software, servers, users and so on.  
 
2.3.1 The perks of being a semi-insider  
I quickly realised that conducting participatory observation as an intern/researcher made me 
one who was ‘always there’ at almost every meeting and public event; this meant a lot to 
practitioners. In Madrid, some practitioners liked to joke that they saw me ‘everywhere’ at 
various events, from small private internal meetings to semi-private usability tests. In Taiwan, 
other actors nick-named me as a hacker or a ‘shadow-er’ who wanted to ‘hack the Taiwanese 
Government’ (see a full list of meetings and events that I took part in Appendix 1). The initial 
feeling of being immersed with my Spanish colleagues within Madrid City Council is seen in 
my diary entry of 3rd October 2017 in Madrid:  
Mike is technically the boss of the whole team, so his 
presentation/introduction of me means a lot to other civil servants. I guess 
through shaking hands and kisses during the introduction, which means at 
least (no matter you like it or not) I am part of the team. 
 
From this point on, I saw a close working relationship with Spanish colleagues was 
developing, which differentiated myself from the pile of journalists who wanted quick and 
one-time interviews. Thus, I had a better chance of gaining trust from practitioners. What 
follows is a note of at least four points which indicate how I benefitted from my double 
positionality: (1) it aided in collecting contextual information and ‘discovery’ of additional 
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critical information; (2) it allowed me to gain trust from colleagues; (3) it helped to mitigate 
cultural and language barriers in Madrid City Council, and (4) it allowed me to trace offsite 
or former actors further. All these internal relations and knowledge assisted me in ‘digging 
into’ critical dimensions of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan during the follow-up interviews. I 
will now explain each of these four points in further detail.  
 
Firstly, conducting participatory observation as an intern/researcher allowed me to collect 
valuable contextual information regarding digitally-mediated policymaking. Sticking to key 
practitioners gave me a sense of the ways in which the platforms I was studying operated as 
institutions within the policymaking processes of the Spanish and Taiwanese governments. 
By taking notes of routine and everyday practices in my diary, I observed and took part in the 
convoluted procedures of digital political participation which are entangled with legislative, 
political, material and digital infrastructures (see a full list of meetings and events which I 
attended in Appendix 1). Also, the collection of such contextual information helped me to 
construct interview questions that were tailored to each interviewee’s capabilities and 
position within the team. I conducted 60 semi-structured interviews with identified 
practitioners by the end of both internships, and in addition, conducted less-structured 
interviews with key practitioners. I also repeatedly re-interviewed key actors on both sites 
during and after the internship. 
 
Secondly, being an intern/researcher allowed me to gain trust from my temporary colleagues 
in the Taiwanese and Spanish government. Adherence to events made me visible and present 
to colleagues and allowed me to develop ‘intimate’ working relationships. Achieving this 
level of immersion —as was argued by Prasad (1997, p. 113) —can encourage practitioners 
to confide in the researcher or reveal aspects of their viewpoints on researched objects, which 
are not typically shared with others. Being known by practitioners, I could initiate informal 
conversations when they were not busy. As Cook (2005, p. 177) mentions, the juiciest 
information is often acquired when practitioners are not heavily guarded; I took advantage of 
using informal conversations not only to learn important information but also to acquire 
additional documentation. This included official or non-official reports on usability testing, 
internal reports on reports digital campaigning and the digital divide in the case of Decide 
Madrid and draft documents for conducting face-to-face public participation for vTaiwan.  
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Thirdly, I got help from ‘colleagues’ to mitigate the language barrier. Native Spanish speakers 
who also spoke fluent English within the team of Decide Madrid acted as my 
interpreters/translators during my ‘lodging’ at Madrid City Council. They were extremely 
helpful in translating proceedings of meetings and sat in with me on interviews with civil 
servants who did not speak English. As they were colleagues of those who did not speak 
English, their presence as interpreters was less intrusive in comparison to the alternative, 
which was to hire an outside interpreter. They also understood technical jargon in relation to 
Madrid City Council bureaucratic processes and Decide Madrid better than outside 
interpreters. This was very critical to me, as despite taking lessons my Spanish was not at an 
adequate level of proficiency. The information I received through colleagues in this way was 
enough to understand ‘what is going on’ with regard to civil servants’ everyday work on 
Decide Madrid, such as on issues related to the digital divide, data protection, security, public 
relations and marketing. I then was able to cross-reference this information with internal or 
official documents such as news and reports, which were largely understandable to me with 
the assistance of Google Translate.  
 
Fourthly, I was able to trace and recruit ‘missing’ practitioners. Harrington (2016, pp. 136–
137) notes that a key contribution of conducting an immersive participatory observation is to 
provide deep insight into what has previously been taken for granted. By subjecting 
practitioners to enquiry and adhering to everyday political events, I gained knowledge which 
allowed me to identify and trace both former practitioners who were once highly-involved 
and present practitioners who worked ‘off-site’ (holding crucial information but not present in 
the context of my physical fieldwork). In addition, I used my new identity as an intern to 
ingratiate myself and negotiate with ‘off-site’ practitioners when recruiting them for interview. 
Before and during the interviews, I demonstrated my working relationships with both 
Taiwanese and Spanish government officials to practitioners were otherwise unable to verify 
my bona fides; in doing so, I increased my chances of convincing ‘on-site’ and ‘off-site’ 
practitioners to be interviewed. For example, I got connected to off-site actors who possessed 
very detailed, in-depth and crucial information on Decide Madrid and vTaiwan-Pol.is. They 
agreed to be interviewed by me because they understood that I had been working with critical 
practitioners in Madrid and Taipei City and because I demonstrated my knowledge about the 
two participatory platforms by asking deliberately provocative questions. Also, I got a 
fantastic opportunity to collaborate with a data scientist from the Pol.is team in the United 
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States to recreate a vTaiwan participatory process related to a consultation on Uber, on the 
basis of an email exchange and Skype chat. 
 
2.3.2 Ethical conflicts in the field   
I will now describe how I understand ethics in research in a relative context, which is to see 
ethics as not only perceived differently across different practitioners but also as being infused 
with power relationships, such as those existing between researchers and the researched. 
Cook (2005) and Harrington (2016) indicate that studying elite institutions throws up a power 
imbalance between the researcher and her object of study, which manifests at various 
points —such as at the point where initial access needs to be obtained —and indicates where 
the researcher needs to obtain more information. When compared to other researchers, such 
as those who conduct ethnography in vulnerable communities, my relationship with 
governmental institutions was different in the sense that they had the power of deciding what 
I should learn, which meetings I could attend and generally what I could acquire in the field. 
In contrast to the senior officers and practitioners who held different sorts of information on 
Decide Madrid and vTaiwan, I was only a semi-insider with limited and potentially unreliable 
knowledge. I observed that such a power relationship was entwined with the different degrees 
of ‘conservation’ adopted by practitioners, dependent on their positions within the hierarchies 
of the Taiwanese and Spanish governments. Shared between both governments is the fact that 
in general high-ranking officers were more defensive when critically questioned. Here, given 
the particular power relationship between myself and both governing institutions I was 
studying within, a crucial ethical conflict emerged related to how I could retain my own 
criticality without breaking ethical principles (Centre for Social Justice and Community 
Action, 2012), obtain consent, inform participants and keep information I collected 
anonymous and confidential.  
 
Under any given circumstance, I made sure I got consent from interviewees (verbally or 
signed) before I conducted an interview. I provided a written consent form to interviewees, 
which briefly explained my PhD project in both English and the local language (traditional 
Chinese or Spanish) and how I was going to use the information, as well as providing a 
guarantee of anonymity within my PhD study. I also briefly explained what was written in the 
consent form again to the interviewee before I conducted each interview. In some particular 
situations, when I was not able to give interviewees the consent form, I verbally explained 
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what was written in the consent form and asked for verbal consent from interviewees; in 
doing so, I made sure that all interviewees acknowledged that the data and information they 
provided would be treated anonymously, transcribed and only used for my PhD research. In 
addition, I let them know that all interview data would be destroyed one year after I finished 
my PhD study and that they could withdraw from participating in my PhD research at any 
time. 
 
During my PhD research, there were several moments where senior officers or policymakers 
attempted to interfere with the direction of my research in both the Spanish and Taiwanese 
cases. There were moments when some actors within both vTaiwan and Decide Madrid 
assumed me to be a researcher who was bent on producing negative criticism of their projects. 
Some practitioners were defensive or tried to dodge critical questions during the interview by 
either implicitly or explicitly expressing to me that they did not like to be critiqued or 
critically commented upon: in effect, they acted to ‘protect’ the official discourse on the 
DPPP which had been agreed within each governmental organisation, rather than answering 
questions honestly during the interviews. This situation was further complicated across 
different institutional cultures of Madrid City Council and the Taiwanese Government. It was 
clear that Spanish practitioners were more explicit about ‘how far’ I could ask and ‘how 
much’ data that I could obtain and use for my PhD project. By contrast, practitioners (in 
particular civil servants) in the Taiwanese Government were generally more reserved towards 
answering critical questions, such as a question on to what degree vTaiwan could empower 
citizens.  
 
I attempted to work through the aforementioned ethical conflicts by finding exceptional 
practitioners who were more amenable to critical questioning. A relatively large number of 
actors were once civic hackers or activists, with international work experience and/or an 
ethos of ‘openness’ or ‘revolution’. Those who held advanced university degrees could easily 
relate their previous research experiences to my positionality as a researcher and understand 
the point of the critical questions that I asked them during interviews. Even though they could 
be still defensive against such questions, they did not mind being pushed forward; this 
applied in both the Spanish and Taiwanese cases. Recognising their nature, I would repeat 
questions to them in different ways during the ‘gap’ in the interview until they provided a 
clear answer. Those who were young and revolution-minded did not mind critical questions at 
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all and were out-spoken. Whilst this was evidently seen in both Taipei and Madrid, in general 
people in Madrid City were more outspoken.  
 
In addition, I continued to chase up former practitioners and researchers after I completed the 
internships, where I gained some key documents and interviews which were not possible for 
those who had a dual identity as an intern/researcher. After both internships were concluded, I 
conducted follow-up interviews with key actors during a revisit of Madrid City in 2018 and 
via Skype calls with Taiwanese actors. During the revisit and the post-internship interviews, 
when I stated my ‘former’ dual identity as intern/researcher, I can see the changes in 
interviewees’ attitude. They shared with me a lot of information, and thus allowed me to 
explore deeper into users’ performance in Decide Madrid, and to reconfirm the hidden power 
hierarchies and conflicts inside the team of vTaiwan I had observed earlier. As a result, I 
uncovered ‘different viewpoints’ from off-side or former practitioners, whose articulation of 
issues related to the DPPPs was not inhibited by restrictions stemming from political ‘lines’ 
which were issued from inside the Taiwanese and Spanish government. 
 
There were situations when some Spanish participants offered critical information to me and 
told me that I could not use it in my PhD research. This information was related to a range of 
issues, such as party politics, strategic and resource prioritisation issues within Decide 
Madrid, hidden facts about the digital political participation process and information about 
the coding process of the rival platform (vTaiwan-Pol.is). In these cases, despite promising 
them not to use this data in my PhD, I would follow up the lines of inquiry with other 
practitioners, without revealing the identity of contributors (if at all possible). I also discarded 
and filtered out some information which did not relate to core research questions. With regard 
to information which did not bear on crucial research questions, I took this not as evidence 
but as insights for potential future research. In short, I used information only if they fit my 
aforementioned ethical protocol.  
 
2.3.3 Challenges in comparing two different variations of digital urbanism    
In the previous section, I mentioned how ethical conflicts can emerge differently in each case 
due to the different institutional cultures within the Spanish and Taiwanese governments. In 
this section, I want to draw out some challenges stemming from cultural, political and social 
differences which are relevant to carrying out a comparative study between Taipei and 
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Madrid. The biggest challenges that I encountered were almost the ‘endless’ work which I 
had to complete within very tight deadlines, and the feeling of ‘disorientation’ I experienced 
working between four different languages: English, Spanish, Traditional Chinese and 
programming languages (Ruby, JavaScript and Clojure).  
 
Given the fact that my thesis was only funded for three years by the Taiwanese Government, I 
had a very tight schedule for doing participatory observation in Taipei and Madrid City. Each 
internship was assigned 12 weeks (with an additional pilot study for Madrid City completed 
in the summer of 2018). I spent every day as if it was my last day in the Spanish and 
Taiwanese Governments. On an everyday basis, I demanded myself to at least complete one 
of these tasks: attending meetings, acquiring ‘the right information’, obtaining ‘the right 
connection to’ potential interviewees and going through the websites of Github, Decide 
Madrid and vTaiwan. This work was a hard and highly stressful task; however, as I obtained 
more contacts as a semi-insider within the Spanish and Taiwanese governments, I gained 
essential and necessary help from my ‘colleagues’, who translated Spanish for me, offered me 
unpublished reports and so on (see the details in Section 2.3). With their invaluable help, I 
was able to collect adequate official documents, obtain more contacts with off-site or former 
actors and conduct around 50 interviews within a short period of time (a total of 60 
interviews, including follow-up interviews after the fieldwork. This is particularly helpful in 
the Spanish context where I had to navigate through cultural and language barriers.    
 
Of course, there was a time when I felt disoriented and lost between the four different 
languages I encountered, and had no idea where to start my comparative analysis. As an 
intern, my everyday practice in the field involved working in at least two different languages. 
I wrote my fieldnotes in English, yet I had to speak in Chinese or Spanish/English to 
communicate with my ‘colleagues’. There was a lot of translation going on within my head 
when I was drafting interview questions, transcribing interviews or even just speaking to my 
colleagues. I felt especially disoriented when I completed transcription for the key interviews 
and attempted to tease out the comparative pillars through which I could systematically 
compare Decide Madrid and vTaiwan. This was perhaps the most painful period of my PhD 
research because I was lost in a sea of algorithms, fieldnotes in English, policy reports, 
user-generated data (citizen proposals and comments) written in Spanish or Chinese. It took 
me some time to work out the theoretical approach which allowed me to make meaningful 
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comparisons between the data I collected in each DPPP, and I will describe this process in the 
next chapter. 
  
Reflecting upon what this comparative study means for my understanding of digital urbanism, 
my PhD project was definitely confined due to resource and time constraints, as well as by 
the ‘short-lived’ nature of the two DPPPs under study, which were only very active in very 
short time periods. Decide Madrid was only active from 2015-2019; whilst vTaiwan was 
mainly active from 2015-2017. It was lucky for me that I was able to witness and capture the 
‘fleeting’ and ‘growing’ life periods of both Decide Madrid and vTaiwan, as each of them 
subsequently became ‘less alive’ as a result of politically driven changes. It did strike to me 
that these two DPPPs suggest a fast, short-lived and ‘fleeting’ style of digital urbanism, where 
effects appear and disappear within relatively short periods of time (in comparison, for 
example, to how much time has to spent in completing an urban regeneration project, such as 
King’s Cross regeneration). The fleeting nature of digital urbanism certainly gives researchers 
some advantage, as results can be obtained via fast but intense fieldwork, but this is possible 
only if they arrive at the ‘right time’! Also, the ephemeral nature of phenomena related to 
digital urbanism which I uncovered during my empirical research was a major contribute to 
my selection of using the assemblage approach as a theoretical lens (see Chapter 3), as both 
DPPPs indeed came together and went apart within a period of around 3-5 years.     
 
2.3.4 Methodological challenges: where are the algorithmic processes? 
Despite the advantages I obtained as a semi-insider in conducting participatory observation 
and interviews, I remained faced with a challenge: by the end of the internship, I had not 
collected adequate information about the ‘actual’ operation of the algorithmic processes in 
either of the two DPPPs. Data I lacked included: (1) information on the algorithmic processes 
(via ranking algorithms and Machine Learning algorithms3) which sorted and calculated 
user-generated data (such as proposals and comments) in the two platforms; and (2) data on 
the algorithmic visualisation of the dynamic User Interfaces (UIs) of the two platforms as 
they interacted with users4. Whilst this data would obviously be of a highly-technical nature, 
without knowing these algorithmic processes, my analysis on the impacts of DPPPs in 
empowerment would be largely confined to discourse analysis.   
 
 
3 Including K-means and PCA algorithms  
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The absence of data on the said algorithmic processes from the data I had already collected 
via interviews and participatory observation significantly highlights the limitation of using ‘a 
non-digital centric’ perspective of digital ethnography, which follows events via participatory 
observation and interview rather than using digital methods (Pink et al., 2016). Whenever I 
asked key practitioners about how I could get to know the in-situ process of digital political 
participation in the DPPPs, they simply shrugged and told me no one knows. I did not know 
how to solve this issue during my internships. Here, I see a real danger for researchers, who 
may make insufficient claims on both the effect and impact of algorithms as they lack the 
data to know how they actually work (Amoore and Piotukh, 2015). Furthermore, as Kitchin 
(2017, p. 25) has pointed out, algorithms do not ‘play by the book’:  
First, what an algorithm is designed to do in theory and what it actually 
does in practice do not always correspond due to a lack of refinement, 
miscodings, errors and bugs.  
Second, algorithms perform in context — in collaboration with data, 
technologies, people, etc., under varying conditions — and therefore their 
effects unfold in contingent and relational ways, producing localised and 
situated outcomes.  
 
It is this nature of algorithms — the fact their effects unfold in ‘contingent and relational 
ways’ — which makes it very crucial for researchers to capture how algorithms actually 
shape and affect users engaged in digital political participation.  
 
At this point, I realised if I wanted to develop a deeper analysis of the two DPPPs — one that 
was more attuned to the actual and material behaviours of algorithms as they are exposed to 
incoming data — additional methods had to be deployed. This focus on the role of algorithms 
is important for my comparative examination of the effects and impacts of the two DPPPs on 
empowerment, because the unfolding understanding I had of the algorithms status as 
non-human agents presented me with the opportunity; I could integrate an assemblage 
approach which recognised the importance of non-human actors within 
technologically-driven modernity and understand the concomitant challenge this brought to 
narratives of human exceptionalism (Bennet, 2005; Anderson and McFarlane, 2011). I 
realised that only by doing so could I obtain the theoretical key to make sense of what was 
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actually going on within and on-the-surface of the UIs of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan. If I 
did not do this, my research would be solely focused on the ‘institutional context of 
policy-making’ and the ancillary face-to-face political participation the two DPPPs 
conducted.  
 
I decided to give this approach a shot; in doing so, I was helped by the fact that a data 
scientist in Pol.is (the software provider of vTaiwan) expressed a willingness to export and 
give to me the data related to a particular process of digital political participation (the Uber 
case, which I will discuss in detail in the next section). Also, data scientists offered me a 
report which performed data-driven analysis of user behaviour in Decide Madrid (a so-called 
usability report). With this information, I was more confident that I could develop my 
argument with a focus on the role of algorithmic calculations in the calculation of user data 
and on the display of the dynamic UI. In short, my decision to conduct a further investigation 
into the material effects of algorithms significantly affected the direction of my research.  
 
 
2.4 Going down algorithmic ‘rabbit holes’  
After making a decision to change the direction of my research to focus more specifically on 
how the aforementioned algorithmic processes reacted with user data of various kinds to 
affect digital political participation, I realised that I needed to employ new methods, which I 
call ‘digital flashbacks’, in order to extend my understanding of the two DPPPs’ internal 
process of algorithmic calculations, their processes for modulating user data and the 
processes which determined how the UI dynamically changed appearance for each user; in 
doing so, I would have the right equipment to descend into the ‘rabbit holes’ which 
algorithmic interactions hid down! This posed a huge challenge for an urban geographer like 
me, and reflected Leszczynski’s (2018, p. 473) observations on this issue made in her recent 
introduction to digital methods. In her words, there are ‘epistemological limitations of 
geographical methodologies for accessing and making sense of socio-spatial relations, practices, 
and processes of digital presences, practices, and spatialities’. Apart from Leszczynski’s (2018) 
digital methods of triangulation (qualitative methods), representativeness (data analysis), 
digital-visual methods (2019a) and the digital mundane (2019b), other researchers have 
suggested the need to develop a post-phenomenological method for studying digital interfaces 
(Ash et al., 2018b) and have posited a set of critical qualitative methods for studying the 
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operation of algorithms as they relate to broader political, political and economic contexts 
(Kitchin, 2017).  
 
I developed an ‘unfolding’ approach which allowed me to sketch out both internal and external 
processes which involved algorithmic calculations and interface configuration. This was done 
by coordinating a variety of methods which together I term ‘digital flashback’, seen as an 
analysis, simulation and visualisation of digital archives of users online activities via the 
DPPPs. Here, ‘unfolding’ has two meanings, both of which have implications for my 
methodology. Firstly, this approach specifically recognises what Kitchin (2017) argues to be 
the ongoing, contextually-embroiled, and heterogeneous nature of algorithms. Such a 
recognition of algorithms matters because it fundamentally avoids producing an 
over-generalised view on algorithmic calculations. As Kitchin (2017) particularly notes, 
algorithms can do many different things (heterogeneity) and the things that they do depend on 
how their surroundings contextually unfold (contextual-embeddedness and ongoing-ness).  
 
Secondly, this unfolding approach connotes the emergent and challenging research process 
through which I often had to strategically innovate and orchestrate different methods that 
were feasible and effective in showing the works of algorithms as my research went on. 
Working out and inferring how algorithms actually operate is a messy and non-linear process. 
This involves cross-referencing the transcriptions of the interviews with software engineers in 
relation to the ‘real’ situation where algorithms operate as indicated on the data-spread-sheet. 
One of the central challenges is the contingent, technically-convoluted, and un-folding 
natures of algorithms (Kitchin, 2017), which makes it extremely difficult for me to translate 
the technical complexity (such as the terminology of ‘dimension-reduction’ and 
‘multi-dimensional data’) into something understandable and theoretically meaningful for 
social scientists even if I can describe how it works and I know which mathematical method 
it uses. In particular, this challenge gets more complicated when I also want to translate two 
sets of algorithms into a similar amount of evidence which allows me to develop the same 
analytical level. What this means is that I employ a range of different digital methods to the 
extent that they allow me to enquire and capture information regarding:  
 
(1) algorithmic processes (ranking algorithms and Machine Learning algorithms5) of 
 
5 Including K-means and PCA algorithms  
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sorting and calculating user-generated data (such as proposals and comments) for 
Decide Madrid and vTaiwan 
(2) the algorithmic visualisations of the dynamic UI (i.e. how algorithms behind the UI 
interacted with user data to change appearance over time).  
  
These two focuses are important because they offer me technical explanation and information 
about algorithmic operations that can be developed into my analysis of DPPPs by situating 
them within a wider context of policymaking and/or governments. Knowing how algorithms 
work and operation within the context of DPPPs is not just about understanding their 
technical meaning but is to develop a critical analysis of them by revealing their limitations 
and possibility in empowerment and policymaking as has been indicated by my research 
questions.  
 
2.4.1 Digital Flashback 
The digital flashback method can be seen similar to a combination of the ‘digital archive’ 
(Beer and Burrows, 2013) and ‘digital twin’ methods. It aims at analysing the digital data (the 
archive) in terms of the ways in which users act through and within algorithmic calculations 
at specific times within the context of digital political participation. The concept of the digital 
twin6, despite various extant usages, can be broadly understood as ‘a digital mirror of the 
physical world … [which] maps the performance of physical world’ (Guo et al., 2019, p. 
1189; Zohdi, 2020).  
 
In my digital flashback method, I firstly created a digital visualisation and simulation of data 
on users’ actions (or what Beer and Burrow (2013) call ‘by-produce data’/’digital archive’) 
with the help of a data scientist working for vTaiwan; this related to a specific case of the 
operation of digital participation related to the vTaiwan consultation on Uber. Secondly, I 
inferred users’ performance on historical processes of citizen participation and participatory 
budgeting processes by analysing data-driven reports produced by Decide Madrid. The use of 
visualisation and simulation in the case of Uber on vTaiwan makes my digital flashback 
method similar to the method of digital twin. However, different to digital twin method, my 
 
6  
 The usage and concept of ‘twin’ originates from Nasa’s Apollo project which created two identical spaceships 
(one was created on earth to mirror and simulate the condition of the spaceship in space) in order to assist 
astronauts in making critical decisions (Arnarson, p. 3). 
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digital flashback on vTaiwan-Uber does not create a real-time connection and simulation of 
the real-time physical world. Rather, it only recreated a digital replica of a case of 
vTaiwan-Uber consultation which happened in 2015 with the same algorithm and same 
database.  
 
(1) Creating a digital twin of vTaiwan-Uber case  
I chose to apply the digital flashback method on the digital archive of online participation on 
VTaiwan related to the Uber case as the Uber issue was regarded by practitioners as the most 
successful case in improving citizen participation amongst other vTaiwan cases. I was able to 
get a data scientist from Pol.is Inc to recompute the data which was originally generated by 
users’ activities (comment/voting pattern and opinions with time references) in 2015 with the 
same algorithms (Machine Learning algorithms, namely Principle Component Analysis and 
K-means) during the monthly online participation on vTaiwan. As a result, the vTaiwan 
online participation was digitally replicated into 30 daily sections, which were able to 
indicate temporal changes in the number of Opinion Groups, incoming votes and comments, 
voting patterns of each user and the selection of Intra-Group common opinions (comments 
that gain majority votes within each Opinion Group) within a monthly participatory process. 
To complete the digital twin, from here, I recalculated the Inter-Group common opinions 
(comments that gained majority votes amongst all Opinion Groups) following the consensus 
formula7 (provided by the data scientist) for the first five days in the monthly participation 
via Excel. I then visualised the voting patterns of users and opinion groups in digital visual 
diagrams (see the column Y in Figure 4) via the visual functions provided in Excel.  
 
 
7 [G1(number of positive votes+1)/(number of total votes+1)]*[G2(number of positive votes+1)/(number of 
total votes+1)] *[G3(number of positive votes+1)/(number of total votes+1)] 
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Figure 4: a screengrab of the creation of ‘flashbacks’ of digital political participation related 
to the Uber case on the vTaiwan platform as of 15th July 2015. It shows three different 
Opinion Groups (highlighted in grey, blue and yellow): each shares a similar voting pattern 
on the Uber issue amongst users, as visualised at the Y column. It also shows the result of 
calculating the inter-Group Common Opinions — i.e. what is common between different 
Opinion Groups — via specifying the consensus rate6 (indicated in the bottom row). 
 
The use of recalculation and visualisation of real-time data is essential because it offers a way 
to create a ‘flashback’ about how participants voted and were grouped by Machine Learning 
algorithms on a daily basis in 2015. The visual digital diagrams and real-time data allowed 
me to understand the entanglement between participants and algorithms that were involved in 
the participatory process. I was able to identify critical moments where changes occurred, 
including when participants were grouped differently by algorithms and incoming votes (as in 
‘Opinion Groups’) and when the inter-Group Common Opinions were reshuffled by 
algorithms and incoming votes (the comments that gain the majorities from different Opinion 
Groups). Thus, these digital visual diagrams and information provided me with more 
insightful evidence on the ways to theorise algorithmic calculations with a consideration of 
both users and user-generated data for vTaiwan. Without recreating and visualising real-time 
digital political participation, I would not have been able to figure out two sets of rules 
through which algorithms interact with users between vTaiwan and Decide Madrid (see the 
details of my analysis in Chapter 6).  
 
There were two issues which I encountered which highlighted problems in integrating visual 
digital diagrams in my analysis; these ultimately led me to take a decision not to present 
visual digital diagrams in my empirical chapters. Firstly, I needed to recalculate the 
consensus rate for each day on the basis of formulae from the data spreadsheet, which 
required a lot of time even though I employed Excel to help. As a result, I stopped 
recalculating at the fifth day in the Uber case where the most drastic changes happened; 
however this meant that I only had partial information on monthly digital political 
participation in the Uber case. Secondly, I discovered that visual digital diagrams were not 
easily-understood without a lot of works to explain and translate the technical capacities of 
Machine Learning algorithms. 
 
58 
 
(2) Inferring the impact of the online activities of users on Decide Madrid’s UI via the use of 
data-driven reports   
In the case of Decide Madrid, due to lacking direct access to the digital archive of users’ 
activities, I was not able to create a digital twin of online participation in the same way as I 
did for vTaiwan. However, I was able to do this via different means by using online 
observation and data-driven analysis reports produced by MediaLab Madrid and Torresburriel 
Estudio. The data-driven report conducted by MediaLab was created to understand what 
obstacles and opportunities for users existed in online participation on Decide Madrid. As the 
report employed a data-driven network analysis on digital archive of users’ activities in 
Decide Madrid and in Twitter (Leszczynski, 2019a), it was able to be used to trace and 
visualise the relationships or connections amongst users within Decide Madrid, as well as 
between Decide Madrid and Twitter. Another important report — a usability test — was 
published by Torresburriel Estudio on the commission of Decide Madrid by Madrid City 
Council; it intended to examine the ability and knowledge of users of how to participate in 
the UI of Decide Madrid.  
 
By using these data-driven analysis reports, I was able to infer and understand how users’ 
vote and propose via the Decide Madrid UI throughout different participatory processes such 
as the citizen proposal and participatory budgeting processes. The specific issues which were 
analysed and indicated in these reports can be seen as part of my digital flashback of Decide 
Madrid’s online participation. To complete my creation of the digital flashback of Decide 
Madrid, I also carried out online observation on the changes to a specific UI feature — the 
yellow banner — within the citizen proposal process over a four-month period from June 3rd 
2019 to October 30th 2019.  
 
(3) A comparison of the digital flashback method to digital archive, digital twin and digital 
visual methods 
In comparison to other digital methods, my method of the digital flashback shares some 
similarity to the understanding of the digital archive in terms of ‘by-product data’ that are 
generated by users’ online activities to varying degrees (Beer and Burrow, 2013, p. 48). As 
the two DPPPs collect and document ‘by-product data’, they have created archives of users’ 
activities and opinions with references on time and partial geographical locations. It can be 
said that these new sources of digital archives offer new and innovative possibilities and 
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method tools for social researchers to discover and unpack the entanglement between 
algorithms and different sections of life in terms of social, cultural and political, as well as 
opens up new fields of inquiries in social science (Beer and Burrow, 2013; Nicholson, 2013). 
However, as Beer and Burrow (2013, p. 54) point out, using conventional social science 
methods do not make it ‘straightforward to study’ and make sense of ‘ebbs and flows of 
relationship change’ in user-algorithms and thus the fast-moving nature of social media and 
popular culture. What they imply is that social researchers might want to use other 
non-conventional methods to further make sense and analyse these digital archives.  
 
That said, despite the fact that digital devices can collect and create massive digital archives 
on users’ online activities, precisely how to analyse these archives presents methodological 
questions for social researchers. From here, we can see how my digital flashback method can 
contribute such understanding and how it differs from the digital archive method precisely 
because the digital flashback method is more than collecting and browsing digital archives. 
Rather, the digital flashback method ‘recreates’ the process of digital participation or/and 
further analysis these digital archives through statistical and visual methods. It is this 
computational recreation that makes my digital flashback method resemble the method of 
‘digital twin’ in at least two ways. Firstly, similar to the digital twin method, which involves 
an element of digital archive about the targeted physical object in its simulation of the 
physicalobject/system (Tao et al., 2018, p. 356; Arnarson, 2019, p. 1), my usage of digital 
flashback analysis on vTaiwan recomputes and thus reproduces what has already taken place 
in one instance of vTaiwan online participation. Similarity, the data-driven reports on Decide 
Madrid only analyse past events. Secondly, the digital flashback method echoes the digital 
twin method as both are able to incorporate the visualisation effects into their production of a 
‘digital replica’. Often, the simulation of a physical system comes alongside the visualisation 
of such systems (Guo et al., 2019). For instance, Arnarson (2019) has used software to 
simulate and visualise a physical robot’s performance on the server; this digital visualisation 
is a visual replica (digital twin) of the physical robot.  
 
Additionally, my digital flashback method differs from the digital twin method as it does not 
offer a real-time connection and analysis of the datafied ‘physical world’ as the digital twin 
does. As the concept of the digital twin develops, engineers and designers are increasingly 
using it as a tool to make design decisions and to test and optimise physical systems by 
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simulating physical systems in a real-time and interactive manner (Tao et al., 2018, p. 356). 
That is to say, a physical system and its digital twin are interconnected in real time through 
digital devices; the digital twin can also be connected to the data archive of the physical 
system (Tao et al., 2018, p. 356).  
 
From the perspective of digital geography, the digital flashback method can be broadly seen 
as one interpretation of ‘digital (visual) methods’ which ‘use digital technologies and 
computational techniques to collect, explore, and analyse visual media or to visualise data’ 
(Leszczynski, 2019, p. 1144; Rose, 2014). The creation of a digital twin, as I did through 
visualising voting patterns of users in diagrams via my digital flashback method, can be seen 
as one variation of the use of visual materials, such as photographs, maps, paintings and 
videos, which are often used in the diverse ‘visual method research’ (VMR) across varied 
research topics (Rose, 2014). The digital diagram is similar to VMR in two ways. Firstly, I 
used digital visual diagrams to make the invisible and material working process of algorithms 
and participants visible, in a similar way as how Rose (2014, pp. 28, 30) describes the use of 
photos as visual materials to inscribe and make ‘things’ visible. Rose (2014) has argued that 
VMR makes things visible in the way that interviews, survey and other methods cannot. She 
points out that the use of visual material, in particular photography, functions as ‘inscription 
devices’ to generate evidence (Rose 2014). Secondly, my digital visual diagrams are similar 
to VMR because they are collaboratively created with and by participants. The real-time data 
was not generated by myself but by data scientists, participants and Machine Learning 
algorithms: I only visualised and recalculated this existing real-time participatory data into 
digital visual diagrams.   
 
As noted by Rose (2014) within her idea of VMR, it is important to acknowledge that visual 
diagrams are mediated through and produced by in-situ work and arrangement of technical 
devices, experts and participants. Rose states that these visual diagrams are essentially partial 
facts which are produced by particular arrangements between human and nonhuman actors. 
For instance, scientists can use diagrams that are generated by inscription devices as evidence 
to support a scientific fact (Latour and Woolgar, 2013). Thus, whilst these visual diagrams 
can be seen as evidence for research purposes, they are only partially representing the facts of 
the world.  
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Echoing Rose (2014), I am aware these hybrid arrangements only represent a partial view of 
the object/subject of research and play a ‘mediation’ role in producing visual diagrams. In the 
context of creating my digital visual diagrams, their partiality largely comes from the 
contingent nature of Machine Learning algorithms, where algorithms perform with a degree 
of randomness (Kitchin, 2017). This means that given the same data input, the way in which 
Machine Learning algorithms perform calculations will be different and a different result will 
therefore be produced for each. Thus, there was a marginal difference between the recreated 
participatory process in 2019 and the ‘original’ participatory process in 2015.  
 
Acknowledging the partial view inherent within the production of digital flashbacks is 
important. My intention of creating digital (visual) flashbacks is to present, visualise and 
incorporate Machine Learning algorithms, user-generated data and participants into my 
analysis. I want to provide a more ‘in-situ’ illustration which shows how the agency of 
Machine Learning algorithms ‘actually’ plays out in a contextual environment with users and 
data; this will highlight the differences in real-world performance as opposed to how 
algorithms were envisaged to be used at the design stage (Kitchin, 2017). This points to a 
significant possibility of using such digital flashback methods, which contextualise our 
understanding of algorithmic calculations within an empirically-grounded, ‘already-happened’ 
case study. This digital flashback method, despite the aforementioned limits, can significantly 
contribute to the challenges of studying algorithms in human geography. 
  
To sum up, employing the digital flashback method has impacts on my PhD thesis and on the 
study of digital geography more generally. Firstly, the digital flashback method had a major 
impact on the direction of my PhD by providing solid evidence on how users’ online 
activities shape or are being shaped by algorithms and data in the context of the two DPPPs. 
Based on this evidence, I was able to shift my focus from a wider understanding of ‘the 
digital’ in policymaking processes to a specific focus on examining the effects of algorithms 
in terms of their internal calculations and configurations of the interface of Decide Madrid 
and vTaiwan. As a result, my understanding of the three assemblages used within this 
thesis — design, UI, algorithmic decision-making — took shape based on the particular 
understanding of algorithmic calculations and configurations of interfaces with a 
consideration of users.  
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Secondly, the digital flashback method contributes to recent discussions over methods on 
studying algorithms (Kitchin, 2017; Leszczynski, 2018) and analysing different forms of 
digital archives (Beer and Burrow, 2013). It offers a way to analyse digital archives of users’ 
online actions by recreating and recomputing the specific digital archive with the same 
algorithms. This can be seen as a form of ‘digital twin’/digital visual method as it creates a 
digital replica of vTaiwan online participation for the issue of Uber legalisation.  
 
2.4.2 Ethics for studying algorithms and user-generated data 
In Section 2.3.2, I described how I dealt with the ethical conflicts which emerged due to the 
specific power relationships between myself and practitioners in the field during the 
processes of conducting my research. In this section, I discuss how I approached the ethical 
issues which were raised when studying the interactions between user-generated data and 
algorithms within the two platforms. The algorithms and user-generated data that I got access 
to and which are analysed and reproduced in my PhD study are all publicly available 
information, which the British Sociological Association (2017) considers as not requiring a 
need to acquire consent. Nor did these data contain any personal information of users that 
were not published by the users themselves.   
 
Algorithms of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan-Pol.is (written in the ‘source codes’ which refer 
to any instructions written by programmers in a particular programming language, such as 
Ruby) are distributed in Github under the licence of the GNU Affero General Public License 
3.0 (AGPL). APGL is a license for free software which gives everyone the freedom to 
distribute, download, run and modify the software that is subscribed under AGPL8. Therefore, 
I did not breach any legal right of the Pol.is Inc. and Madrid City Council by accessing to and 
downloading the algorithms of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan-Pol.is.  
 
The fact the algorithms were published on Github gave me some advantages in understanding 
and verifying the information related to algorithms; even though I did not know how to code 
in Ruby, JavaScript and Clojure (the programming languages that are used to construct 
Decide Madrid and vTaiwan-Pol.is), Github shows how these algorithms were 
(re)programmed over time. Based on the information about algorithms on the Github website, 
I can ask software engineers why particular ranking algorithms were changed at a given time. 
 
8 https://opensource.org/licenses/AGPL-3.0, access at 09/08/2019 
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Also, there was a strong commitment to openness among software engineers who worked for 
the two DPPPs. Most of them were genuine and very open to explain and discuss how they 
designed and programmed Decide Madrid and vTaiwan-Pol.is. 
 
User-generated data from two platforms — which included user-generated proposals or 
comments and the numbers of votes — are publicly available information. Even though the 
BSA does not think acquiring these user-generated data requires gaining the consent from 
users for reproduction and reuse, consent has been gained directly or indirectly from users, 
when users agreed on the terms of use while registering or using the two participatory 
platforms. Users agreed that the proposals, comments or votes that they post on both 
platforms will be known by the public, including me, even though some of the proposals or 
comments have indicated their user name, which might be their real name.  
 
Both Decide Madrid and vTaiwan platforms stressed in their terms of use that participants 
have to agree to publish their user-generated data in their platform. One of the terms of use on 
the website to Decide Madrid addresses that users must acknowledge and consent that all 
content generated and submitted by themselves will be shown and known by the public9. Also, 
a particular term of use indicates that participants have to acknowledge and accept the fact 
that Madrid City Council might publish user-generated data on its official website and via 
other means.  
 
In addition to the content of user-generated data, I have acquired the real-time participatory 
data (containing the time, the group and the written text of User content) to generate digital 
visual diagrams for the Uber case, which was exported, given and reproduced by a data 
scientist from Pol.is Inc. I did not breach the data privacy as these participatory data do not 
contain any personal information (such as IP address) about users who are anonymous in the 
dataset. I did not breach any legal right of users as users have given Pol.is Inc. the right to 
store, transfer, reproduce and distribute the user content when they were submitting and 
generating the data on vTaiwan-Pol.is. This consent is written in Pol.is term of use10:   
 
By posting or publishing User Content, you grant Pol.is a worldwide, 
 
9 https://decide.madrid.es/condiciones-de-uso, access at 09/08/2019 
10 https://pol.is/tos, access at 08/08/2019 
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non-exclusive, royalty-free right and license (with the right to sublicense) to 
host, store, transfer, display, perform, reproduce, modify, and distribute 
your User Content, in whole or in part, in any media formats and through 
any media channels (now known or hereafter developed). 
 
By using vTaiwan-Pol.is and agreeing to its terms of use, participants in vTaiwan-Pol.is gave 
their consent to allow Pol.is Inc. to store and reproduce their user data for research purposes, 
such as this PhD study. However, in practice, this does not mean all participants know this 
right they have granted to Pol.is Inc., especially given that the terms of use are written in 
English. This ethical concern has been pointed out by the British Sociology Association 
(2017) in Ethics Guidelines and Collated Resources for Digital Research, which is described 
in that:  
even if you [researcher] are legally allowed to re-use some online 
information, there are still no absolute guarantees that those who share 
their information on the Internet will feel 100% happy with you using their 
information in your research, and will not feel they have been harmed in 
any way (British Sociological Association, 2017, p. 7). 
This ethical concern can also occur in Decide Madrid: it is not absolutely sure that every user 
has read through the terms of use even though they have clicked on the agreement on the 
terms of use when they register with Decide Madrid. I agree that this is undoubtedly an 
ethical concern I needed to take into consideration when I was researching participatory 
platforms in the future. However, I do not think this concern is an issue in the case of Decide 
Madrid and vTaiwan-Pol.is., because the user-generated data — proposals or comments, and 
numbers of votes and proposals — are publicly available information, which BSA considers 
not to require consent from users. For the real-time participatory data provided by Pol.is Inc., 
they are anonymous and non-personal information. There was no way for me to gain consents 
from users to make sure they read and understand the term of use because I do not even have 
their personal information.      
 
Overall, my use of user-generated data and the participatory data does not breach data 
privacy requirements. I did not use or hold any unpublished personal data, such as IP 
addresses. The user-generated data and the participatory data are both publicly available 
information and both have been given usage consent from users who agreed the platforms 
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could publish them and that data could be made available to the public during the registration 
period: this is addressed in terms of use in both platforms. In particular, users have granted 
Pol.is Inc. the right to distribute and reproduce their user content for the purpose of my 
investigation.    
 
 
2.5 What I have learned from using a hybrid method  
I conclude this chapter by indicating what I learned from conducting a hybrid method of 
participatory research practices and purposely-developed digital methods for investigating 
DPPPs. These findings can be summarised under three key headings: (1) establishing 
research inquiries comes first before the deployment of digital methods; (2) obtaining digital 
archives of the two DPPPs matters more than knowing how to code; and (3) non-digital 
methods are useful.  
 
Firstly, the most important thing that I learned is the limitations of employing non-digital 
methods in terms of participatory observation and interviews. Such methods do not guarantee 
researchers can understand changeable and mutable processes of digital political participation 
as they can lose sight on ‘what is going on’ within the fast-changing, unfolding and 
transformative nature of algorithmic calculations (Kitchin, 2017) and UI visualisations. In the 
context of digital political participation, this shows the limitation of using a 
non-digital-centric perspective which does not necessarily consider digital methods (Pink et 
al., 2016). However, I do not reject the use of non-digital methods which provided me with 
important information regarding the institutional context of the DPPPs under study here, such 
as user actions in interaction with the UI and how algorithmic outputs are integrated into the 
policymaking process. In particular, the follow-up interviews I conducted with software 
engineers and designers were extremely useful as I discovered a lot of hidden facts and 
rationales behind the design process of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan. Agreeing with 
Leszczynski (2018), I note that an investigation of DPPPs does not necessarily require using 
digital methods, yet digital methods should be deployed ‘specifically in relation to the 
particular research questions being asked’ (Pink et al., 2016, p. 10). Once digital methods are 
discerned as necessary for answering research questions and put into research practice, they 
can offer information about the material works of algorithmic calculations.  
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Secondly, regarding my development of the bespoke digital flashback method, I learned that 
getting access to the data archive of digital political participation process is as important as 
getting access to the institutions for gaining a critical view of DPPPs. In my case, getting 
access to the two DPPP’s data archive was even more important than knowing how to code, 
because I could further analyse the digital archives in order to unpack the ways in which 
users participated and interacted with algorithmic processes.  
 
That said, conducting digital methods — despite their ability to provide new perspectives and 
contributions to digital geography in studying algorithms-mediated actions via digital 
platforms/social media (Kitchin, 2017; Beer and Burrow, 2013) — requires only obtaining 
access to digital archives (including getting content from the authority and users) but also 
technical supports in distilling and analysing the data. If institutions say that it is not possible 
to get access to real-time data and algorithms, it would be apparent to researchers that they 
can only get ‘so far’ without being able to create digital flashback analysis. Thus, taking 
accounts of the accessibility of digital archive of the targeted digital devises will provide 
researchers with a better expectation how we can get the most from our fieldwork, and a 
more efficient plan for data-driven analysis (including acquiring data, preparing technical 
analysis skills or asking for technical supports and examining data).  
 
Thirdly, it is important to note that I do not dismiss the use of non-digital-methods such as 
participatory observation and interview. As Kitchin (2017, p. 26) points out, conducting 
interviews with users can also effectively unveil ‘how people engage with and are 
conditioned by algorithmic systems and how such systems reshape how organisations 
conduct their endeavours and are structured’. Similarity, Ash et al. (2018a) provide fruitful 
and critical analysis of the effect of the interface in shaping the emotion and actions of users 
by conducting interviews with users. In addition, Kitchin (2017) also notes that participatory 
observation can effectively work for revealing the rationale and the design process of a given 
algorithmic device. For instance, I addressed how the practice of participatory observation 
and interviewing with former, off-side and current practitioners were useful in providing 
contextual information in terms of the design rationale behind DPPPs, the policy-making 
processes and users online behaviours. In Chapter 7, I will offer an agenda for future research 
in digital democracy, and specify how a non-digital centric ethnography can contribute to 
unpacking users’ actions and emotions in relation with various forms of political participation 
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and with democratic institutions.  
 
Also, I discussed how I work through the central ethical conflicts due to the specific power 
relation between myself and the powerful practitioners within both governments. Here, I raise 
the pros and cons of conducting these participatory research practices as a semi-insider. On 
the one hand, it is easier for me to discover and follow-up with former, off-site actors and 
gain help from them. On the other hand, this duo-identity can be both emotionally and 
physically exhausting because of doing multiple tasks when I was acting as an intern within 
the field. Therefore, it is at best to carry on strict time management and clearly state my 
responsibility when I negotiated with gatekeepers in the Spanish and Taiwanese governments.  
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Chapter 3 On the development of a situated lens 
 
In the following sections, I will explain how I approached the task of developing a theoretical 
approach to analysing the empirical data I collected during my fieldwork. I found this 
theoretical approach through integrating relational comparative urbanism, assemblage 
thinking and empowerment theories, which allowed me to develop an analytical lens which 
compares and explores the impacts of DPPPs and thus allows me to answer the specific 
research question:  
 
(1) How can we develop an analytical lens which allows for an understanding of DPPPs at 
the various levels they operate and facilitates us in making meaningful judgments on 
impacts on urban policymaking and issues of citizen empowerment? 
 
The deployment of a situated lens serves several important functions in my thesis. It responds 
to the theoretical challenges of the subject of my research — DPPPs, and specifically Decide 
Madrid and vTaiwan — as they are interdisciplinary and situated at the nexus between citizen 
empowerment, urban policymaking and digital platforms (which includes the algorithmic 
calculations and User Interface). I found both studies of digital urbanism and the digital 
citizen lacked any real development of an analytical lens which had the power to assess the 
‘democratic effects’ of DPPPs via nuanced and empirically-evidenced understandings of the 
nature and operation of algorithmic-driven technologies. One the one hand, reading through 
urban studies focused on the intersection between digital technologies and cities (which I 
term digital urbanism), I found that they have tended to focus on how such technologies are 
‘co-constituted’ with cities. This focus has tended to neglect the invisible, inaccessible, 
contingent and heterogeneous nature of algorithms (Kitchin, 2017; Amoore, 2019); as a result, 
a key challenge for researchers studying these technologies is to investigate these hidden 
processes. In particular, within the critical challenge of studying algorithms, studies of smart 
urbanism have tended to overlook effects stemming from how algorithms interact with 
‘user-generated data’ and users, and to reduce citizens to sensor points lacking meaningful 
democratic capacities (Gabrys, 2014). On the other hand, echoing Isin and Ruppert (2015), in 
what I term emergent studies of the digital citizen, there is a gap in taking account of the 
potential that theoretical understanding DPPPs can bring to deepening the analysis of the 
political impacts of algorithmic devices. 
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Furthermore, learning from relational comparative urbanism (Robinson, 2015), the situated 
lens was able to ground my comparative study of the DPPPs within their shared trajectories 
stemming from the Occupy Movement — despite significant cultural, political and technical 
differences — as I have already demonstrated in Chapter 1. To build from here, I draw on 
Deleuzian assemblage thinking and empowerment theories to offer a consistent, comparative 
and meaningful pillars and standards of analysis on the impact of Decide Madrid and 
vTaiwan on citizen empowerment and urban policymaking. Therefore, the situated lens 
serves as a bridge which connects and integrates emergent studies of the digital citizen and 
digital urbanism with those of assemblages and empowerment.  
 
 
3.1 Challenges for geographers in studying algorithm-powered technologies  
In a recent introduction to digital methods in human geography, Leszczynski (2018, p. 474) 
raised a big challenge for geographers who study digital technologies. She notes that there are 
‘epistemological limitations of geographical methodologies for accessing and making sense of 
socio-spatial relations, practices, and processes’. This methodological warning is relevant when 
considering the present mainstream understanding of ‘digital urbanism’, which predominantly 
focuses on ‘co-constitutive’ dynamics of ‘networked (urban) infrastructures’, such as between 
bundles of road, energy, pipelines, telecommunication, sensors, digital platforms and urban 
spaces (Graham and Marvin, 2001; Graham, 2004a; Rodgers and Moore, 2018, n.p.). The idea 
of co-constitution suggests the presence of mutually reinforcing relationships between cities and 
the technological network infrastructures which constitute the technological, economical and 
social aspects of modern cities; these infrastructures are also shaped and normalised by planners, 
engineers, regulations and institutions in cities (Graham and Marvin, 2001, p. 10-12). In their 
call for studying platform urbanism, Rodgers and Moore (2018) also pointed out what they term 
the ‘co-generative dynamics between platforms and the urban’. The research challenge, with 
regard to our common understanding of digital urbanism as co-constitutive revolves around 
existing methodological limitations in studying digital technologies; Steven Graham (2004, p. 
18) critically reflects that: 
the realisation that urban life and new media tend to be constituted 
together means that social research must move beyond generalized and 
deterministic discourses about the “impacts” of “cyberspace” on society to 
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look in rich empirical detail at the complex ways in which new media 
technologies are being used in real ways, in real places. 
In his other work, Graham (2005) identified that certain challenges, stemming from the 
limited tools geography has to understand of algorithmically-sorted processes, have not yet 
been addressed within contemporary geographical research on digital technologies. In 
particular, this manifests as a need to unpack the invisible and unsensed technical processes of 
automation and sorting in the operation of ICT: 
… [g]iven the inevitably confidential, proprietary and highly technical nature of 
the core algorithms that now socially sort so many key social domains, what 
research techniques and paradigms can offer any genuine assistance 
here?...the worlds of software-sorting tend not to be amenable in any 
meaningful way to traditional geographical or social scientific research 
techniques or conceptualizations (Graham, 2005, p. 576). 
Graham (2005, p. 571) highlights the serious challenge posed by the invisibility of 
algorithmic processes (which he refers as software-sorting), which perform functions such as 
choice-making, simulation, ordering, and classification. He describes algorithmic processes 
as ‘remain[ing] completely opaque and utterly unscrutinised’ (ibid). Crang and Graham (2007, 
p. 812) discern the same challenge, from a more explicitly political perspective. They urge 
that invisible digital technologies be made visible to users within their embedded 
infrastructures, in order to give more opportunities for citizens to take part in the 
development of new technologies. Rather than merely rejecting or fetishising technologies, 
they suggest a need to work through the details to identify new ‘shadows and opacities’ 
produced by and within technological systems. Similarly, by understanding invisible 
algorithmic process as the ‘technological unconsciousness’, Beer (2009) urges researchers to 
investigate the operationality of specific digital platforms in order to unpack the forms of 
power that they may exercise in social, cultural and political life. In their critique of smart 
urbanism, Marvin and Luque-Ayala (2017) argue that only by questioning and scrutinising 
the underpinning logic and knowledge of computational systems can we develop a more 
progressive version of smart urbanism. 
 
More recently, in addressing the challenge of examining black-boxed and often inaccessible 
algorithmic processes, Kitchin (2017, pp. 20–22) notes two other challenges which reflect 
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upon the convoluted nature of algorithmic calculation: (1) their heterogeneous and embedded 
natures; and (2) the unfolding, performative and contingent nature algorithms evince when 
performing their calculations. He explains that algorithmic calculation is not only invisible 
and inaccessible to researchers but also involve sets of different algorithms which ‘are rarely 
fixed in form, and their work in practice unfolds in multifarious ways’ (Kitchin, 2017, pp. 
20–22). Kitchin (2017) stresses the first point by explaining any given algorithmic device is 
assembled via the use of hundreds of separate algorithms and is embedded in specific social 
and institutional contexts which consist of legal, working and data relationships. Due to 
differential entanglements with databases, software engineers, protocols and other contextual 
conditions, it is not straightforward for researchers to tease out the various logics and 
relationalities which lie behind the use of algorithms (Kitchin, 2017, pp. 20–21). It is very 
difficult for a single programmer to fully understand how a large and convoluted algorithmic 
system works, as it may be divided into parts and outsourced to different programming teams 
across the globe.  
 
Secondly, Kitchin (2017) discerns that the unfolding and emergent nature of algorithms –
which react to input, interaction and different situations as they emerge — makes it difficult 
for researchers to theorise about them if they base their views only on how a specific 
algorithm performs in a limited amount of situations. For instance, Bucher (2012) shows that 
Page Ranking algorithms in Facebook will order posts differently depending on how a user 
interacts with her/his friends. That said, Facebook’s Ranking algorithms do not act from 
above in a static manner but operate ‘fluidly’ on how algorithms contextually react to each 
individual user. Considering the contextually embedded and unstable nature of algorithms, 
Kitchin (2017) demonstrates that algorithms pose an extraordinary challenge for a single 
researcher aiming to unpack their underlying logic.   
 
The challenges of studying algorithms noted by Kitchin (2017) are entrenched in 
contemporary research into new digital technologies and platforms. Addressing this issue is a 
matter of urgency as digital technologies become increasingly influential, organising or 
controlling ever-more aspects of our everyday lives and perception of cities (Graham, 2004b; 
Crang and Graham, 2007; Lash, 2007; Zook and Graham, 2007; Beer, 2009; Amoore, 2013; 
Kitchin, 2017). Lack of knowledge on how exactly digital technologies operate through 
algorithmic sequences in calculating or circulating data is becoming a crucial set of empirical 
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and theoretical research problems. For instance, when studying the algorithmic process 
embedded in navigation platforms (Microsoft’s Pedestrian Route Production, Sketch Factor 
and Ghetto Tracker), there is a lack of detail on how information such as ‘demographic 
information’ or ‘crime statistics’ within the app is produced and made visible in term of 
sources and composition (Leszczynski, 2016, p. 1697). As a result, researchers continue to try 
to tease out specificities regarding the nature and operation of data and 
algorithmically-embedded devices (Beer, 2009; Ruppert, Law and Savage, 2013; Kitchin, 
2014, 2017; Aradau and Blanke, 2015). In a critical reflection upon current conceptualisation 
on smart urbanism, Luque-Ayala and Marvin (2015, p. 2112) ask researchers to understand 
how specific digital technologies operate in order to go beyond co-constitution to unpack the 
relationship with users, space, services and networks. 
 
Learning from the above, it is clear to see that urban researchers are making either general 
claims or specific case-study-based claims on digital urbanism. These facts again suggest the 
methodological challenges in studying algorithmic devices for geographers, which I have 
attempted to overcome through employing a method of ‘digital flashback’ to recreate the 
process of digital political participation in the case of the Uber consultation on the vTaiwan 
platform (see details in Chapter 2.4.1). What is more, going beyond the current approaches to 
studying digital urbanism, I attempt to take up a comparative approach that can offer a more 
nuanced understanding of digital urbanism across Spanish and Taiwanese cities, which 
manifest significant contextual differences in economy, politics and culture. I assert that this 
comparative analysis can potentially sketch out a new direction for digital urbanism, which is 
currently confined to conceptualisations of a single case study or on making general claims 
about the operation of algorithmic technologies within Anglosphere contexts which I 
identified earlier.  
 
3.2 Questions in the digital turn of studying data and algorithms  
More recently, researchers have started to pay attention to the effect and influence of 
algorithm-empowered devices in both our everyday life and surveillance practices. Kitchin 
(2017) claims that algorithms, via their power to make suggestions and decisions, are 
increasingly influential in shaping social and economic aspects of our everyday practices. 
Diakopoulos (2013, p. 2) claims that ‘we’re living in a world now where algorithms 
adjudicate more and more consequential decisions in our lives.…Algorithms, driven by vast 
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troves of data, are the new power brokers in society.’ 
 
Marking a digital turn in geography, which aims to move beyond a technical definition of big 
data11 and algorithms12 via the use of a critical approach informed by wider disciplines, Ash, 
Kitchin and Leszczynski (2018) indicate the need to understand algorithm-powered devices and 
infrastructures as new regimes of algorithmic governance; such work is informed by works 
on governmentality (Foucault, 1977). Algorithmic governance is defined by Coletta and 
Kitchin (2017) as algorithms which control, mediate and regulate urban life and spaces. This 
can include monitoring ‘the temporal rhythm’, seen as the level of noise and traffic flow of 
urban spaces (Coletta and Kitchin, 2017), controlling financial markets and chances of 
receiving public goods such as organ transplants (Steiner, 2012, p. 214) and informing 
decisions made regarding risk and surveillance practices (Amoore, 2009, 2013). In short, new 
forms of algorithmic governance or governmentality are enacted through utilisations of 
algorithms to actively ‘search, collate, sort, categorise, group, match, analyse, profile, model, 
simulate, visualise and regulate people, processes and places’ (Coletta and Kitchin, 2017, p. 4; 
Kitchin, 2017, p. 18).  
 
Rather than focusing on a single story of algorithms controlling users’ behaviour and 
everyday life, Isin and Ruppert (2015) show the potential of digital citizens to act as subjects 
via cyberspace. Users can conduct digital actions of participating, connecting and sharing in 
order to enact and substantiate their status as a citizen-subject. They are, however, at the same 
time also submissive to digital forms of control, such as acts of filtering, tracking and 
behavioural regulation in digital space. Being a digital citizen can be considered as one form of 
resistance; Amoore (2013; 2019) describes this in terms of subjects who can use their agency to 
demonstrate the ability to doubt and challenge algorithmic decisions.   
 
Central to these different approaches to unpack the impacts of algorithmic devices is to  
‘careful attention to how it [data] is analysed, and to what can be said about the data on the 
basis of that analysis’ (Amoore and Piotukh, 2015b, pp. 4, 15). Without doing so, Amoore 
and Piotukh (2015b, pp. 4, 15) warn that those who argue ‘an era of widespread algorithmic 
governance’ where algorithms control a wide range of our everyday life and urban spaces are 
 
11 which focuses on the four V (volume, velocity, variety and the scope) of data generation (Kitchin, 2014). 
12 Such as ‘any form of calculation that takes input and yields desired output’ (Crampton, 2016, p. 141). 
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making ‘insufficient claims’. Without having ‘clarity about how algorithms exercise their 
power over us’ (Diakopoulos, 2013, p. 2), questions are raised for those who argue algorithms 
create new forms of power and control, such as via causing job losses in labour markets 
(Steiner, 2012), amplifying capital power (Lash, 2007), and controlling our everyday life and 
societies (Kitchin and Dodge, 2011).   
 
Therefore, the questions of whether subjectivities — the ‘identities, experiences, affect and 
perceptions’ of users (Graham, 2005, p. 576) — are influenced by software technologies and 
whether there are new forms of power over individuals, society and politics embodied in new 
digital platforms and media (Beer, 2009, p. 698) remain on-going investigations in digital 
geography and information studies. Given the contingent and diverse nature of algorithmic 
governance, which varies from suggesting recommendations, to pattern recognition, data 
compression, auto-correction, routing, predicting, profiling, simulation and optimisation 
(MacCormick, 2013), critical questions raised include: how are algorithms effectively 
controlling our everyday life? Are they all exerting the same form of power, shaping the same 
regime of algorithmic governance? 
 
After conducting a review of recent studies on data and algorithms, I divided them into three 
categories: (1) anticipatory governance; (2) smart urbanism and (3) the digital citizen. Taking 
the contingent, contextual and multifarious nature of algorithms (Kitchin, 2017) into 
consideration, I have teased out two assumptions in the first two categories’ 
conceptualisations of data and algorithms: (1) that the nature of algorithms is stable in 
operation and anticipation of desirable futures; (2) that the user is essentially passive, being 
seen as ‘data’ without any capacity of rights-claiming, with limited democratic capacity 
(Crang and Graham, 2007; Gabrys, 2014; Chenney-Lippold, 2011) in the face of 
algorithmically automated systems. By engaging with other works on the digital citizen 
through the specific focus on digital interface, citizenship and resistance, I intend to show 
how in contrast to the embedded assumptions I have identified, in reality a more dynamic 
relationship between users and algorithmic devices/interfaces exists where different forms of 
power (resistance, obedience, control and so on) co-exist with each other. 
 
3.2.1 Anticipatory governance  
Central to all forms of study on algorithmic governance is a view that the mobilisation of 
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algorithms is a stable way of anticipating and thus regulating potential futures (Anderson, 
2010). By virtue of the abilities to analyse ‘big data’ — typically about individuals and 
cities — in ways which have been designed by programmers to suit the needs of the 
organisations who have conceived them, algorithms are able to anticipate outcomes of 
real-world events and in turn select (i.e. govern) certain desirable futures (either profitable or 
risk-free) by pre-empting particular ‘un-wanted’ uncertainties, such as financial obstacles to 
investment in commercial drones (Crampton 2016), various forms of risks at the border 
(Amoore 2009, 2013) or impediments to the navigation of urban spaces (Leszczynski, 2016). 
This ability, known as anticipatory governance, however, raises a critical question: to what 
degree algorithms work effectively, successfully and seamlessly to expect and pre-empt risks 
and abnormal behaviours in practice? Does what is imagined to be pre-empted in the design 
of algorithmic systems match perfectly to what is actually pre-empted by the calculations 
made by algorithmic systems? 
 
A presumption in both the theory and practice of anticipatory governance appears to be that 
algorithms are designed and work to cover all possibilities of risk and abnormal behaviours of 
users in a stable manner. In an early analysis of the impact of ‘ubiquitous systems’ on urban 
spaces, Crang and Graham (2007) suggest that ICT-ubiquitous systems enact ‘an anticipatory 
seeing’, which not only tracks and visualizes commodity goods and practices of consumption 
through Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) chips or other geo-identifiable sensors, but 
also anticipate[s] threatening and ‘abnormal’ behaviours and emergencies which can thus can 
be detected and dealt with before the point of terrorist or insurgent attack (Crang and Graham, 
2007, pp. 801–2). Within the security context, central to Amoore’s (2013, pp. 9, 58) argument 
is that anticipatory governance operates through data-analytics and risk calculus to create a 
desired future through pre-empting events which do not yet exist on the basis of their degree 
of risk. Risk calculus is able to preempt emergent risk by identifying it as ‘high profile and 
low probability’ within various projected possible futures. It is in this sense that it creates a 
future by making unknown future events and subjects knowable, locatable and identifiable, 
and thus controllable (also see Amoore 2009, p. 28).  
 
Following Amoore (2013), Leszczynski (2016) and Crampton (2016) study forms of 
anticipatory governance within navigation-based and market analytics platforms respectively, 
each of which seeks to generate risk-free futures for privileged investors or residents in cities. 
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Leszczynski (2016) argues that in practice navigation-based platforms create classed, raced and 
spatially-differentiated urban futures, by identifying risks of crime and personal harm against 
privileged life that has to be secured against. Within the context of the market for commercial 
drones, Crampton (2016) uses economic forecasting and data-analytics as examples of 
algorithmic governance deployed by interested groups, which seek to pre-empt various 
obstacles and threats to neoliberal profit-making activities. The algorithms, in this case, are 
employed to govern and extend neoliberal practices within the commercial drone market to 
create a profit-guaranteed future.  
 
In the context of videogaming, Ash (2010) argues that the interfaces of games are designed to 
anticipate positive encounters with users. They do so by preempting contingencies and 
frictions which might stop users from continuing to engage with the videogames. He 
describes how design practices in videogames anticipate and manipulate contingencies — 
such as the unpredictability of participant intelligence as well as how the game evolves 
through interacting with temporal and spatial rules — into positively affective encounters 
between participants.  
 
However, the missing picture in all these forms of anticipatory governance, as raised by 
Leszczynski (2016), is how much the futures that are claimed to be anticipated (and thus 
governed) by algorithms are materialised into the actual present. It is clear that the 
aforementioned examples of anticipatory governance are largely based on the assumption that 
algorithms work effectively, steadily and impeccably to anticipate a risk-free future with 
well-behaved citizens. Some resistance to these claims, however, emerges from Amoore (2013) 
who notes the failures made in various risk management systems prior to the 9/11 attacks; in 
addition, Ash (2010) explains that not all videogames can successfully control the emotions and 
activity of users through the digital interface. Such arguments tend to ‘look good in theory’ at the 
design stage, but in practice we must take into account Kitchin’s (2017, p.14) suggestion that 
algorithms ‘are best understood as being contingent, ontogenetic and performative in nature, 
and embedded in wider socio-technical assemblages’. What this means, briefly, is that 
algorithms, even when operated within the same version of a piece of hardware or software, 
hardly ever produce the same results out of their calculations in a given circumstance because 
there are other contextual factors (such as input data) affecting how these algorithmic 
calculations and effects play out.  
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I will now summarise three key factors which allow me to elaborate on the contingent and 
changeable (fluid) nature of algorithms. Firstly, Kitchin (2017, p. 21) explains how some 
algorithms are designed to ‘be reactive and mutable’ to data inputs. For instance, ranking  
algorithms are designed to pick up the most popular news on a website by selecting the news 
which receives the highest number of ‘clicks’ within a day. In practice these ranking algorithms 
work contingently and fluidly, as they depend on contextually-generated data inputs (i.e. what 
is ‘new in the news’ on an everyday basis). Only at the point when they interact with a specific 
set of data inputs will static algorithms know which news to pick as the most popular one. That 
is to say, two different data inputs will suggest different results, so different news will be 
selected as the top ones, in the use of the same version of ranking algorithms. 
 
Secondly, algorithms work ‘contingently’ and ‘contextually’ because the way in which they 
conduct calculations and thus their effects can be altered by software programmers and 
designers at any time. Kitchin (2017, p. 21) explains that in a case where algorithms are 
constantly being refined and (re)programmed by software designers, such as within Google and 
Facebook, they are ‘different versions of an algorithm’ running within a short period of time. As 
a result, there is no guarantee that the algorithm a user interacts with stays unchanged ‘five 
seconds later’.  
 
Thirdly, in addition to being subject to change at any point via external reprogramming, the 
calculations can be refined internally ‘by ‘themselves’. In the case of Machine Learning 
algorithms, Kitchin (2017) has noted that they have agency to ‘evolve’ to initiate different forms 
of calculations and therefore produce different results, as they observe and learn from data 
inputs. What this means is that algorithms can act differently in order to ‘adapt’ or ‘react’ to 
contextually-generated outputs (such as the different user histories with regard to 
participatory and interactive action) (Kitchin 2017).  
 
Besides these form of contingency which I have identified, there are wider factors which can 
also influence the process of algorithmic calculations, including what Rose (2016) called 
‘frictions’: human errors, bugs, and digital decay. 
 
Due to all of these factors, it is difficult to say that algorithmic devices ever work the same in 
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practice as they were conceived to when they were designed and programmed (Mackenzie, 
2006; Amoore, 2013; Parisi, 2013; Danaher et al., 2017; Kitchin, 2017). In setting out a 
research agenda for exploring algorithmic governance, Danaher et al. (2017, p. 11) note that 
‘the apparent uncertainty regarding the effects of technological development was seen as a 
significant barrier to effective and legitimate algorithmic governance’. For Amoore and 
Piotush (2015b, p. 15), algorithmic devices ‘exceed their design, producing effects that are 
undeniable and irrevocable political’. Amoore (2013, p. 147) continues to explain that whilst 
algorithms can indeed identify and locate suspected illegal immigrants at the border, the way 
they process a given life can make them act in ways beyond those their design was intended:  
As a bridge between items of data, the algorithm gathers the elements 
differently and in ways that could not be anticipated. Though the presence 
of data elements guide the design of the algorithm (like Heidegger’s banks 
that guide the building of the bridge), once built it is a thing that gathers, 
and gathers beyond its design, such that even the data “banks” look quite 
different.  
 
Understanding algorithms in such terms suggests that they could in a sense be said to have a’ life 
of their own’, exercising agency and potentially making mistakes and errors. This means that 
their powers of anticipation are never as great as they are assumed to be at design phase. 
Moreover, they do not imagine the future in the same ways. Algorithms that are deployed for the 
facilitation of democratic practices, David Lyon (2010) reminds us, can generate different 
possibilities from those that are designed as surveillance systems. That is to say, despite the fact 
surveillance systems of algorithmic governance which primarily seeks to provide new 
possibilities for securing a risk-free future (Amoore, 2013), there are apparently other 
possibilities that algorithms can offer to our societies in different contexts, such as when they are 
designed and used for democratic purposes. Considering the multiplicity of effects that 
algorithms can generate, it is, thus, not possible to assume that every algorithm implies ‘racist’ 
or ‘classed’ consequences in urban governance and space (Leszczynski, 2016), nor does 
every algorithm impose the same form of control over information and data flows in every 
city (Marvin and Luque-Ayala, 2017). 
 
Consideration of the specific nature of a given algorithm, then, is an important point when 
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seeking to answer critical questions regarding algorithmic/anticipatory governance. For 
example, how does the presence of frictions and ‘liveness’ within a given algorithmic system 
influence our current conceptualisations of algorithmic governance? To what degree are 
algorithms effectively deployed to control the lives of targeted subjects? To what degree do 
frictions and ‘liveness’ within algorithms open up new possibilities for resistance and dissent 
against algorithmic powers, and does this change the common perception of algorithmic 
powers as exercising powers of control and modulation? 
 
3.2.2 Smart urbanism: automated data and discourse analysis  
Within the discourse of ‘smart cities’ or ‘real-time cities’ in urban studies (Graham, 2013; 
Gabrys, 2014; Kitchin, 2014; Kitchin, Lauriault and McArdle, 2015; Leszczynski, 2016; 
Marvin and Luque-Ayala, 2017), there has been a preference for studying what Kitchin (2014) 
called ‘direct’ and ‘automated’ data over ‘user-generated’ data (also known as volunteered data) 
and a preference of using discourse analysis as a method to study smart urbanism. These two 
preferences result in (1) portraying users as passive or with limited capacity; (2) questionable 
whether the narrative and techniques of smart-mentality can effectively transform citizenship 
and urban governance in smart/environmental directions (Luque-Ayala and Marvin 2015).  
 
Both these types of data suggest more passive users who are not consciously and actively 
involved in the processes of data generation. In the case of ‘directed data’ generation, as 
Kitchin (2014, p. 4) explains, the details of users (such as fingerprints and identity profile) are 
passively generated into data by methods of data collection such as CCTV, finger-scans, or 
thermal scans, none of which require the user to do anything other than be present as a 
subject to be monitored. Similarly, Kitchin (2014, p. 4) denotes ‘automated data’ as being 
‘generated as an inherent, automatic function of the device or system’, such as through the 
use of sensors, RFID chips, smart travel cards or GPS-embedded mobile devices; users do not 
play an active role because they are not consciously aware of their actions or behaviours, 
which are ‘automatically’ turned into data. 
 
The over-reliance on studying automated data in urban studies has three implications for the 
contemporary understanding of algorithms. Firstly, it has largely downplayed the innovations 
that users can make in the production of data and the potential of exploring algorithms in 
relation to this user-generated data. As argued by Rose (2016), only a few researchers include 
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such a focus on the shift towards users becoming producers rather than passive consumers of 
data, a new form of innovation in digital participation via social media. However, the ability 
of participants to consciously post and upload comments and photos on social media 
(including Facebook or Twitter) or contribute to OpenStreetMap by coding GPS-traces 
(Kitchin and Dodge, 2011) is an essential component to modern digital participatory platforms 
(O’Reilly, 2005; VanDijck, 2013; Orlikowski and Scott, 2015; Langley and Leyshon, 2017).  
 
Secondly, due to the inherently different relationships with users platforms relying on 
automated data have as compared to those relying on user-generated data, the prioritisation 
by researchers of automated data leads to a limited understanding of the diversity 
algorithmically-powered platforms shows in constituting users’ everyday life and different 
facets of cities. That is to say, within systems working with user-generated data, users can do 
more than be just ‘sensor points’ in relation to algorithmic devices, and this had important 
implications for understanding modern platform urbanism. In participatory platforms such as 
TripAdvisor, without the data written and rated by users, not only algorithms will have no 
input to compute with, but also platform will fail in providing its hospitality service 
(Orlikowski and Scott, 2015). The lack of focus on user-generated data suggests that 
arguments commonly made around the smart city — that algorithms and data analytics can 
control and govern citizens and cities through indicator-embedded dashboards or 
sensor-based systems (Kitchin, 2014) — are only truly applicable within those platforms 
which utilise automated data.  
 
The existence of algorithmically-mediated platforms reliant on user-generated data 
challenges a variety of other similar claims which have been made within smart urbanism: (1) 
that the proliferation of smart urbanism envisages a new modality of citizenship which is 
solely constituted by techniques of data management and monitoring (Gabrys, 2014); (2) that 
smart urbanism heralds new regimes of diagrammatic control over information and data 
flows (Marvin and Luque-Ayala, 2017); and (3) that indicators and dashboards can transform 
the ways in which cities can be controlled, tracked, visualised, known and governed (Kitchin, 
Lauriault and McArdle, 2015, p. 16) on a continuous and automatic basis (Batty et al., 2012, 
p. 482). An acknowledgement that citizenship and cities in the digital age are also mediated 
by the existence of platforms relying on user-generated data suggests the need for a more 
nuanced understanding of algorithmic governance in the digital age, with the possibility of 
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different regimes applying depending on which algorithm is being used. Therefore, the 
reliance on analysis of automated data does not provide a full picture of algorithmic 
governance, specifically the existence of various relations between data which exert different 
effects in sorting citizens, infrastructures and urban spaces. 
 
Thirdly, another key issue here is that those who argue for a new regime of smart governance 
or governmentality are largely arguing on the basis on ‘discourse analysis’ around the use of 
algorithmic devices. Luque-Ayala and Marvin (2015) disclose that for many technical 
providers of smart urbanism, technically, most smart technologies are not guaranteed to work 
out as they envisage. Similarly, Kitchin (2014, p. 11) highlights the inherently ‘brittle and 
buggy’ nature of smart systems — which are not void of glitches and failures or secure from 
being subjected to malicious cyberattacks — within what can be understood as a ‘panoptic 
city’. That is to suggest that the caveat that analysing data-driven/algorithmic governance on 
the basis of ‘discourse analysis’ — which tends to suggest digital technologies always claim 
to effectively reduce risks and control user behaviours, increase efficiency and productivity in 
societies — should not be conducted without remembering to mention the inevitable presence 
of frictions and glitches. Given that the existence of glitches and frictions makes the actual 
practices of smart systems not function as they claim to do, the question arises of whether the 
so-called new regime of governmentality plays out as an actual influence on everyday practices, 
or is merely a rhetorical discourse in policy documents. As mentioned by Luque-Ayala and 
Marvin (2015), there is a lack of attention paid to empirically-evidenced material works of 
so-called smart technologies as they operate in the real world in relation to citizens and urban 
spaces. This is further complicated, as I have previously noted, by the need to take account of the 
contingent and ad-hoc nature of algorithms and the various forms of frictions that manifest 
during their operation (Mackenzie, 2006; Kitchin, 2017; Amoore, 2019). This raises a limitation 
for using the notion of ‘smart governmentality’, as this does not pay attention to the 
experimental, on-going, fleeting and emergent nature which is inherent within material 
practices within the deployment of algorithms in two DPPPs under study, which operates in 
non-Anglosphere contexts. 
 
In response to this issue, scholars using the idea of ‘dispositif’ to highlight the material practices 
of digital technologies within wider political, social and cultural contexts (Ash, Kitchin and 
Leszczynski, 2018; Kitchin and Lauriault, 2018) have shown ways of responding to the 
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concerns raised by Kitchin (2017), who notes the importance of examining both the wider social 
context and the ways in which algorithms are initially designed in order to investigate which 
logics are forged in the deployment of algorithms, and to provide yardsticks against whether 
algorithms fulfil their promises and goals when deployed in the real world.   
 
Adopting the modified Foucauldian concept of ‘dispositif’ (Kitchin and Dodge, 2011; Kitchin, 
2014; Coletta and Kitchin, 2017; Kitchin and Lauriault, 2018), theorists such as Kitchin and 
Lauriault (2018) and Ash, Kitchin and Leszczynski (2018, p. 37) refer the idea of ‘dispositif’ to 
a ‘thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, 
regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, [and] philosophical, 
moral and philanthropic propositions’ (in Gordon, 1980, p. 194), which enhances and maintains 
the exercise of power within society. That is to say, a digital dispositif involves an interplay 
between discursive and material practices in a specific context where such interactions ‘shape[s] 
the design, deployment, normalization and use of digital technologies’ in order to ‘serve and 
sustain particular kinds of interests (the economy, social capital) in society, consolidating and 
channelling the exercise of power’ (Ash et al., 2018a, p. 37). Sharing a similar view on 
‘dispositif’, Kitchin and Lauriault (2018, p.8) define the ‘data assemblage’ as ‘a complex 
socio-technical system, composed of many apparatuses and elements that are thoroughly 
entwined’, which operate not only to produce data but also to ‘enhance and maintain the 
exercise of power within society’. It must be noted here that this conception of assemblage is 
not the same as the assemblage theory which I will draw upon to develop my situated lens. For 
instance, other scholars do not view the idea of ‘dispositif’ and that of ‘assemblage’ as the 
same, in terms of the focus on different temporalities of assemblages (Legg, 2009; McFarlane, 
2011, p. 655). Legg (2009) has discerned that Foucauldian scholars (including himself) tend 
to view the temporality of ‘dispositif’ as denoting a long-lasting period of time, whereas they 
view the temporal nature of ‘assemblages’ as ephemeral, emergent and experimental.  
 
Despite taking different views on ‘dispositif’ and ‘assemblages’, theorists all both suggest 
that the ideas suggest ways of analysing the phenomenon of smart urbanism beyond 
‘discourse analysis’, which is seen as one of the key approaches in analysing ‘smart 
governmentality’. The notion of governmentality - used to explain sensor-based systems, such 
as smart meters — suggests that governments and private sectors can produce new 
strategies/discourses of ‘smart-mentality’ which are able to control the behaviours of citizens 
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(Ho, 2016), dominate the definition of a ‘good city’ (Vanolo, 2014) and define who is counted 
as a citizen (Gabrys, 2014). 
 
3.2.3 The digital citizen: interface, subject and political movements  
Looking beyond urban studies, there is an emerging attention towards trying to understand 
different forms of the digital citizen through their interaction with in-situ operations of digital 
interfaces (Rose, 2016; Ash et al., 2018a) in the light of the citizen-subject (Isin and Ruppert, 
2015) and the idea of digital social/political movements (Juris, 2012; Fenton, 2016; Tufekci, 
2017) and resistance (Amoore, 2013). I call these studies works on the ‘digital citizen’ as they 
point to the diverse forms of dynamic relationships between users and 
algorithmically-visualised digital interfaces associated with various devices (Rose, 2016; Ash et 
al., 2018a; Isin and Ruppert, 2015). These studies of the digital citizen attempt to argue against 
technological determinism by integrating a view of users as citizen-subjects who retain the 
ability to exercise their agency, as not always being passive and controlled by digital interfaces 
and algorithmic devices (Isin and Ruppert, 2015). However, Isin and Ruppert (2015) point out 
a gap in the approach of studying digital citizens as the need to investigate further into digital 
political participation.  
 
(1) Digital/user interface  
The digital interface, defined by Rose (2016, p. 341) as ‘the mutual constitution of human 
practice, digital hardware and software codes creates what is visible on a screen’, has been a key 
space where various forms of digital citizen are (re)configured. Rose (2016, p. 341) sees the 
digital interface as a distinctive and transient entity which cannot be reduced to ‘an inert object’. 
This view of the digital interface suggests an inherently dynamic and unstable relationship with 
users: she stresses that due to being subject to frictions of various kinds, ‘interfaces do not 
always work smoothly’ (Rose 2016, p. 343). These frictions include ‘crashes’ in material 
infrastructures due to external events such as power cuts, ‘glitches’ in software and data 
caused by viruses or bugs, digital decay in computations, or human error during the ‘drawing’ 
of digital images of urban development projects. 
 
Building upon Rose’s (2016) understanding of the digital interface, Ash et al. (2018a) argue that 
the powers which can be exercised through of digital interface design cannot fully control the 
actions of users; rather interfaces configure discontinuous forms of guidance and modulation of 
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user activities. In their own words, the ‘power in relation to interface design is, we argue, a 
matter of producing continuities and discontinuities that work together’ (Ash et al., 2018a, p. 
1138). They show that the presence of frictions will tend to interrupt the control of behaviours, 
actions and experiences of participants if they are not mitigated. 
 
In recognising the importance of frictions in the interface/algorithmic devices, Ash et al. 
(2018a) critically question the claim that algorithmic devices flawlessly and continuously 
modulate the subjectivities of participants (Deleuze, 1992; Cheney-Lippold, 2011); this claim 
can be seen in Deleuzian (1992) notion of societal control, which suggests that digital or 
algorithmically-configured systems exercise continuous, constant and complete modulation 
and control over users’ actions. Following Deleuzian’s notion of control (1992), 
Cheney-Lippold (2011) claims that individuals become digital subjects — dividable 
‘dividuals’ — whose subjectivities are formed and identified through algorithms aggregating 
and analysing data within particular categories (gender, race, class and so on): 
 
These dividuals become the axiom of control, the recipients through which 
power flows as subjectivity takes a deconstructed dive into the digital era. 
When we situate this process within questions around digital identity, 
dividuals can be seen as those data that are aggregated to form unified 
subjects, of connecting dividual parts through arbitrary closures at the 
moment of the compilation of a computer program or at the result of a 
database query (Cheney-Lippold, 2011, p. 169). 
 
Cheney-Lippold (2011) strongly argues that algorithms exert power of control over users by 
creating new digital subjects through data analysis and categorisation; however, it is 
questionable to what degree this power of control effectively regulates the identities of 
participants. As noted by Ash et al. (2018a), in Cheney-Lippold’s argument users are assumed 
as passive recipients that are smoothly controlled via algorithmically-defined identities. Ash et 
al. (2018a, p. 1140) note such assumptions are widespread in ‘accounts of control and 
modulation [which] can assume that those who design such systems have complete control 
over what they do’. Users, as Thrift (2004) and Rose (2016) highlight, are no longer passive 
audience but producers. In the case of soft computing, Thrift (2004, p. 183) has pointed out 
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the advent of new human-centred interfaces indicates ‘computing is increasingly adapted to 
and modulated by the user’ rather than having direct control over participants’ attention.  
 
In addition, the presence of unavoidable frictions has a significant implication for arguments 
made about algorithmic governance because they demonstrate that it is not always the case 
that digital systems operate in ways that effectively anticipate a knowledge production or 
exert the same control on users and societies. Due to an unfolding relation with frictions for 
each interface and algorithmic systems, the ways in which they control and modulate users 
vary. As a result, it is better to assess each system on a case-by-case basis. 
 
(2) Digital citizen subject and political participation 
Users do not always act as passive recipients subject to digital powers of control. In citizenship 
studies, Isin and Ruppert (2015) highlight that the power relationship between the digital citizen 
and cyberspace is always contested, and that there is no single narrative of control. Theorising 
citizens as new political subjects emerging from the Internet, they illustrate the power dynamics 
between the digital citizen and cyberspace. Here, the digital citizen is considered as a ‘composite 
subject’ (Isin and Ruppert, 2015, p. 22) who both acts as the political subject of power by 
claiming rights through cyberspace (submission and subversion) as well as being subject to 
power imposed by the sovereign and other authoritative subjects, such as filters and tracking in 
cyberspace. In their words,  
[a] citizen is often imagined subjects as passive data subjects, but 
actually…The features of citizen subjects are not only obedient to the 
sovereign subject but (potential) subversive, transgressive expectation to 
make rights claims (Isin and Ruppert, 2015, p. 4).  
Importantly, Isin and Ruppert (2015) call for a situated approach to researching the 
geographically diverse practices of digital citizenship. They stress that the geographical 
differences — different legislation, imagination (history) and performance (unwritten 
convention) — ‘make a huge difference in how citizen subjects uptake certain possibilities and 
act and organise themselves through the Internet’ (Isin and Ruppert, 2015, p. 42). In other words, 
the ways in which a citizen makes right-claims through ‘digital acts’ in one city will be different 
to another city, even though the Internet promotes the homogenised concept of new digital 
‘activist’.  
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Moving to the subfield of the digital citizen, Isin and Ruppert (2015, p. 82-83) critically 
suggest there is still a lack of focus on digital political participation in terms of ‘the potential 
of citizens’ (Isin and Ruppert, 2015, p. 85) who produce and consume ‘political content –
political positions, opinions, demands, claims’. Digital political participation is absent in the 
discussion on digital interfaces (Ash et al., 2018a; Rose, 2016) and digitally-enabled social 
participation (Beer, 2009); where they do exist, discussion is narrowed down into a narrative 
of ‘digital divide/inclusion’ (Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal, 2008; Isin and Ruppert, 2015, 
p. 81-84). In one sense, with the advent of Web 2.0, Beer (2009, p.985-986, 994) calls for 
both an empirical and theoretical investigation on new forms of power playing out in the 
context of ‘social participation’, where social media constitutes new ‘social and cultural 
relations’ which have an impact in everyday life. This focus has clearly precluded focusing 
on digital political participation. In another sense, Isin and Ruppert (2015, p. 82-83) critically 
allege that recent studies have merely reduced the understanding of digital participation to the 
discourse of ‘digital divide/inclusion’, which sees digital participation as a matter of 
accessibility and a set of literacy and technical skills (also see Mossberger, Tolbert and 
McNeal, 2008, p. 1-2). They claim that such a discourse of digital inclusion, particularly in 
the UK, does not consider the digital political participation, such as ‘participating in politics 
digitally through actions as petitioning, organising, recruiting, contributing, campaigning, 
blogging and so on’ (Isin and Ruppert, 2015, p. 84). To put it differently, the discourse of 
digital participation understands ‘participating’ as a functional requirement rather than a 
political complex which involves contestation and struggle. As a result, this discourse leaves 
out the possibility of asking crucial questions on how citizens act beyond what they are 
imagined and defined within the discourse of digital divide/inclusion. For Isin and Ruppert 
(2015), it is critical to unpack the tension between how citizens are conceived within political 
agendas and the discourse of digital inclusion and how they act exceed or beyond these 
imaginaries. 
(3) Digital political movements and resistance  
Isin and Ruppert (2015) and others (e.g Micó and Casero-ripollés, 2014) have pointed out 
that there is no consensus in in digital studies and citizenship studies on accounting for the 
role of social media and the Internet in the Occupy Movement and other political events.  
 
Some scholars argue that social media played a central role in causing, determining and even 
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inventing new decentralised and collective forms of social/political movement, from the 
example of 15M (Micó and Casero-Ripollés, 2014) and online-driven activism (Harlow, 
2011). They argue that social media such as Facebook offers ‘new forms of organization and 
communication’ for social/political movement in terms of decentralised and real-time 
communication and circulation of news and information and mass-scale participation (Micó 
and Casero-Ripollés, 2014; Harlow, 2011). However, from a historical viewpoint, Fominaya 
(2015, p. 144) argues that claims of 15M establishing new horizontal, decentralised and 
autonomous forms of political movement are ‘far from being novel, [as] this has been a 
hallmark and mainstay of Spanish autonomous movements since at least the 1980s’. For 
Fominaya (2015, p. 144), what has claimed about 15-M being new (such as being 
individualistic, leaderless and horizontal) are not new; rather activists exercise ‘strategic 
amnesia’ to ‘emphasise the noteworthiness of the protests and distinguish them from previous 
cycles of mobilization’.  
 
In contrast to suggesting a deterministic role for social media and digital technologies, others 
argue that social media plays a role of enabling, facilitating and mediating organised political 
movement (Juris, 2008, 2012; Fenton, 2016). Fenton (2016, p. 45) clearly notes this role of 
social media in that ‘social movements of the last decade are enabled but not determined by 
digital media’. For her, whilst the internet can enable large-scale projects, ‘it does not craft a 
politics’ and ‘may change nothing’ (Fenton, 2016, p. 44-45) as what matters for a ‘a critical 
democracy will, by its very purpose, call constantly into question the existing levels of 
achieved democratisation but crucially it will also translate this into an institutional reality’ 
(Fenton, 2016, p. 46).  
 
Fenton’s critical view on digitally-facilitated social movements echoes Juris’s (2012) focus 
on using a situated approach to unpack digital social movements through their specific 
cultural-political histories. What is more, in challenging the understanding of horizontally 
networked digital social movements, Gerbaudo (2012, p. 13) argues that there were 
essentially groups of leaders (what he terms as ‘soft form of leadership’) who carried out 
tasks of organising and mobilising people in ‘social centrality’ via digital medias and 
platforms. Moving beyond the said debates on digital social movements, Gerbaudo (2012) 
explores the ways in which the interactive and participatory character of the new 
communication technologies were used by activists-leaders to channel and craft participants’ 
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emotions and actions.  
 
In the context of security studies, Amoore (2013, 2019) has offered an insightful 
understanding of the digital citizen by pointing out the co-existence of resistance and 
sovereign power within the practices of using surveillance systems. She highlighted various 
forms of resistance/dissent conducted by artists and researchers aiming to challenge the role 
of algorithms as contemporary practices of sovereign power able to decide on the futures of 
individual lives. Drawing on Deleuze’s idea of life, Amoore (2013, p. 26) notes: 
the exercise of power at a threshold of what is possible must always and at 
the same time implicate relations of resistance at that same threshold, the 
two knotted together unless and if only power itself ceases to be. 
 
Amoore describes two forms of resistance to algorithmic governance which are available 
within the context of surveillance technologies. Firstly, she notes the ability to critique the 
‘sovereign decisions’ (Amoore 2013, p. 163) made via (or informed by) algorithmic risk 
calculus, which she describes as partial and incomplete. The decisions are made ‘too easy’, 
Amoore (2013, p. 163) argues, and do not take into account either ongoing political conflicts 
or contestations around the judgements. By questioning and critiquing the objectivity of 
algorithmic decision and knowledge which is created through their use, she theorises a form 
of resistance to algorithmic power. In her recent work, Amoore emphasises the significance 
of seeking out ‘the possibilities of an alternative orientation to doubt, one in which the subject 
necessarily doubts the grounds of their[algorithmic] claims to know’ (Amoore, 2019, p. 4). 
For Amoore, it is particularly important to cast doubt over the supposedly objective output of 
algorithmic devices in surveillance contexts, which suggests a power of resistance co-existing 
with the sovereign power practised through algorithmic decisions. This can be seen in an 
example where a subject can doubt a political decision that is made on the result of 
algorithmic calculations which indicate a ‘high’ risk score for a passenger on the screen of 
border security for this passenger has travelled to Pakistan and stayed over three months and 
whose fee was paid for by a third party (Amoore, 2013, p. 59).  
 
Secondly, Amoore describes how potentialities that are either ignored or rejected by the 
algorithmic logics embedded in surveillance technologies persist as ‘indeterminate life’ 
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(Amoore, 2013, p. 172-4). For Amoore (2013, p. 173), indeterminate life refers to the life of 
half-formed potentialities that are rejected and closed down through the operation of 
algorithmic devices; focusing on such indeterminate life can present a site of resistance to the 
reductive and determining power of algorithms. Giving the example of an algorithmic system 
designed for v-Bomb, such indeterminate life can be seen as ‘the contingent chances’ for lives 
in the targeted city that ‘are not amenable to calculation’ (Amoore, 2013, p. 75). Whilst to 
unveil such indeterminate life does not directly judge the decisions of algorithms per se, it 
offers a means of going beyond what an algorithmic system can imagine by highlighting 
‘possible subjects, subjects as yet unknown’ (Amoore, 2013, p. 156-7). This critique remains 
significant for studies of contemporary algorithmic governance because studying 
indeterminate life presents new kinds of potentialities through opening up unexpected places 
and unknowable subjects that are yet to be actualised as possibilities through algorithmic 
devices.  
 
3.3 Developing a situated lens from relational comparative urbansim, Deleuzian 
assemblage thinking and empowemrent theories   
 
I will now focus on explaining how I developed an analytical framework — which I term a 
situated lens — for this thesis. Following the relational turn in comparative urbanism, which 
opts for an open and innovative comparative urbanism, I devised a comparative framework 
which allows me to trace and relate Decide Madrid and vTaiwan whilst acknowledging their 
geographical, political, cultural and social differences. I further build this comparative 
framework by integrating Deleuzian assemblage thinking and empowerment theories, which 
allows me to conduct a contextual-based analysis and examination of the two DPPP’s 
democratic implications. In doing so, I respond to the call for geographically-situated 
perspective of studying digital citizenship in terms of political participation (Isin and Ruppert, 
2015, p. 42), and answer the call for a situational analysis of the political impacts of 
algorithmic devices (Amoore and Piotush 2015).  
 
The situated lens is seen as a three-fold conceptual framework. The initial concern, as I have 
illustrated in Chapter 1 is to discern the ‘genetic’ similarities and differences between Decide 
Madrid and vTaiwan. The second concern of the situated lens is to generate the object of 
comparison (comparator) by discerning shared features across Decide Madrid and vTaiwan  
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in terms of three assemblages focusing on: (1) processes of design of the DPPPs; (2) the 
dynamic UI, where real-time user participation takes place within wider political contexts; 
and (3) processes of algorithmic decision-making. Lastly, drawing on theories of 
empowerment (Fung and Wright, 2001; Mäkinen, 2006; Fischer, 2012; Baiocchi and Ganuza, 
2014)), I develop a set of empowerment standards against which I examine and compare the 
degrees of digital empowerment offered by DPPPs.  
 
3.3.1 Starting from a relational comparative urbanism 
Robinson (2006, 2011, 2015) and McFarlane (2010, p. 732) call for a relational turn within 
comparative urbanism, which urges researchers to rethink ‘comparison as a strategy for 
destabilizing the assumptions and limits of knowledge, ideas or theory and reveal its 
distinctiveness, and for formulating new positions and lines of inquiry’. In a nutshell, a 
relational comparison is to reconsider three trends to compare cities based on: (1) ‘categories 
of success’ (in terms of global cities, or developed cities); (2) the categorial division between 
developed and developing cities; and (3) the legacies of paradigmatic urbanism (McFarlane, 
2010, p. 728).  
 
McFarlane (2010, p. 728) explains the first type of trend has become entrenched in urban 
studies, where scholars tend to learn from ‘usual suspects’, places that are obviously from 
similar categories such as global cities: New York, London, Paris and Tokyo. He continues to 
point out the consequence of reproducing urban comparison from similar cases is to 
‘necessarily negate a range of experience across the globe that could prove useful’ and which 
do not preclude ‘the possibility of learning from a variety of different sites’ (McFarlane, 2010, 
p. 728) outside of global cities.  
 
Secondly, as urban studies have been influenced by categorisation and developmentalism, it 
has not been possible to compare cities across developed and undeveloped categories;. 
Robinson (2006, p, 41) illustrates that this trend has prevailed urban studies since the 1970s, 
where a division was set up by ‘the hierarchical categorization of different kinds of cities as 
developed or undeveloped... This divide continues to form the basis for urban studies to this 
day, in which different kinds of cities are broadly thought to be incommensurable’.  
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Lastly, McFarlane (2010, p. 729) notes that urban studies has been heavily influenced by the 
LA school’s paradigmatic urbanism, which prioritises Los Angeles as a model example of a 
world city or a paradigmatic city. As a consequence, urban comparison is reduced to a 
predefined assessment on how other cities were compared to a single paradigmatic city and 
has produced overgeneralised urban theory. Despite there being a few attempts to produce 
global urban theories from comparing different cities, McFarlane (2010, p. 729) warns that 
such attempts are problematic as urban studies has tended to produce ‘accounts of urban 
economy, politics, public space or infrastructure [which] slip from the experience of a clutch 
of Western cities to claims about the city more generally’. It is also important to be aware of 
‘integrationist forms of comparison, where sites, people and processes are integrated into 
pre-given positions with limited openness on the part of the researcher to learning from 
different contexts’ (McFarlane, 2010, p. 732; also see Robinson, 2015, p. 4). 
 
Within the field relational urban comparison, there is a trend to openly understand urbanism 
‘not as discrete or self-enclosed, but as open and relational, embedded in networks and flows’ 
(Ward, 2008), to compare cities that are deemed ‘different’ from ‘usual urban suspects’ within 
conventional urban comparison (Robinson, 2006; McFarlane, 2010). Robison (2015, p. 3) 
note that it is important to rethink and redefine the scope of comparative cases ‘to avoid the 
restricting and territorializing trap of only comparing (relatively similar) cities’. Instead, she 
opts for comparing ‘specific elements or processes in cities, or the circulations and 
connections which shape cities’ in order to make urban experiences from different contexts 
‘comparable’ (Robinson, 2011; 2015, p. 3) (also see McFarlane 2010 to open urban 
comparison from different theory cultures). That said, such relational comparative urbanism 
aims to discern the relationship between different cases and how this relationship is 
influenced and situated within wider processes (Robinson, 2015, p. 4). In particular, 
Robinson (2015, p. 4) has offered two comparative methods: the ‘genetic’ method, which 
aims to trace the ‘interconnected genesis’ of cases in comparison; and the ‘generative’ 
method, which aims to generate or revise concepts from the cases with shared features. 
Relational comparative urbanism, therefore, points to an experimental, relational and open 
approach to devising comparative studies.  
 
As I have illustrated in Chapter 1, I began my comparative study by tracing the genesis of 
Decide Madrid and vTaiwan, two DPPPs which are seen as important cases for studying 
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digital democracy. My comparative method uses Robison’s (2015) genetic tactic as I analyse 
and trace the genesis between Decide Madrid and vTaiwan, from similarities of wider 
processes of democratisation in 1970/80s to similarities in recent usage of digital 
technologies in Occupy Movement in 2010s. In other words, my comparative study on two 
DPPPs can be seen as one of relational comparative urbanism, as I trace the wider processes 
(both democratisation and digitally-mediated social movement) in shaping how Madrid and 
Taipei City designed innovative digital platforms for participatory democracy. In particular, 
within those genetic processes shared between Decide Madrid and vTaiwan, I further note 
cultural, social and political differences between Spain and Taiwan and describe how these 
differences continue to influence the development and invention of the two DPPPs.  
 
I proceed by introducing a second comparative tier which discerns similarities between the 
two DPPPs as a common set of three assemblages. I develop my comparative framework 
based not on an a priori approach but on what is empirically shared between Decide Madrid 
and vTaiwan and between geographical and other different processes that also shape the two 
DPPPs. I do so by following Robinson’s (2015) generative comparative method and thus am 
able to claim that this comparative framework can serve as a new conceptual opening within 
digital urbanism. That is to say, this second comparative tier — a set of assemblages of 
design, algorithmic decision-making and UI — may be applicable to examining the impacts 
of other variations of digital urbanism. Noting that Marvin and Luque-Ayala (2015) have 
critically flagged that there is very little research comparing the varied forms of smart 
urbanism across different geographical locations, my comparative framework has brought 
geographically remote cases together to enrich the current focus on a single case study of 
smart urbanism occurring within Anglosphere, European or Latin American contexts.  
 
Lastly, to answer the research question on the degree of digital empowerment offered within 
the two DPPPs, I further create a set of comparative standards of empowerment from the 
concepts of participatory democracy and digital empowerment, which I will detail in the 
following section. 
 
3.3.2 From Deleuzian assemblage thinking 
Secondly, the situated lens, building on Deleuzian assemblage thinking (1986), centres its 
focus on the fluidities (coming-together and falling-apart) which are inherent within 
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human-algorithmic alignments. In their book ‘A Thousand Plateaus’, Deleuze and Guattari 
(1986, p. 9) describe rhizomatic assemblages in that: 
Every rhizome [assemblage] contains lines of segmentarity according to 
which it is stratified, territorialized, organized, signified, attributed, etc., as 
well as lines of deterritorialization down which it constantly flees.  
For Deleuze and Guattari (1986, p.7-8), rhizomatic assemblages are characterised by 
principles of connection, heterogeneity and multiplicity. Rhizomatic assemblages are 
connected ‘between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to 
the arts, sciences, and social struggles’, which suggests not only ‘different regimes of signs’ 
but also ‘things of different status’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986, p. 7). That said, an 
assemblage can change its nature as it expands its connections with other assemblages 
(rhizomes/multiplicities). This changing nature of assemblages is termed by Deleuze and 
Guattari (1986, p. 9) as ‘the line of flight or deterritorialisation’. In relation to the movements 
of deterritorialization, assemblages can be also reterritorialized (or ‘restratify’) by ‘starting up 
again on one of its old lines, or on new lines’ (ibid, p. 9-10) and thus possibly to reinforce 
fascist power or any other power formation that comes into light. That is to say, in these 
‘becoming’ processes, one rhizomatic assemblage can be deterritorialised by becoming into 
something new; whereas the other assemblage is reterritorialized by reinforcing its own order 
at the same time (see the example of the wasp reterritorializes the orchid by transporting its 
pollen whilst the orchid deterritorialises the wasp in p. 10).  
 
From here, Anderson and McFarlane’s (2011) reinterpreted what Deleuze and Guattari (1986) 
termed ‘deterritoiralisation’ and ‘(re)territorialisation’ of assemblages as the destabilising and 
stabilising (coming together and coming apart) of heterogeneous parts/actants which can be 
seen as human and non-human, organic and inorganic, technical and natural (Anderson and 
McFarlane, 2011, p. 126; McFarlane, 2011, p. 653). Assemblages can claim their territory 
through stabilising their heterogeneous parts/actants (as the movement of territorialisation), 
but at the same time, assemblages are constantly subject to the movement of 
de/re-territorialisation as their stabilised heterogenous parts might change or broken because 
new actors appear.  
 
Again, McFarlane’s (2011) interpretation highlights the fluidity of assemblages. McFarlane’s 
(2011) interpretation of Deleuzian’s ‘lines of flights/deterritorialisation’ as stressing the 
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changes in interactions of heterogenous actants can (re)shape the agencement/agency of 
assemblages. Here, agency can be understood as, in Barnett’s (2006, p. 447) word, ‘the 
distinctive efficacy of a working whole made up, variously, of somatic, technological, 
cultural, and atmospheric elements’. Thus, assemblage thinking points us to pay attention to 
an open-ended, temporary and emergent process whose agency (efficacy) is functionally 
constituted by heterogeneous actants coming-together and going-away and situated within 
various wider contexts. 
 
From this situated perspective, we can see how Deleuzian assemblage thinking can assist us 
in contextualising our understanding of the multifarious and contingent nature of algorithms 
(Kitchin, 2017). By looking at algorithms through their interactions with specific actors 
within the two DPPPs, we arrive at the point where algorithms are no longer existing by 
themselves but are becoming involved in processes of both stable (territorializing) and 
unstable (de-territorialising) interactions with users, data, software engineers or politicians. 
That is to say, algorithms are as more than a set of ‘any form of calculation that takes input 
and yields desired output’ (Crampton, 2016, p. 141) but are actants (defined) which ‘move in 
and out’ in complex alignments with users, data, politicians, software engineers which are 
situated within specific political context. Here, the term alignment should be seen as a way of 
describing the agency/agencement of the given assemblage is formed and determined 
(McFarlane, 2011).  
 
Applying this assemblage thinking to explain the two DPPPs, we can define DPPPs as three 
common assemblages:  
 
(1) The assemblage of design: the open-ended process of developing specific algorithms by 
politicians and civic hackers within DPPPs in specifically-conceived ways, such as to 
generate global solutions for solving alleged problems with democracies located in 
specific institutional contexts. 
(2) The assemblage of the UI: how the algorithmically-visualised dynamic UI of the DPPPs 
influences user’s actions during real-time participation.  
(3) The assemblage of algorithmic decision-making: in the context of urban policymaking 
and participation, the ways in which these algorithms work ‘in practice’ via living 
interactions with user-generated data. 
95 
 
 
Again, the usage of Deleuzian assemblage thinking pays attention to both contextual 
‘situatedness’ and ‘fluidity’ and thus better illustrates the contingent and 
contextually-embedded nature of algorithms without making assumptions on what algorithms 
by themselves can do or cannot do. Kitchin (2017, p. 25) stresses that: 
 algorithms perform in context — in collaboration with data, technologies, 
people, etc. under varying conditions — and therefore their effects unfold in 
contingent and relational ways, producing localised and situated outcomes.  
Kitchin (2017, p. 25) explains that the contexts where algorithms are formulated and operated 
matter, because contextual conditions — including hardware and legal/institutional 
infrastructures — will influence and frame how algorithms work in practice. For Kitchin 
(2017), it is critical to understand how any practice in data analytics is affected by its social 
and technical ‘situatedness’ within particular contexts; he also notes the existence of a 
feedback loop by which these contexts are in turn affected by the various contingent and 
heterogeneous effects which are part and parcel of any deployment of algorithms. As I have 
elaborated in Section 3.3.1, Kitchin (2017, p. 21) explains algorithms work ‘contingently’ 
(fluidly) and ‘contextually’ (‘situatedly’) because their operation in practice can change due to 
being reprogrammed by software programmers, due to the fact they are ‘reactive and mutable’ 
to contextually-generated data inputs and due to some Machine Learning algorithms can evolve 
to initiate new forms of calculations by learning from data inputs. Similarity, in theorising the 
data security assemblage, Aradau and Blanke (2015, p. 5) also assert that assemblage 
thinking helps to explain not just human-machine relationship, but also ‘the content of the 
relationships that hold assemblages in place’ (Allen, 2011, p. 156). They argue that ‘what 
matters in the Big Data-security assemblage is how the relationship between humans and 
computers gains content’ (Aradau and Blanke, 2015, p. 5). To put it differently: given the fact 
that algorithms can be deployed very differently in different cases, it is only by paying 
attention to how algorithms perform contextually in practice that researchers can analyse 
algorithms with due consideration of their specific contingent and ongoing (fluid) nature. As 
Kitchin (2017), Aradau and Blanke (2015) warn, without considering the social-technical 
context, there is a risk of fetishising and partialising the understanding of algorithms at the 
cost of other contextual meanings and impacts.  
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Thus, drawing from the assemblage thinking, the situated lens offers a way to begin an 
analytical contextualisation of the two DPPPs, which incorporated elements of heterogeneity 
of elements, contextual ‘situatedness’ and ‘fluidity’. The situated lens is able to grapple with 
the contingent and multifarious nature of algorithms (Kitchin, 2017) in order to understand the 
particular type of relations algorithms have with data in the empirical case studies I have 
conducted. In particular, there is a need to pay attention to the material works of data and 
algorithms within digital technologies, to avoid assuming that every algorithmic device ‘sorts’ 
cities and everyday practices in the same way. For instance, an urban operating system 
incorporating digital technologies and the material-digital dimensions of cities, as suggested by 
Marvin & Luque-Ayala (2017, p. 84), will not exert the same controlling power as the interface 
of a loan-application system such as that indicated in Ash et al. (2018a). If they do not clearly 
differentiate specific algorithmic devices from each other, then, researchers face risks of 
over-generalising the effects of data and algorithmic devices. This situated lens, by further 
substantiating the importance of studying ‘algorithmic devices in situ’ (Amoore and Piotukh, 
2015a, p. 3), is able to offer a response to the aforementioned challenges in studying and 
conceptualising black-boxed algorithmic operations in studies of digital urbanism and digital 
citizens. 
 
3.3.3 Comparative standards from concepts of empowerment  
As I have already noted, the assemblage approach is not by itself sufficient to answer one of 
my primary research questions, which is to do with how the DPPPs under study effect 
empowerment. The application of a hybrid of assemblage theory supplemented with theories 
of empowerment is therefore necessary in the context of the specific nature and purpose of 
the DPPPs I am studying. As Anderson et al. (2012) explain, it is perfectly possible to 
combine the use of assemblage theory with other theories for the purposes of answering 
different research enquiries. As such, I bring a focus on theories of empowerment from 
participatory democracy and beyond (Fung and Wright, 2001; Mäkinen, 2006; Fischer, 2012; 
Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014; Isin and Ruppert, 2015) to assemblage thinking, which will 
enable me to specifically examine the effects of DPPPs in citizen empowerment in a 
comparative approach.  
 
This allows me to develop a comparative standard against which I can assess the degree of 
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empowerment of the two DPPPs. Principally this will involve a focus on comparing the three 
assemblages: the design assemblage, the algorithmic decision-making assemblage and the 
dynamic UI assemblage against three comparative standards: (1) the provision of political 
legitimacy (2) the empowering capacity for individual citizens which are determined in the 
assemblage of design, (3) an enabling environment for users to feel engaged and make 
informed decisions through the assemblage of UI.  
 
Empowerment theories, despite a lack of definitional precision and their diffuse usages across 
fields such as psychology, democracy, organisational/community and environment studies 
(Wilkinson, 1998), generally focus on both the process and results of empowerment which 
take place at individual and organisational levels (Perkins and Zimmerman, 1995). In a 
general sense, empowerment can be seen as an ongoing and intentional process through 
which citizens gain critical understanding and control over the social, economic and political 
institutions that directly affect their lives (Perkins and Zimmerman, 1995, p. 56; Wilkinson, 
1998; Mäkinen, 2006).  
 
It is this focus on both individual and institutional contexts (Perkins and Zimmerman, 1998; 
Fung and Wright, 2001; Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014; Pateman, 1970) in which empowering 
processes may happen that makes empowerment theories particularly useful and important 
for my thesis: not only because the two DPPPs aim at improving the quality of political 
participation, but also because they are constituted across alignments of individual users, 
algorithms and wider political contexts (such as those within the Spanish and Taiwanese 
governments). To avoid using an unclear definition of empowerment, I have aimed to 
integrate the works of empowerment from various participatory democracy (Baiocchi and 
Ganuza, 2014; Fung and Wright, 2001) and digital citizenship theorists (Mäkinen, 2006; Isin 
and Ruppert, 2015) into my three comparative standards derived from the use of assemblage 
theory. I am aware that the idea of democratic empowerment is mostly evidenced from 
examples of participatory budgeting, such as that in Porto Alegre (Baiocchi, 2005; Fischer, 
2012; Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014). However, it is worth noting that Fung and Wright (2001) 
also applied the idea of democratic empowerment in other participatory initiatives in the US 
and India, such as public participation in education system reform in the city of Chicago, 
economic policy-making in the city of Milwaukee, environmental legislation reform in the 
US and participatory-centred developments to empower marginal groups in two Indian states, 
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Kerala and West Bengal.  
 
Political legitimacy, in terms of its ability to ensure a particular practice is able to drive 
change within policy-making processes or wider society, is seen as an important quality for 
democratic empowerment by scholars of participatory democracy. Participatory democracy 
theorists have focused on participation in political/democratic institutions in terms of citizens’ 
ability to access parliamentary structures (Macpherson, 1977) and the quality of participatory 
initiatives in local governance (Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014; Fung and Wright, 2001). Within 
the recent focus on participatory budgeting processes, Baiocchi and Ganuza, Fung and 
Wright have provided more practical details of their understandings of political legitimacy. 
They have pointed to the importance in any reforms of the presence of some form of 
administrative reorganisation, with adequate financial support (Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014), 
the ability of a process to given ‘decision-making power devolution to participants’ (Baiocchi 
and Ganuza, 2014) and a promise of ‘the real prospect of exercising state power’ in terms of 
political commitment over the medium to long-term (Fung and Wright, 2001, p. 27).  
 
The importance of political legitimacy just noted by Habermas-influenced participatory 
democracy scholars such as Fung and Wright/ Baiocchi and Ganuza. Rather, political 
legitimacy is also considered an important aspect of conducting empowered democratic 
practices by pluralist/critical democracy theorist such as Mouffe (1999), who stresses that 
political legitimacy as the most important quality of deep democratic practice. Here, what 
Mouffe (1999, p. 755) means by radical or plural democracy is ‘the recognition and 
legitimation of conflict and the refusal to suppress it by imposing an authoritarian order’. For 
Mouffe (1999, p. 753, 755), legitimacy is not grounded in rational consensus but is meant to 
recognise soemone who has different identities and opinion from oneself as a ‘legitimate 
enemy, an enemy with whom we shared adhesion to the ethico-political principle’.  
 
Whilst a legitimate democratic process will not eradicate power conflicts, it nevertheless 
possesses the capacity to, at a bare minimum, allow different individual, identities or groups 
to express themselves and to confront each other in an institutionalised political forum. In 
Mouffe’s (1999, p. 756) own words, ‘plural democracy needs to make room for dissent and 
for the institutions through which it can be manifested’. It is important to form ‘collective 
identities forming around clearly differentiated positions, as well as on the possibility of 
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choosing between real alternatives’(Mouffe, 1999, p. 756).  
 
At the micro level, the second standard of empowerment can be as the capacity of the 
individual to be able to perform certain acts considered as essential by scholars of 
participatory democracy (e.g. Fung and Wright, 2001; Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014; Pateman 
2012) and scholars from digital citizenship (Mäkinen, 2006; Isin and Ruppert, 2015). For 
these scholars, an empowering practice of participatory democracy is one which develops and 
improves the political capacities of an individual. Empowering practices encompass the 
ability to perform acts of deliberation, discussion and debate; these are considered as essential 
by various scholars of participatory democracy (Pateman 2012, Fung and Wright, 2001; 
Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014). Pateman (2012, p. 8) clearly indicates that ‘deliberation, 
discussion, and debate are central to any form of democracy, including participatory 
democracy’.  
 
Vitale (2006) notes that participatory democracy theory is similar to deliberative democracy 
theory in that both emphasises the essential role of public debate and deliberation in 
achieving the goal of improving democratic decision-making. Yet, there are some differences 
in theoretical context, as deliberative democracy is directly influenced by Habermas idea of 
deliberation, whereas participatory democracy is more conceptually vague (Vitale, 2006, p. 
749) and has a different interpretation of democratic modalities (Baiocchi and Gunuza, 2014, 
p. 35). Despite these differences, both Fung and Wright (2001) and Baiocchi and Ganuza 
(2014) clearly refer to Habermas’ idea of deliberation in their recent work on empowered 
participatory democracy. From here, we can see how Habermas’s idea of deliberation has 
influenced the deliberative turn in participatory democracy, where participants are urged to 
debate and develop shared understandings of political issues to forge a collective political 
will (Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014, p. 35; Fung and Wright, 2001). Fung and Wright (2001) 
claim that empowered political participation requires participants to make ‘collective’ 
decisions by voting between alternative projects, in a way which does not hinge on 
self-interest but rather on a grasp of the ‘reasonableness, fairness, or acceptability’ of 
alternative options (Fung, and Wright, 2001, p. 20). They highlight that learning to be able to 
communicate and deliberate are key factors for citizen empowerment, as deliberation can 
lead to forming collective decisions in political participation.  
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My third standard of empowerment defines empowerment on the basis of the recent work of 
theorists of participatory democracy (Fung and Wright, 2001, Fischer, 2012) and digital 
empowerment (Mäkinen, 2006; Lerner, 2014; Hassan, 2017; Sgueo, 2017). Here, digital 
empowerment is defined as the provision of an enabling environment where users feel 
engaged and capable of making an informed and collective actions of political participation, 
namely voting, proposing and commenting (this is substantially predefined by design 
processes, such as those of the two DPPPs under study here). That is to say, I see digital 
empowerment as not only about users’ participatory capacity in conducting whichever 
political actions that are granted by designers and policymakers but also about their ‘feelings’ 
and whether they are able to take consideration of ‘a wide range of information’ when they 
are voting, proposing and commenting.  
 
In participatory democracy, the ability of a user to feel engaged and motivated is regarded as 
essential for increasing the degree of democratic empowerment by both Fung and Wright 
(2001) and Fischer (2012). Fung and Wright (2001) identified apathy as one of the problems 
of contemporary participatory democratic practices. They speculate that citizens can be 
politically disengaged and ignorant as a result of the institutional design of these practices. 
Fischer (2012) also illustrates that when it comes to building more empowered practices of 
political participation, a sense of engagement is even more crucial than having a strong 
participatory capacity, because it tends to be more difficult to motivate users to continuously 
participate in digital political participation (for a lot of hidden costs) than to build their 
participatory capacity. To tackle this issue, Lerner (2014) and Hassan (2017) advocated a 
reinvention of participatory modes of practice through the integration of interactive games. 
Despite there being no consensus on the definition of ‘game’ or ‘gamification’, Lerner and 
Hassan argue that embedding features drawn from video game design and mechanics into 
democratic processes can ‘make democratic participation more fun, to increase citizen 
engagement and trust in democracy, and to empower people to democratically decide more 
issues that affect their lives’ (Lerner, 2014, p. 25; also see Hassan, 2017, p. 252). In particular, 
Lerner (2014, p. 201) argues that good game design can produce ‘competition [that] makes 
people care more about playing and try harder to succeed—and that it can even encourage 
collaboration’.  
 
By integrating the use of these theories of empowerment, this situated lens is able to provide 
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a comparative assessment of the degrees of empowerment, with comparison between: (1) 
how the assemblages of design integrates capacity for empowerment and the provision of 
adequate political legitimacy; and (2) how the assemblages of dynamic UI presents or 
otherwise of an enabling environment where users feel engaged and capable of making 
informed and collective decisions in political participation differs between the two DPPPs 
under study; and (3) offering a point of reference on what constitutes a fair and meaningful 
political decision to question the assemblage of algorithmic decision-making.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
I conclude this chapter by highlighting the contribution my development of a situated lens 
can make to studies of digital urbanism and the digital citizen, and explain how this theory 
guides me to assess and compare the two DPPPs’ impacts on empowerment and urban 
policymaking within the next three chapters, which integrate this theory with my empirical 
research.  
 
I devised this situated lens for the purpose of examining and comparing the two chosen 
DPPPs effects on citizen empowerment and urban policymaking processes, and for providing 
a new way of thinking about digital urbanism which integrates thinking on the role of a 
specific type of emerging platform, namely DPPPs which utilising interactions between 
user-generated data and algorithms. Informed by Deleuzian assemblage thinking and 
geographers’ interpretations of his ideas of assemblage, then supplemented by wider theories 
of empowerment, this situated lens can systematically contextualise our understanding of the 
two DPPPs by diving them into three assemblages (design, UI, algorithmic decision-making), 
which are then analysed through the use of empowerment theory. Each assemblage is openly 
co-constituted by particular alignments between politicians, users, software engineers, digital 
interface, data and algorithms which are affecting and affected by the wider political 
contexts.  
 
The ability to gain a rich description of DPPPs via a situated lens suggests four key 
contributions my research can make to wider studies of the digital citizen and digital 
urbanism. Firstly, drawing from assemblage thinking, this situated lens identifies contextual 
similarities between the two DPPPs — design, UI and algorithmic decision-making — points 
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of comparison. The situated lens does so to offer common grounds for researching other 
variations of digital urbanism across different contexts. Also, this situated lens can better 
illustrate the fluidity of algorithms embedded in the two DPPPs by paying attention to how 
algorithms stabilise and destabilise in relation with designers and/or users within a specific 
context (Kitchin 2017, Amoore 2019). In doing so, the situated lens can potentially open up 
what has been conceptualised as smart urbanism which largely uses discourse analysis of the 
effects of digital/automatic technologies in urban governance within Anglosphere contexts.  
 
Secondly, this situated lens contributes to filling what Isin and Ruppert (2015) identify as a 
gap in studies of the digital citizen. It draws on theories of empowerment, as these are 
theories which offer the explanatory value over the nature and purposes of the DPPP which 
are appropriate in this context. As a result, the application of empowerment theory is also 
situated in the context of the DPPP. This situated lens provides a comparative assessment of 
digital political participation with a consideration of the dynamic UI (Ash et al., 2018a; Rose, 
2016) and the design processes of the two DPPPs. In particular, this situated lens shows that 
an empowered practice of political participation is not only a fixed set of participatory skills 
and capacities (Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal, 2008) but an enabling environment where 
users feel engaged and are able to make informed decisions. In addition, by offering a 
comparative standard of empowerment, a situated lens makes it possible for me to assess the 
effects of the two DPPPs on citizen empowerment. As a result, it provides a comparative 
perspective in digital empowerment across Western and non-Western contexts. It can 
potentially inform policy guidelines for evaluating and monitoring the quality of digital 
political participation.  
 
Now I will briefly delineate how a situated lens will guide me in assessing and comparing the 
two DPPPs’ impacts on empowerment and urban policymaking in each empirical chapter.  
 
In Chapter 4, the situated lens foregrounds the role of algorithms through the ways in which 
they are programmed and deployed by software engineers and politicians within the 
assemblage of design. Understood as ‘the interpretative key’ (Latour, 2013, p. 57) of the 
world, studying the process of design matters, as through it we uncover ‘hidden’ values, 
biases, and political effects underneath the apparent objectivity of digital technologies 
(Bowker and Star, 2000; Mackenzie, 2006; Amoore, 2013, 2019; Crawford, 2013; Kitchin, 
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2017). Guided by the situated lens (see in Section 3.4), I will reveal how this particular 
alignment between democratic narratives, algorithms and politicians has produced an 
agency/modality of anticipation which seeks to promote and produce self-celebratory 
democratic promises and outcomes via ‘narrative of global solutions’ and ‘participatory 
calculus’. I, then, evaluate and compare the implications that two anticipatory modalities 
have against the common standards on empowerment — political legitimacy and individual 
capacity to perform participatory acts — in participatory democracy (Fung and Wright, 2001; 
Pateman, 2012; Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014) and digital citizens (Isin and Ruppert, 2015).  
 
In Chapter 5, the situated lens serves to contextualise algorithms through their use in the 
dynamic UI of the two DPPPs. In particular, it focuses on the interactions the dynamic UI has 
with users in real-time, and how this opens up and closes down the possibilities of digital 
empowerment for citizens. I call this the assemblage of UI. The chapter examines the 
possibility of digital empowerment: whether users are enabled to conduct collective actions 
of political participation via the dynamic UI within the wider political contexts. By 
considering the effects of emergent and unexpected frictions in shaping and reshaping the 
ways in which users act through the dynamic UI, the situated lens in this chapter is deployed 
to highlight the ‘fluid’ character of digital empowerment. It does not assume users are passive 
recipients of digital control and manipulation, or that they are necessarily subjected to 
‘smooth manipulation of user action and experience’ (Ash et al., 2018a, p. 1138); rather, it 
takes seriously the agencies users can manifest to contribute innovative inputs or forge 
collective forms of power through or against the control and modulation of the digital powers 
(Isin and Ruppert, 2015; Rose, 2016; Ash et al., 2018a).  
 
In Chapter 6, the situated lens works to investigate the internal operation of algorithms which 
produce political decisions via ‘living’ interactions with users and via human reinterpretation 
in policymaking. I call this the assemblage of algorithmic decision-making. The situated lens 
indicates how a comparison of the different processes of algorithmic decision-making which 
exist in the two DPPPs suggests, on the on hand, the production of political decision whose 
meanings are ‘mutable’ within their own processes of policymaking; on the other hand, they 
also close down other urban issues which have not been deemed legitimate within either 
algorithmic calculations or human reinterpretation. Here, it is by studying the process of 
making algorithmically-informed political decision that the situated lens is able to question 
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the fairness and empowerment of political decisions, as it points out what urban issues have 
been excluded alongside the (re)configuration of political decisions. By specifying the 
algorithmic rules of the two DPPPs, the situated lens makes it possible to not only reveal the 
impacts of algorithmic decision-making in urban policymaking but also raise the question of 
what constitutes an equal and empowered process of political decision-making. It does so to 
the salience of algorithmic devices which ‘exceed their design, producing effects that are 
undeniable and irrevocably political’ (Mackenzie, 2006; Parisi, 2013; Amoore and Piotukh, 
2015a; Kitchin, 2017) and to consider the mutable nature of algorithmic calculations (as 
explained in Section 3.2) (see the contingent machine-human interaction which detours from 
its plan in Suchman, 1987).  
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Chapter 4 On the design of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan  
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
I will now begin my comparative analysis of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan via the situated 
lens, which integrates assemblage theory which stresses situatedness and fluidity with those 
theories of democratic empowerment which are best situated to answer my research questions. 
In this chapter, I will focus on a comparison of the first assemblage, that of the design 
processes of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan, each of which are situated within their own 
political contexts. Studying the processes of conception and design of algorithmically-driven 
systems is important as decisions taking during these processes influence how algorithms 
work in practice and impact on our everyday lives. As Bowker and Leigh-Star (1999, p. 35) 
remind us, the design process of a piece of software integrates sets of decisions in which 
‘values, opinions and rhetoric [are] frozen into code’; such decisions, however, are generally 
not visible to the public. Though they are opaque, these decisions have been shown in recent 
years by studies of algorithmically informed surveillance practices to produce crucial 
‘political effects’ (Amoore and Piotukh, 2015b). Besides, Amoore (2013, p. 54) has critically 
revealed how the design processes behind algorithmic analytics entail the use of intuitive 
judgements, incomplete knowledge and explicit or implicit biases held against the subjects 
under surveillance; therefore, algorithm-dependent technologies should not be taken as 
objective and neutral. 
 
A ‘situated’ analysis of these design processes must make use of data which pays attention to 
the wider political and economic environments where technical aspects of Decide Madrid and 
vTaiwan — both algorithmic systems — are held together; in other words, where they gain 
specific ‘content’ in this case seen in terms of potential for empowerment. The situated lens 
emphasises that such design processes are open-ended because they can be changed by 
re-programming new algorithms, investing or withdrawing new financial or political 
resources and other potential changes stemming from various externalities. Essentially, 
viewing the design processes of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan as assemblages means they 
should not be seen as permanently fixed but as dynamic alignments between politicians, 
software engineers, algorithms, political narratives and political-economic recourses.   
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Drawing on the work of scholars working on the idea of empowerment in the context of 
participatory democracy (Fung and Wright, 2001; Mäkinen, 2006; Pateman, 2012; Baiocchi 
and Ganuza, 2014), and digital citizenship (Isin and Ruppert, 2015), my situated lens is able 
to reveal how crucial aspects of democratic empowerment are (often consciously) precluded 
via an array of decisions involved in the conception/design assemblages of Decide Madrid 
and vTaiwan. As I have previously noted in Section 3.4.2, we can establish two common 
standards for comparing the degree of empowerment in these assemblages: (1) are users’ 
actions given political legitimacy?; and (2) is the individual given the capacity to be able to 
perform certain participatory acts seen as key to empowerment (e.g. deliberation and debate)?  
 
Adopting these standards allows me to answer three research questions via the focus on the 
design process of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan:  
 
(1) What are the effects of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan on citizen empowerment?  
(2) How do Decide Madrid and vTaiwan differ in terms of potential for citizen 
empowerment? 
 
Using the aforementioned standards of empowerment, I will now critically examine various 
constituents of the design process assemblages of the two DPPPs, with a focus on their 
production of democratic narratives and the creation of a ‘participatory calculus’ (an 
algorithmic design which preconditions the participatory actions available to users within the 
platform).  
 
Firstly, I will investigate the ‘global narratives’ of democratic solutionism which surround the 
design and execution of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan, via examining statements made about 
them in the media and at international conferences. Such narratives anticipate a future in 
which democracy is able to fix widespread perceptions of a crisis in democratic participation 
by technological means. I argue that lying beneath these claims is a very ‘thin’, 
self-celebratory and quantitative narrative of democracy, where the future of democracy is 
one in which issues can be solved easily via decisions made within DPPPs by fairly crude 
majoritarian means which lack critical aspects of empowerment. Also - particularly in the 
case of vTaiwan - this supposedly global solution comes without any guarantee of a 
meaningful level of economic and political support into the future, which has been widely 
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noted as a critical necessity of participatory democracy (Fung and Wright, 2001; Mäkinen, 
2006; Pateman, 2012; Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014).  
 
In the second part of this chapter, I review the ‘participatory calculus’ which is inserted into 
the operation of the DPPPs at design stage, which associates a machine code with the specific 
actions of a given user. This participatory calculus seeks to anticipate any action from the 
user side by assigning it a value and thus making it countable, which holds similarities to 
Amoore’s (2013, p. 15) understanding of software design as ‘as a means of rendering mobile 
and circulating things, people, money, and objects calculable’. Crucially, I note that designing 
a participatory calculus precludes or reduces the quality of some important actions such as 
deliberating, commenting and communicating, which are considered as essential abilities of 
an empowered subject (Fung and Wright, 2001; Pateman, 2012; Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014; 
Isin and Ruppert, 2011). Therefore, I argue that the deployment of participatory calculus has 
crucial implications limiting the potential of DPPPs to provide empowerment, by precluding 
non-calculable and qualitative actions for political participation. By disclosing the 
preclusions which occur in the construction of a participatory calculus at design stage, I not 
only problematise this process, but also propose how (re)think the ethics of such practices 
through highlighting the potential for questioning decisions made within design processes. I 
do so by engaging with Amoore (2019, p.4)’s work on posthuman ethics in which she argues 
that ‘the possibilities of an alternative orientation to doubt, one in which the subject 
necessarily doubts the grounds of their[algorithmic] claims to know’.  
 
It is essential to point out that highlighting the web of elements which surround processes of 
design is only the first step for examining the impact of DPPPs on citizen empowerment in 
the digital age. The full impact of algorithms embedded in DPPPs on empowerment and 
urban policymaking processes will be revealed more clearly when we move to examine the 
dynamic User Interface in disabling and enabling citizens to make informed actions in 
political participation (Chapter 5) and to question the algorithmic interacting with 
user-generated data to produce political decisions (Chapter 6).  
 
4.2 Problematising DPPPs as global solutions for the future of democracy 
This section explores one aspect of the assemblage of design of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan; 
it critiques the narratives made by configurations of actors working in and around the 
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platforms about how DPPPs can be seen as global solutions for securing the future of 
democracy, by focusing on how these processes of articulation of narrative foreground the 
idea of anticipation (Anderson 2010, p.784-786). Anticipation is defined by Anderson (2010, 
pp. 778–779) as the use of different performative, calculative and imaginative techniques 
which make potential ‘futures known and rendered actionable’. To avoid confusion, I strictly 
use Anderson’s idea of anticipation to describe the logic behind the design of Decide Madrid 
and vTaiwan, which seeks to ‘imagineer’ a majoritarian and machine-calculable vision of 
democracy. This is done via the encoding of what I have termed ‘participatory calculus’ into 
the operation of the algorithms, which is underneath the self-promoted yet widely-publicised 
democratic narratives in the media, professional conferences and other stakeholder fora.     
 
In the first and second parts of this section, I will illustrate in turn how the designs of Decide 
Madrid and vTaiwan are driven by narratives which consider DPPPs to be global solutions 
for the future of democracy, heralds a consensus-oriented future which will be made possible 
by their deployment and suggests that societal division and polarisation can be pre-empted 
via technology. This narrative is a textbook example of what Morosov (2013) calls 
‘solutionism’ — the supposed ability of technology to solve the problems of humanity — at a 
global scale. It is circulated through news, reports and presentations curated and written by a 
wide variety of institutions and individuals; research foundations (i.e. Nesta, Consul), 
international media (i.e. the BBC, the New York Times, Wired, Open Democracy, 
G0vInsider), international conferences (i.e. Consulcon in Madrid City and the g0v Summit in 
Taipei City) and Open Government Partnerships. These wider networks should be considered 
as part of the design assemblage of the DPPPs. 
 
In the third part, I critically examine and compare how these global narratives of digital 
democracy, mediated via the political contexts of Madrid and Taipei City, can be judged 
against the essential elements of empowerment I pointed out in the previous section. Here, it 
is clear to see that vTaiwan, — despite its claims to be delivering digital democracy — has 
largely failed to obtain political legitimacy, as it fails to redistribute its decision-making 
power to participants and did not guarantee the necessary financial and political support in 
the same way as Decide Madrid. 
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4.2.1 vTaiwan 
In recent years vTaiwan has been heavily deployed by the Taiwanese government as a brand 
for portraying Taiwan as a global leader in digital democracy to the outside world. Taiwan is 
depicted as a leader in providing new solutions to the various problems faced by democratic 
countries, from decline of trust and political engagement between citizens and the 
government (Simon et al., 2017) to polarisation caused by social media (Miller, 2019). 
vTaiwan is claimed as a new form of digital democracy on the basis that its algorithms can 
identify areas of consensus between groups of people who on the surface seem divided in 
their options on political issues; with vTaiwan these are known as ‘Opinion Groups’. By 
identifying areas of consensus between Opinion Groups via the use of algorithms, divisive 
and trolling actions which can potentially occur during online participation are pre-empted 
(Miller, 2019; Tang, 2019a, 2019b). The narrative of vTaiwan as a way of solving conflicts 
between Opinion Groups has been circulated around the world via various international 
conference and workshops, such as Consulcon in Madrid in 2017 and workshops at 
MediaLab in Madrid and at New York City Hall in 2018.  
 
In the New York Times, Audrey Tang (2019a) clearly stated that vTaiwan ‘remains one of the 
best ways to improve participation — as long as the focus is on finding common ground and 
creating consensus, not division’. This promise of a consensus-oriented future is praised in 
Wired (Miller, 2019) as a crucial lesson for democratic countries to heed:  
vTaiwan has allowed citizens to sidestep the gruelling divisions that define 
online politics. vTaiwan didn’t necessarily try to resolve the areas of bitter 
disagreement, but instead to forge a way forward based on the numerous 
areas most people agreed on…vTaiwan proves that the character of 
political debate is partly down to platform engineering. Polarised and 
angry content keeps us engaged, and that is exactly what platforms have 
been designed to show us. Design a platform [Taiwan-Pol.is] to find 
consensus, and you see it arise in the debate…  
 
Again, the same illustration of vTaiwan as a world example for digital democracy is seen in 
the Economist, where Audrey Tang (2019b) claimed that through a combination of A.I. and a 
Taiwanese government that listens to diverse demands from citizens, vTaiwan creates a new 
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form of digital democracy. Tang (2019b), indeed, mentions the role of the Taiwanese 
government as a listener; however what she does not point out are the contextual details of 
how this so-called new democracy will work in practice within the Taiwanese Government. 
Everything is portrayed as working out magically and smoothly. There were no metrics or 
wider evaluative processes offered which would be able to know to what degree Pol.is 
actually creates consensus; in addition, there is a lack of clarity on how the Taiwanese 
government is able or willing to translate the outcomes of digital democratic processes into 
legislative actions13.  
 
It thus seems that despite the wide-ranging claims offered in the narrative around vTaiwan,  
this discourse offers remarkably little explanation on offer regarding either the definition of 
consensus or how a supposed new form of digital democracy is better than the previous 
version. If we look closely at the deployment of algorithms, underneath the narrative of a 
global solution, a consensus-oriented future, is a limited and quantitative understanding of 
democracy, devoid of the richness and depth it is given by theorists of empowerment. What is 
meant by ‘consensus’ within narratives around vTaiwan seems to be no more than those sets 
of comments which gain simple majority support from the user base. Diana14, a consultant 
from Pol.is software Inc., concedes that those comments that are considered as a ‘(rough) 
consensus’ by A.I. algorithms are not that different from a simple majority-based consensus. 
In her words, the consensus in Pol.is, being supported a majority number across minority and 
majority groups of users, ‘tends to be a majority opinion statement. There is a lot of overlap 
between Pol.is consensus and majority consensus’ 15. Crucially, here we can see how the old 
idea of a majority-based consensus is ‘rebranded’ within the narrative of DPPPs, in a way in 
which it turns into an apparent saviour of global democracy in the 21st century. What this 
majority-based consensus demonstrates is a minimal and thin understanding of democracy. 
Can democratic futures really be resolved by a majority number of users?  
   
4.2.2 Decide Madrid   
In an official press release, Madrid City claimed itself to be the largest open-source platform 
for participatory democracy in the world. It did this on the basis that it had been adopted by 
 
13 This opinion is derived from an in-depth participatory observation with the Taiwanese Government and it 
‘promotion’ tours of vTaiwan in Consulcon conferences in Madrid City, as well as from a recent informal 
conversation with one of the researchers in Nesta, who has been investigating vTaiwan platform 
14 Interview conducted on 25/09/2018 
15 Interview on 25/09/2018  
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93 institutions located in 18 different countries, largely in the Spanish-speaking world: these 
included Porto Alegre, the Uruguayan government, and municipal authorities in Buenos Aires, 
Paris, Turin, Quito, Lima, La Paz, Zamora, Valencia and Gran Canaria (also see BBC, 2019). 
In another press release for Consulcon, the international conference of Decide Madrid, 
Madrid City celebrated itself as ‘the epicentre of citizen participation and democracy’ 
initiatives around the world (Madrid City Council, 2018). Also, in the context of an 
EU-funded project on ‘e-government’, López (2016) claimed that Decide Madrid is a 
‘scalable software solution’ for e-participation. He notes such a solution has interested many 
municipalities around the world:  
some other municipalities, including Fuenlabrada and Cádiz, are also keen 
to adopt the platform. According to official sources, more than a dozen 
administrations are already installing the Consul framework used by 
Decide Madrid. Even the city of Nariño, in Colombia, has expressed 
interest in this eParticipation and transparency solution.  
Here, I want to indicate how Decide Madrid narrates a discourse of a future democracy which 
is reduced to governance via a simple majority of supporters; this solution is described as 
being potential of use to any government worldwide. The emphasis on governance via simple 
majority came out vividly when I was working as an intern for Madrid City Council, Mike, a 
senior advisor in Decide Madrid, often told me their primary concern is about ‘numbers’: 
whether citizen proposals meet a numerically-defined threshold (1%, or approximately 
26,000 registered residents) and whether participatory budget proposals achieve a simple 
majority of support from voters. They do not consider the results of other participatory 
processes, such as deliberative participation (via Local Forum) as legitimate unless these 
processes decide to incorporate their results into the process within Decide Madrid which 
works on the simple majority principle. A simple majority becomes the decisive criteria in 
defining which proposal or idea should be incorporated into the future of Madrid City by 
Madrid City Council. In this regard, Decide Madrid is not at all different from vTaiwan. They 
both conceive and anticipate that the determination of a simple majority number of support 
within their user base is adequate for defining and securing future democracy.  
Should we let our future democracies be defined by reliance on majoritarian rules in which a 
small majority of participants might be enough to green-light highly contentious issues? I 
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note that Decide Madrid not only reduces the future of global democracy into a single 
narrative of majoritarianism but also sidesteps the crucial issue of integrating the wider 
empowerment agenda; this means that such global solutions do not guarantee citizens will be 
empowered at the expense of governments. Thus I feel it is safe to conclude that traditional 
forms of governance, rooted in state and sub-state structures, appear to have simply installed 
participatory platforms which use ranking algorithms which operate on traditional logics of 
majority support.  
 
4.2.3 The missing dimension of empowerment: political legitimacy     
In this section, I use the situated lens to analyse the effects of the design assemblage in citizen 
empowerment. I have illustrated how networks of actors within the design assemblage of 
DPPPs come together to anticipate a particular form of democratic future based on a 
majoritarian logic. What is missing from this anticipated future, this narrative of DPPPs as a 
global solution to fix democratic problems is a consideration of whether their functions 
provide adequate legitimacy from the perspective of theories of participatory democracy (e.g. 
Fung and Wright, 2001, Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014).  
 
Drawing on my comparative study of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan, I will offer evidence that 
the level of economic and political support given by a government can make a significant 
difference in increasing the level of empowerment within a potential democratic future, as it 
is this support which will provide the requisite legitimacy for results of digital political 
participatory processes in the medium to long-term. Here, the main issue in the development 
of future democracy is not whether a specific algorithmically-powered platform is developed 
or not, but that the results of such a new initiative can have real political impact in processes 
of policy-making by being granted with sufficient economic and political support.  
 
By redistributing an annual 100 million Euro budget for city-wide and district-based 
participatory budgeting proposals, Madrid City Council has mobilised not only strong 
political will and resources (such as administration and legislative time) but also financial 
support, both of which (according to empowerment theory) are critical to ensuring the 
democratic future envisaged by the designers. These supports provide substance to the claim 
that citizens’ decisions have power in the policy-making process. Madrid City Council is 
committed to taking up any decision in Decide Madrid which reaches a majoritarian standard 
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(including a minimum support threshold of 1% of the population/27662 votes or a simple 
majority) into its policy-making processes. Simply put, participants indeed have some 
‘participatory power’ (Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014, p. 31) over the public budget. 
 
Andy16, a software engineer of Decide Madrid, has pointed out that citizen empowerment 
means more than simply installing and using a piece of software. In addition, the wider 
political will must exist to make participatory processes legally binding or to invest real 
money into the projects over the medium to long-term. Echoing this point, Andy, Jean17, a 
former software engineer of Decide Madrid, described how the uniqueness of Decide Madrid 
was based on the fact that Madrid City Council pays attention to the ideas of people and had 
committed to devolving real power to the user through the commitment to turn their ideas 
into projects if they are supported by a certain number of votes (1% of the registered 
population of Madrid, approx. 26,000). Decide Madrid allows the:  
 
ideas of people organising to get something done that goes against the 
opinion of the government of Madrid…like your government right now, the 
local government in Madrid does not want to do this thing, but if a certain 
number of you vote yes, they will do it… I would not call it direct 
democracy — its too strong a term I think. But yes, it is important in the 
thing that I said: that you can do things the government doesn’t want to do. 
That’s a tool for doing that, and that is really cool I think. 
 
As Jean has clearly noted, the platform of Decide Madrid is not in itself a solution for direct 
democracy but a ‘tool’ which enables users to ask the government to do things that are 
proposed by users if they have 1% support from the registered population of Madrid City. 
What matters is that Decide Madrid is used by citizens and allocated political commitment 
and resources from Madrid City Council. Without them, Decide Madrid can only function as 
a platform which can provide for ‘publicity awareness’, as Andy notes that  
the tool [Decide Madrid] can be just publicity measure for making into the 
newspapers, but I mean Consul [Decide Madrid] is not the solution, it is 
 
16 Interview on 28/10/2017 
17 Interview on 22/11/2018 
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just a tool, the solution is you actually changing your gov into adopting 
participatory democracy18.  
 
What these software engineers remind us is that the political legitimacy of a DPPP has to be 
backed up by governmental institutions which can incorporate the result of participation into 
the policy-making process. In Jean’s words, it is more about ‘how it [the platform] is used, 
because the system is made by the people inside Decide Madrid, where the government 
decided they were gonna do it — whether they like it or not’19, than merely installing a 
participatory platform.  
 
From this viewpoint, then, we can start to see the difference between Decide Madrid and 
vTaiwan. Madrid City Council committed to turning proposals into real projects which were 
able to draw on resources from a 100 million Euro budget; this includes even those proposals 
which were against the will of the elected government. However, there has not been the same 
level of political and economic support from the Taiwanese Government to take the results of 
vTaiwan into their policy-making processes. As a conclusion, we can say that Decide Madrid 
has a higher degree of empowerment than vTaiwan, because it gave political and economic 
support for incorporating the conclusions of digital political participation into political 
decisions/ processes of policy-making.  
 
A vital issue raised by my ‘situated’ account of empowerment is the fact that in contrast to 
Decide Madrid, vTaiwan does not highlight the importance of devolution of political 
decision-making power to participants, which has been considered as an important factor in 
constituting a deep democratic practice (Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014; Fung and Wright, 2001). 
The absence of meaningful devolution of political power to participants can be seen by 
studying a TED talk made by the former chief of the Taiwan Ministry of Development (Kuan, 
2015). Kuan (2015) explicitly states that vTaiwan was not designed to create conflicts with 
pre-existing regulations and configurations of political power inside the Taiwanese 
government. By not explaining who can make a real decision in vTaiwan-facilitated 
participation, Kuan (2015) implies that participants’ inputs (votes and ideas) in vTaiwan will 
not necessarily be legitimated. In acknowledging that participants’ decisions are not given 
 
18 Interview on 28/10/2017 
19 Interview on 22/11/2018 
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any political power and legitimacy, Kuan (2015) almost guarantees that vTaiwan will not 
pose any challenge to existing power relations within the policy-making process.  
 
In addition, in an interview I conducted with Derek20, a senior officer from the Taiwanese 
Cabinet Office, I heard that officials had made no firm commitments to legitimating any 
decisions which are agreed within vTaiwan. On the contrary, Derek stated that the Taiwanese 
government was delighted with the new mechanism of vTaiwan as it had not required them to 
make any meaningful commitments. In his own words:   
there is no binding…for governments to take on [the result of vTaiwan]…. 
For the government, even though it is part of the consultation…it didn’t 
commit anything that it is going to be part of decision-making, but it gets a 
proposed solution [which has undergone some consultation from vTaiwan]. 
 
Looking at the design of the vTaiwan interface it is evident to confirm that vTaiwan is not 
willing to redistribute any decision-making power to ordinary citizens because there is no 
button which enables users to propose an issue of their choice. Instead, it is only the 
Taiwanese government and civic hacking community who can ‘propose’ issues. Not having a 
‘propose’ button indicates a significant constraint over possibilities for empowerment, which 
we will see more clearly when comparing vTaiwan to Decide Madrid. 
 
Taking into account this issue and the comments made by the two Taiwanese civil servants, it 
is clear to see that vTaiwan leaves vague the issue of whether citizens can use the platform to 
make meaningful inputs into the policy-making process. Contrary to claims of empowering 
citizens, there is a danger that platforms can be repurposed by governments as tools of 
depoliticisation to ‘open-wash’ the existing power structures between governments and 
citizens (Tseng and Lee, 2017, p.3). In the report ‘Taiwan Open Government’, which focused 
on several governmental projects including vTaiwan, Tseng and Lee (2017, p.3) critically 
pointed out this ‘open-wash’ situation in Taiwan, noting that the government ‘pretends to be 
‘open’ with pretty slogans or superficial work while, in practice, does not take views from 
civil society into consideration. Openwashing turns ‘participation’ into mere propaganda for 
government and something that has no tangible impact’. Simply put, ‘open-wash’ describes 
 
20 Interview on 22/03/2018 
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when participation is merely a ‘tokenism’ where the Taiwanese Government is not politically 
held accountable for public participation (Chiang, 2017; Tseng and Lee, 2018). 
 
Despite Madrid City Council appearing to secure a degree of political legitimacy (and 
therefore a higher degree of empowerment) for Decide Madrid, I note that it is important to 
consider the influence of party politics in the political contexts in which Decide Madrid and 
vTaiwan are embedded. Drawing on the Deleuzian assemblage thinking, the use of a situated 
lens reminds us that the degree of empowerment for a DPPP should be viewed as fluid. This 
is because due to the wider political contexts in which they are embedded, heterogeneous 
actants which constitute the design assemblage, from voters to political parties will ‘come 
together and come apart’ (McFarlane, 2011, p. 653; Anderson and McFarlane, 2011, p. 126), 
gather and disintegrate. In the wider political context of the two DPPPs, we can see how over 
time both the Spanish and Taiwanese governments withdrew political and economic 
resources from the design processes of both DPPPs. Therefore, it is the transient and 
open-ended design processes that make the degree of empowerment for each DPPP not fixed, 
able to be significantly decreased due to the impacts that are imposed by wider political 
contexts.  
 
In June 2019, the Carmena Administration lost the mayoral election for Madrid City Council 
(Gilmartin, 2019), which left the operation of Decide Madrid in limbo and in the hands of the 
Conservative Party (Popular Party) in coalition with the centre-right Ciudadanos party and 
far-right Vox Party21. What this meant for Decide Madrid was that both the political and 
economic support, the political legitimacy of allocating an annual 100 million Euro budget 
and administrative support, for Decide Madrid was withdrawn by the new Conservative 
Administration in 2019. Here, it is clear to see that the degree of empowerment of Decide 
Madrid has begun to fall apart.  
 
For vTaiwan, the issue is similar, in that as the Taiwanese Government has gradually lost 
interest in ‘using’ vTaiwan for discussing new digital issues. Since 2018, there has been 
barely any new cases inputted into vTaiwan for the purposes of conducting political 
participation. The low interest the Taiwanese government has in conducting new political 
participation initiatives via vTaiwan is accompanied by a significant drop in the number of 
 
21 An information conversation with Mike, the key actor of Decide Madrid, in London, on November 13th 2019.  
117 
 
users. In 2015, there were approx. 1220 users taking part of Uber consultation, whereas, by 
2017, there were only around 150 users who took an interest in contributing to a debate on 
the issue of online abuse/violence regarding the dissemination of images of nudity (vTaiwan, 
no date). Simply put, the degree of empowerment (as it is derived from the level of political 
legitimation) for both Decide Madrid and vTaiwan is in flux, highly influenced by uncertain 
political environments; this complicates their ability to deliver certainty (and thus legitimacy) 
over the medium to long-term.  
 
 
4.3 On participatory calculus: the role of preclusions in the restriction of empowerment   
 
This section highlights how calculative practices — the creation of numerical formulae, 
numbers and machine codes for specific purposes — have been embedded within the design 
processes of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan for the purpose of anticipating particular 
democratic futures. I term the calculative practices within DPPPs their participatory calculus. 
Participatory calculus can be seen as any set of associations which translates participatory 
actions into machine codes, making every participatory action calculable by the Machine. For 
example, in the DPPPs under study here, participatory calculus is seen in the digital action of 
‘voting’ which consists of options which are associated with machine codes (such as 
agree/disagree/null/pass). 
 
By applying the situated account of empowerment, I assert that the creation of such 
participatory calculus largely reduces the individual’s capacity of conducting participatory 
acts and thus reduces empowerment. Participatory calculus precludes or restricts certain 
non-calculative and qualitative actions — especially, deliberation and speech acts — in 
favour of purely digital acts of political participation which are restricted to machine-readable 
choices such as ‘voting/supporting’ and ‘commenting/proposing’. Acts of deliberation and 
speech are considered as essential acts for empowering citizens by scholars of participatory 
democracy (e.g. Fung and Wright, 2001; Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014; Pateman, 2012) and the 
digital citizen (Isin and Ruppert, 2015). For instance, the ability to express a wide range of 
speech acts — such as feelings, ideas and claims — is restricted to allowing the user to 
‘comment’ on proposals in a limited and digitally-mediated way.    
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Here, we can see the degree of empowerment for the two DPPPs varies as a result of the 
different sets of participatory calculus they employ. For example, by restricting qualitative 
actions (such as vTaiwan’s imposition of a 140-word limit), such as posting and 
communicating, the design of vTaiwan restricts the ability of empowerment for users to 
express themselves in digitally mediated participatory processes more than Decide Madrid. 
Thus, the question of the existence of participatory calculus within each DPPP should not be 
read in empowerment terms as a binary on/off, but should be seen as producing outcomes 
along a varying spectrum of empowerment; this is because how the two DPPPs under study 
impose their logics of participatory calculus is different. 
 
 
4.3.1 Participatory calculus: how machine coding closes down acts of deliberation with a 
digital act of voting   
 
In her study of risk calculus, Amoore (2013) has indicated that algorithms promise to 
pre-empt potential risks such as terrorism and illegal immigration. Amoore shows how by 
transforming the unknown future into a defined output on a numerical risk score, algorithms 
exclude particular forms of life from being seen and prevent the ability of subjects to protest 
against algorithmic decisions. Using the example of Doll — a woman who becomes a 
terrorist suspect — in William Flanagan’s novel of ‘The Unknown Terrorist’, Amoore (2013, 
p. 83, 93) vividly describes how an anticipatory model excludes the life events of Doll and 
transforms her into a different person: 
 
the series of her life events that she might recount to protest her innocence 
(the circumstances of her childhood, the death of her own child, her job as 
a pole dancer, her friendships as more than associations) are torn apart as 
variables and reassembled as a chain of events signalling emergent 
dangerous intent.  
 
Just as Amoore (2013, p. 157) has illustrated how risk calculus renders lives ‘definable, 
locatable, and securable’, the participatory calculus in vTaiwan-Pol.is reduces the rich life of 
a citizen — the user - by reducing her to a set of potential actions and responses expressed in 
binary machine codes (1, -1) or (1, -1, 0 or _/null). Any given participatory behaviour is 
119 
 
translated into a digital action which is rendered as a user ‘decision’ — essentially, a vote - 
via the logic of participatory calculus. For instance, participatory calculus will give the action 
of ‘agree’ the machine-code ‘1’. Users can only be represented as humans within the system 
via a restricted list of designated code associations, which include:  
 
1. a participant agrees with/supports a comment (code ‘1’) 
2. a participant disagrees a comment (code ‘-1’)   
3. a participant pass a comment (code ‘0’) 
4. a participant didn’t evaluate a comment ( code ‘null’) 
 
In the case of Uber, as Figure 5 shows, participant No.7 is inscribed as a particular set of 
machine-calculable association, which can be represented as  
(-1,_,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,-1,_,1,_ ,_ ,_ ,_ ,_ ,_ ,_ ,_ ,_ ,_ ,_……………). This example shows that 
no matter how complicated a users’ actions are in the ‘real world’, their actions can always 
be anticipated and translated into a line of machine code, a voting pattern that represents a 
user and is stored in the database of a DPPP. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: An example of some of the calculable relationalities produced in the case of the Uber consultation in 
vTaiwan (source: 
https://github.com/audreyt/polis-tally/blob/gh-pages/vtaiwan-uberx-08-09-participants-votes.csv, access at 
16/Jan/2019) 
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It is important to note for the purposes of this study that in reducing user actions to a set of 
machine codes — digital actions of ‘voting’ — digital design not only acts to create 
‘categories’ which render reality as ‘calculable’ information (Marvin and Luque-Ayala, 2017, 
p. 89) but also closes down the ability of users to be empowered. It limits the potential of 
public participation because it puts constraints or exclusions on participatory actions that are 
non-calculable within the system of the two platforms, in particular acts of deliberation such 
as debate. Acts of lively deliberation are considered as an essential element in participatory 
democracy (Mouffe, 1999, Pateman 2012, Fung and Wright, 2003; Baiocchi and Ganuza, 
2014), which are lost and displaced under the logic of participatory calculus.  
 
Despite different views existing on the possibility of having a rational consensus and 
resolution in participatory democracy22, what is shared across all theorists is a desire to 
highlight the possibility that diverse participants can have the ability to speak up for their 
interests and engage with different viewpoints. Pateman (2012, p. 8) clearly indicates that 
‘deliberation, discussion, and debate are central to any form of democracy, including 
participatory democracy’. Deliberative processes are also at the core of the concept of the 
participatory budget, which has been scrutinized by Fung and Wright (2001) in terms of its 
contribution to democracy.  
 
I was given a profound sense of the importance of such lively deliberation whilst I was 
observing the polling stations at Madrid’s Plaza de Los Misterios during the voting on the 
Decide Madrid participatory budget in November 2017. Whilst users of Decide Madrid could 
vote purely online, they were also given the option to vote in a physical space in their own 
communities in Madrid. Voters were asked to choose between two proposed options for a 
regeneration project by ticking a box, and could also tick a third box indicating no agreement 
with either proposal; these choices were later manually inputted into the Decide Madrid 
platform by civil servants. However despite the suggested potential for additional community 
involvement, actual input into the platform was limited by prior design to recognising three 
machine-coded options: Agree with Plan A, Agree with Plan B, or Disagree with both plans.  
 
However, despite this limitation imposed by the prior design process, whilst I was observing 
the voting it was clear that I was viewing much richer participatory ‘content’ than was 
 
 
121 
 
suggested by the three machine-coded options. Before actually voting for the regeneration 
plans, participants (residents of specific voting areas, single people, couples and families) 
read explanations and diagrams of two regeneration plans carefully and discussed them with 
friends, family members, or other voters. The conversation was very lively and vibrant, 
supplemented with bodily movements. Some of the participants would point to the plaza 
which was to be regenerated to discuss and imagine the potential implications of each plan 
with their kids, friends or families (see Figure 6). Some would discuss why they liked Plan A 
instead of Plan B with volunteers at the polling stations. 
 
Here, it is clear to see how the logic of participatory calculus precluded a vast range of 
potential user actions by channelling them into trinary pre-defined categories. In an informal 
conversation with Lily and Joseph, who both play a leading role in designing participatory 
community projects in Madrid, they indicated to me that Decide Madrid views on public 
participation were ‘too narrow’. Joseph pointed out that public participation is not just about 
‘voting’ but also about ‘strengthen[ing] the community bond to create new social tissue like 
talking, deliberating. It is like building and learning together’. 
 
 
Figure 6: The discussion before voting in Puente de Vallecas (Source: owned by myself). 
 
What Joseph emphasised is that the particular non-calculable action of deliberation is a staple 
in public participation performed under ‘real-world’ conditions; it builds a sense of 
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‘togetherness’ amongst participants which is arguably essential for real political discourse to 
take place. He indicated that deliberation can really bring people to work together to write 
proposals and create networks of support for particular issues before voting. 
 
These observations exemplify how a simplistic design of the participatory calculus, by 
excluding such non-calculable lively acts of discussion, purposefully closes down 
opportunities for democratic expression. That this design choice was consciously-made was 
confirmed by Mike, a key actor of Decide Madrid. When I went back from the polling station 
to the office in Madrid City Hall and told Mike about the lively interactions I had observed in 
the voting venue, he replied that ‘we only care about numbers because that’s the key to the 
success of direct democracy’ (derived from fieldnotes). Apparently, Mike sees numbers as the 
only way of making public participation practices calculable and knowable; this is the 
essence of anticipatory logic. This short story is reminiscent of Orlikowski and Scott’s (2015) 
critique of TripAdvisor’s evaluative functions, in which they problematised the 
standardisation of the uniqueness of the content written in the comments via the imposition of 
a five-point quantitative scoring mechanism: 
[the five quantitative scores] ignores these subjective reviews [what is 
written in the comment]….…..This eradicates idiosyncrasies and conflates 
differences in user reviews, algorithmically enacting a standardized view 
that excludes vital relationships and context details that help make sense of 
the review as part of the process of travel (Orlikowski and Scott 2015, 
p.211). 
 
Therefore, it is evident to see the design of participatory calculus anticipates and turns 
uncertainties inherent in participatory actions into a calculable number, a quantitative 
machine code, a digital action of ‘voting’. The implication of such participatory calculus is 
critical, as it precludes and eradicates what has been considered as important acts by various 
scholars of democracy (Mouffe, 1990; Pateman 2012, Fung and Wright 2001): the quality of 
deliberation, seen in terms of the richness and liveliness of a particular conversation or 
debate.  
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4.3.2 The restriction or removal of digital actions of commenting and communicating  
 
In this section, I will introduce another example to substantiate how participatory calculus 
can further restrict the ability of a DPPP to empower an individual by reducing or eliminating 
certain digital actions for political participation, with particular regard to acts of 
‘commenting/proposing’ and ‘communicating’. Just as verbal acts of deliberation and 
discussion are reduced to machine-coded acts of ‘voting’ via the logic of participatory 
calculus, participatory calculus can also restrict and remove digital actions of commenting 
and communicating. Here, both of these digital actions are considered as equivalent to 
‘speech acts’ (Isin and Ruppert, 2015); the ability to make these are practically and 
theoretically considered as necessary for empowerment because they allow citizens to 
express, articulate and exchange their ideas as subjects with other users (Isin and Ruppert 
2015). It is important to note that the design decisions of the interfaces understudy 
precondition and confine digital actions of ‘commenting/proposing’ and ‘communicating’ to 
different degrees, and in bringing out how the two DPPPs understudy compare in this regard, 
I will further unveil the significant implications of interface design on restricting user 
freedom before the actual practice of digital political participation had begun. 
 
VTaiwan-Pol.is has established two important restrictions on the digital actions of 
‘commenting/proposing’ and ‘communicating’. For ‘commenting’, the platform only allows a 
user to write a comment which contains 140 characters or fewer; this is indicated clearly in 
the interface. Bryon, Matthew and Felicity23, practitioners who work for vTaiwan-Pol.is, 
express that what they seek to anticipate via this restriction is to encourage users to generate 
‘short and sweet’ comments, rather than lengthy, unclear and out-of-focused narratives. 
Matthew24, a software from vTaiwan, explained that the decision taken within the design 
process to include a ‘word limit’ seeks to ‘push them [users] to think a different 
expression...or to refine your explanation’. That is to say, the process of design, by delimiting 
the length of the user’s action of ‘commenting’, expects users to have the capacity to ‘sort out’ 
or ‘improve’ their writing. The individual is thus presumed to have the capacity to rationally 
outline her goals and views in a particular manner.    
 
 
23 Derived from fieldnotes 
24 Interview on 03/03/2018 
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Secondly, the design process has completely prevented users from practising the digital 
action of ‘communicating’: users are unable to write comments in reply to other comments, 
and as a result, they are completely impeded from performing any communication with other 
users. Key actors from Pol.is Inc. and vTaiwan, such as Felicity and Diana25, have explained 
this particular design decision as being aimed at pre-empting ‘trolling’: users writing in an 
aggressive and emotionally ‘irrational’ way toward each other. This restriction on supposed 
‘trolling’ is considered by the designers to be a benefit, as it is seen as improving the quality 
of public participation.   
 
This restricted ability is a direct constraint on the user empowerment. As mentioned in 
Section 4.1, theorists see an important element of the ability of empowerment in cyberspace 
is being able to conduct a wide range of different ‘speech acts’, including communicating, 
commenting, blogging, messaging, tagging, posting, emailing, filtering, liking, friending and 
so on (just to name a few) (Isin and Ruppert, 2015, p. 69). These digital speech acts make it 
possible for a citizen to conduct the ‘act of saying and doing something — whether through 
words, images or other things’ as a rights-claiming subject (Isin and Ruppert 2015, p.53, 60). 
Therefore, by reducing and removing the digital actions of ‘commenting’ and 
‘communicating’, the design of vTaiwan-Pol.is has directly restricted the ability of 
empowerment for a user, and thus their status as a subject.  
 
By contrast to the views of the designers of vTaiwan, the importance of digital actions of 
‘communicating’ amongst users without constraints on word count was emphasised by Mike, 
a key actor from Decide Madrid. Mike considers writing replies to other users as one of the 
fundamental actions of participation in Decide Madrid. It is the undefined nature of writing 
that generates what he calls ‘collective intelligence’:  
The most interesting part of the consul is to produce the collective 
intelligence that is from the parts that are not defined. Even though we 
define some steps in participation, most of the things are not really 
defined…we just let people communicate between them, but we don’t tell 
them what to communicate…there is no strategy…we just have an open 
communication…and we know that we will lead to collective intelligence.  
 
 
25 Interview on 05/01/2018 (for Felicity), 25/09/2018 (for Diana) 
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Following this strategy of open communication, Decide Madrid decided not to set up a word 
limit for users to write a proposal or a comment, and thus, in Mike’s view, empowered users. 
For Mike, this unlimited writing indicates the ability of empowerment by creating 
communication amongst users and possibly leads to what he calls ‘collective intelligence’. 
Here, we arrive at a point of difference between Decide Madrid and vTaiwan in terms of how 
their anticipatory powers restrict and regulate the ability of users. As I have shown, the design 
of vTaiwan prevented users from writing a comment in reply to any comment, which left 
users with no ability to communicate with other users through words in vTaiwan. In doing so, 
there is no possibility for users to develop a ‘conversation-thread’, as is possible in Decide 
Madrid platform.  
 
In addition, in contrast to vTaiwan, Decide Madrid provides users with an ability to write in 
reply to proposals and comments, and thus enables digital actions of ‘commenting’ and 
‘communicating’ (Isin and Ruppert, 2015, p. 69). Users can leave a comment to any proposal 
as a way of communicating with others in Decide Madrid, in what Mike and Paul call a 
‘conversation-thread’ (derived from fieldnotes) around citizen proposals. For example, one of 
the most controversial citizen proposals is to ask all Catholic churches to pay property tax, 
which has received more than 449 comments with numerous ‘answers’ (sub-comments) to 
them (see Figure 7).  
 
As Isin and Ruppert (2015, pp. 69, 71) point out, digital actions are vital components for 
users to conduct speech acts of saying and doing using statements such as ‘I, we, they have a 
right to’. What this ‘conversation thread’ highlight is that the digital design of participatory 
calculus plays an essential role in preconditioning which participatory actions users can 
conduct. The clear differences between Decide Madrid and vTaiwan which were set up in the 
design processes show that digital design can both open up and close down the ability of 
users to conduct digital actions for political participation, such as ‘commenting’ and 
‘communicating’; this has implications in closing down and opening up the overall ability of 
users to become empowered.   
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Figure 7: Part of a conversation thread in Decide Madrid related to whether Catholic churches should pay 
property tax to local authorities (Source: 
https://decide.madrid.es/proposals/965-aplicacion-del-ibi-a-los-bienes-inmuebles-de-la-iglesia, access at 
31/01/2019) 
 
Understanding empowerment in this particular way, I show how the creation of the 
participatory calculus can preclude the ability of empowerment for individuals, which entails 
those acts of deliberation, including acts of communicating and commenting, which have 
been understood by scholars as critical actions to empower users to make rights-claiming 
statements as digital subjects (Isin and Ruppert, 2015). By critically disclosing what is 
precluded by the design of vTaiwan and Decide Madrid as a result of their desire to make all 
actions calculable, I substantiate Amoore’s (2013, p.54) unravelling of the ‘political effects’ 
of ‘partial and incomplete judgement and decisions’ masquerading beneath the supposedly 
objective and democratic claims of surveillance technologies. Designing the participatory 
calculus has political implications on empowerment precisely because it forecloses or 
restricts the ability of users to deliberate and express themselves with others.   
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4.4 (Re)considering ethics in an anticipated democratic future via the situated lens 
 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated how the situated lens can critically examine the design of 
two DPPPs by combining an assemblage approach with theories of empowerment; this 
provides a ‘situated’ account on the varied networks which bring themselves to bear on the 
design/articulation of the DPPPs and affect the capacity which individual users have to 
perform certain practices of empowerment: such as to be able to debate in a meaningful way 
and make decisions which have a real impact in policymaking. This can be seen through 
viewing processes inscribed through the design of the DPPPs through what I discern as the 
common standards for empowerment, with a focus on (1) general issues of political 
legitimacy; and (2) the ability of an individual citizen to become empowered. These two 
levels of focus have been seen as constituting the nitty-gritty of democracy by various 
scholars (Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014; Fung and Wright, 2001; Isin and Ruppert, 2015). 
Adhering to these standards, I went ‘beneath’ the ‘solutionist’ global narrative espoused by 
both DPPPs to interrogate the particular arrangements of algorithms (including machine 
coding), user actions, economic/political resources and attitudes towards various aspects of 
political communication; these are shown to constitute the particular democratic futures 
permitted under each platform. I unveiled how such arrangements render a minimal and thin 
understanding of the future of democracy as majoritarian ‘consensus’ which is produced on 
the basis of legitimising calculable user actions of voting, whilst eliminating other user 
actions, such as deliberating, commenting and communicating. It is important to note that 
these insufficiencies, which preclude the ability to deepen practices of empowerment, are not 
easy to detect on the surface, as they are concealed underneath a glamorous and 
self-celebratory narrative of DPPPs as global solutions to the democratic deficit. 
 
The sense of empowerment specifies that real democracy should entail political legitimacy 
(defined by sufficient economic and political support) and participatory ability (deliberation 
and digital acts for political participation) (see Figure 8). The existence of such elements of 
empowerment is not a binary yes/no; existence is more like a spectrum in which these 
elements can be present to greater or lesser extents. In other words, the situated lens can 
uncover how empowerment can exist to varying degrees. It is clear that Decide Madrid has a 
higher degree of empowerment than vTaiwan, but neither platform can be seen to possess the 
full range. It is in this sense that I not only problematise the design processes of the two 
128 
 
DPPPs in terms of the empowerment they preclude but also note that their anticipated futures 
raise important ethical and political concerns.  
 
Figure 8: a table of empowerment assessment 
Dimensions of 
empowerment 
Decide Madrid  VTaiwan 
Economic and 
political support 
100 million Euro and 
administrative resources from 
Madrid City Council; temporary  
With limited commitment; 
temporary  
Citizens’ ability of 
political participation: 
acts of deliberation  
Replacing with ‘voting’ Replacing with ‘voting’  
Citizens’ ability of 
political participation: 
digital acts of 
petitioning, 
organising, recruiting, 
contributing, 
campaigning, 
blogging 
Restricting ‘proposing’ and 
‘commenting’ 
Reducing to ‘commenting’ 
with a word limit 140 
characters, no 
‘communicating’  
 
 
The situated lens also stresses on examining the degree of empowerment for the design 
processes in the two DPPPS via a comparative approach. Taking a comparative approach 
offers nuances in the ‘situated’ understanding of empowerment, in that it highlights the fact 
that there are different degrees of empowerment embedded in the design processes of Decide 
Madrid and vTaiwan, and that both the creation of participatory calculus and the allocation of 
political legitimacy are key factors in determining the degree of empowerment for both 
DPPPs. On one level, a comparative approach indicates the significant role that the existence 
of medium to long-term economic and political support plays in ‘securing’ the political 
legitimacy of empowering practices by showing how the Taiwanese Government and Madrid 
City Council allocate different political commitment and resources. Madrid City Council 
guarantees financial security by allocating a 100 million Euro municipal budget and giving 
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political power into the hands of a simple majority of citizens, in a way which is not possible 
in vTaiwan. In this sense, Decide Madrid provides a more empowering practice for citizens, 
as seen by comparing it with vTaiwan, where participants have no guarantee that their 
comments and decisions have an impact in the policy-making process.  
 
On another level, a comparative approach reveals the crucial role that the creation of 
participatory calculus plays in determining the capacity of individuals to act in digitally 
mediated political participation. Section 4.4 illustrates that the decisions made by software 
engineers and politicians whilst designing a participatory calculus have largely eradicated or 
reduced users’ ability to perform acts of political participation — such as deliberating, 
petitioning, organising, recruiting, contributing, and campaigning (Isin and Ruppert, 2015, p. 
65, 69) — into sets of machine-coded options for voting, algorithmic calculations of voting 
actions. Of course, there is a difference between Decide Madrid and vTaiwan in how the 
making of participatory calculus serves to reduce the degree of empowerment for users. 
Participants in Decide Madrid can ‘write’ to express themselves and can exchange their ideas 
with others without much restriction; in comparison, vTaiwan users’ ability to express 
themselves is largely restricted to 140 characters and the ability to communicate with other 
users is therefore eradicated. Therefore, a comparative approach can highlight the two 
specific ‘factors’ (political legitimacy and individual ability of participation) in determining 
the degree of empowerment for both DDDPs, which are shared and evidenced across two 
different cultural, political and social contexts.  
 
Whilst the existence of such a commitment in Decide Madrid is a necessary aspect of 
empowerment, borrowing from assemblage thinking (Anderson and McFarlane, 2011), the 
situated lens highlights the design processes as open-ended and fluid. As a result of this 
fluidity, the impacts of the design assemblage on degrees of empowerment can rise or fall due 
to the changes within the actors who constitute the design processes or the contexts in which 
they are situated. Such a situated understanding has two implications for our understanding of 
DPPP’s degrees of empowerment. Firstly, both the Spanish and Taiwanese governments have 
recently withdrawn their political and economic resources from the design processes and 
have therefore significantly decreased the degree of user empowerment within the DPPPs 
(see in Section 4.3.3). Secondly, understanding the design of DPPPs as open-ended processes 
can offer a way to (re)consider ethics around practices which aim to anticipate certain 
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democratic futures. How should we conceptualise problems of ethics in the digital age? 
Indeed, decisions made by software engineers and politicians in arranging and associating 
machine codes with users’ action and claims for democracy have posed ethical-political 
concern because they attempt to determinate how futures will be ‘solved’, and because they 
preclude legitimacy and abilities of empowerment. Can our democratic futures be solved and 
decided by using a system of voting which relies so much on the concept of the rule of simple 
majority? Or in vTaiwan’s case, will such anticipated futures simply become empty promises 
from the government, which has not committed to endorsing political power and economic 
support to legitimate decisions made by users? Recognising these concerns, I propose that the 
situated lens can provide a way of thinking about such ethical issues.  
 
By viewing the design processes as open-ended, the situated lens recognises the potentialities 
within the design processes of DPPPs, which are unknown or half-form possibilities that are 
not fully actualised but are potentially transformative and possibly progressive. Highlighting 
this potential dimension in the design process can be seen as an ethical response to the 
creation of algorithmic-driven technologies: this view allows us to take up and assemble 
half-formed potentialities, unknown futures, into something else. As noted by Amoore (2013, 
p. 168), an ethical response to the use of algorithms in risk calculus must be able to 
understand that the calculated possibilities such calculus produces have ‘to live with the 
unknowability of the future’ and recognise the partiality in understanding the world as a 
singular output which is contained within the calculus. What is left ‘unscanned’, 
‘unanticipated’ or ‘understood’ by the risk calculus is the unknown potentiality of futures. 
Amoore’s focus on of future potentialities enriches a situated account of ethics in that ethics 
in the digital age should recognise futures as ones whose potentialities lie beyond what can be 
anticipated by the design of a democratic future by a given DPPP. Only in doing so can we 
seize and harness unknown futures to produce something more productive and progressive by 
changing the design processes. What this means for more ethical practice in the design of the 
two DPPPs is that majoritarian futures must be open to the potential that alternatives might 
exist which contain greater degrees of empowerment.  
 
Considering the ethics in this way, then, how should we foreground it into action? As a 
situated lens understands the design of DPPPs as an on-going process which is constituted by 
human and nonhuman, there is always room for doubting and dissenting the inherent 
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preclusions within design processes.   
 
Building on Amoore’s (2019) work on posthuman ethics in relation to algorithms within the 
context of surveillance, I explain that the use of a situated lens serves to reiterate that ethics in 
the digital age should interrogate whether any given subject is permitted to doubt and 
question the decisions made in the design process which potentially preclude other 
possibilities of empowerment, with the knowledge that design of any digital technologies 
cannot anticipate and determine the whole potentiality of our futures. Here, Amoore (2019, p. 
3) specifically explains that ‘this doubtful subject’ is not:  
a unitary individual, but is a composite subject in whom the doubts of 
human and non-human beings dwell together, opening onto an undecidable 
future, where one is permitted to ask new questions on the political 
landscape.  
What may such a composite subject look like in the context of DPPPs? I have observed 
negotiations for more inclusive design being conducted between the team of Decide Madrid 
and participants within Madrid City Council, where dissent against a consensus-based future 
was expressed by former or current members from vTaiwan team, where software engineers 
in Pol.is Inc. and Decide Madrid expressed doubt and challenges on decisions that were made 
by Machine Learning algorithms grouping users. Here, I saw what Amoore (2019) considers 
as ‘doubtful subject’ takes on posthuman forms because there was a formation of an 
‘inquisitive’ or ‘curious’ relationship between participants/software engineers and algorithms. 
Not only can participants and software engineers doubt the decisions made by participatory 
calculus, but also (specifically Machine Learning algorithms) can doubt their own decisions 
on dividing users into Opinion Groups. However, I can foresee that the most critical issue is 
whether the software engineers or politicians who hold the power to anticipate and 
determining a future are willing to take negotiations and dissent into serious consideration. 
For vTaiwan in particular, this process must be more than ‘listening’ to different ideas but 
should also produce real opportunities to empower citizens with decision-making power.  
 
Finally, the situated lens shows the importance for researchers to pay attention to the broader 
political and local context when considering the design of a democratic future. Viewing the 
design of DPPPs via the situated lens, then, researchers can examine its effect on 
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empowerment on the basis of how a platform is locally assembled and interpreted by a local 
government. The situated lens echoes what Kitchin (2017) and Suchman (2007, p. 168) calls 
researchers to examine the context in which algorithmic technologies are ‘interpreted vis-` 
a-vis the world’, where they are designed, perform and operation, preciously because of the 
heterogeneous nature of algorithmic technologies. Algorithms can do various tasks depends 
on how they are designed and interpreted in a particular context (Kitchin, 2017). By 
analysing how DPPPs are designed and given a meaning within its political context, the 
situated lens again highlights the benefits of using the idea of data assemblage is to really 
examine the nature of algorithmic systems through its embeddedness with technological, 
political, social and economic systems (Kitchin, 2017; Kitchin and Lauriault, 2018; Ash, 
Kitchin and Leszczynski, 2018, p. 37). It is only in doing so that we can see how designing a 
platform for democracy opens up and closes down possibilities for democratic futures.   
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Chapter 5 On the dynamic User Interface: the production of waves of 
possibilities and limitations in digital empowerment  
 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4, I compared how differences in the design processes of the two DPPPs 
influenced the degree of empowerment they could offer the user, based on my deployment of 
a situated lens which draws on the concept of participatory democracy (Fung and Wright, 
2001; Pateman, 2012; Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014). I discovered that the participatory 
calculus in Decide Madrid and vTaiwan largely prelimits digital participatory actions users 
can perform into: (1) the ability to propose/comment; and (2) the ability of a user to vote on a 
proposal which has either been inputted into the system from elsewhere or inputted by 
another user. This participatory calculus has limited the ability of users to be able to 
deliberate with each other and thus limited the degree of empowerment that the two DPPPs 
could offer. In this chapter, I explore the effects of the interactions between the user and the 
digital interfaces of the two platforms, in the context of the aforementioned ‘limited’ degree 
of empowerment of the two DPPPs which has already been discovered. It is the interaction 
between users and the digital interface which constitutes the assemblage that I will 
investigate here.  
 
A digital interface is the medium through which a user interacts with a computer. It 
constitutes that which is visible on the screen when a user logs into the platform, and what 
allows them to perform the various functions of the DPPPs I have described. Rose (2016, p. 
314) sees the digital interface as a distinctive and transient entity which cannot be reduced as 
‘an inert object’. Decide Madrid and vTaiwan both utilise what is known as a dynamic User 
Interface (dynamic UI). A UI is a digital interface which has been designed to operate through 
a web browser to allow a user to perform the various functions which each platform 
possesses, such as proposing, voting or commenting. It is ‘dynamic’ because the appearance 
of the UI to a given user is mediated and visualised by algorithms, which interact with user 
data so that each time the UI appears to the user, it is different from every other time. The 
appearance of the dynamic UI to the user at any given time has the potential to change due to 
changes in the user data inputted into the DPPP (levels of support for proposals, for example); 
therefore, the actions of the user affect the UI, and the UI affects the ability of the user to act. 
The dynamic nature of the UI of the two DPPPs under study is most interesting from the 
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point of view of empowerment.   
 
In line with my deployment of a situated lens, I will refer to the user-interface relationship 
specifically as a dynamic UI assemblage, whose visible existence is mutually and 
dynamically constituted by user practices and algorithms which are located within wider 
policymaking processes. In doing so, I intend to answer these questions, which have a 
specific focus on the dynamic UI:  
  
(1) What are the effects of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan’s dynamic UIs on citizen 
empowerment? 
(2) How do the dynamic UIs of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan differ in terms of 
potential for citizen empowerment? 
 
Why does emphasising the dynamic UI matter in an examination of how the two DPPPs’ 
impact on citizen empowerment? I argue that studying the particular form the digital interface 
matters for this form serves to constitute the space where digital political participation takes 
place. In these cases, the specific form the digital interface takes - a dynamic UI - is 
particularly of relevance, due to the mediation by algorithms which is integrated into the 
system. The digital interface has been identified by Ash (2010), Rose (2016) and Ash et al. 
(2018a) as an important space where agencies between the human and the non-human 
interact and play out. Rose (2016, p. 341-342) channels our attention towards thinking of the 
interface not only as an ‘active’ entity in its own right but also as being part of the whole 
operation of software and as ‘part of the human practices that shape and are shaped by 
engagements with interfaces’. The interface as such:  
 is a transitory pulsing of electrons, temporarily convened on a phone 
screen, a consequence of relations between and among hardware, software 
and practices, showing a few of millions of other messages and snaps that 
reside on Twitter’s servers (Rose, 2016, p. 341).  
 
From here, it is evident that the digital interface matters for it is both an assemblage of 
human-software in its own right and is also part of the wider assemblage of the digital 
ecosystem. We need to avoid viewing a digital interface as a fixed entity which does not have 
any impact on my assessment of empowerment and of assuming the digital interface is a 
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stable object which ‘plays by the rules’ that were programmed and designed by software 
engineers. In order not to fall into this way of thinking about the digital interface, we must 
find ways of uncovering how the interactions between the interface and users serve to both 
enable and restrain certain user capacities related to empowerment. 
 
Building upon Rose’s (2016, p. 324) definition of a digital interface, the situated lens sees the 
UI as a dynamic UI assemblage which is defined as co-generating and co-functioning both 
users’ actions and algorithmic visualisations within a given political context. Both algorithms 
and users can destabilise or reinforce the ways in which the visual existence of a UI plays out 
in terms of the experience of a specific user. This understanding of digital interface as a UI 
assemblage is important for my assessment of the two DPPPs’ effects on empowerment 
because the dynamic nature of the UI assemblages used by the DPPPs may have a new and 
significant implication in our understanding of digital empowerment. It is even more crucial 
due to the theoretical and empirical contributions this idea of dynamic UI assemblage can 
make to current understandings of digital political participation. As Isin and Ruppert (2015, 
pp. 81–84) point out, there is very little social research investigating political perspectives on 
digital participation which does not reduce users to a fixed set of participatory skills and 
capacities, such as those which are set out in the discourse of digital divide/inclusion 
(Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal, 2008; Isin and Ruppert, 2015, pp. 81–84). By integrating 
an understanding of the role of unexpected effects stemming from interactions between users 
and algorithms, the concept of dynamic UI assemblage also avoids a reductive analysis of 
participants as passive users whose behaviours and identities are controlled by algorithms 
(Lash, 2007; Cheney-Lippold, 2011).  
 
Considering digital interface as dynamic UI assemblage, then, can we make any claims about 
how it should be viewed in terms of ability to provide digital empowerment? Following the 
situated lens, I define digital empowerment as an enabling environment where users feel 
engaged and capable of making informed actions of political participation, namely voting, 
proposing and commenting (which have been predefined within the design processes of the 
two DPPPs). That is to say, digital empowerment is not only about users’ participatory 
capacities to conduct whichever political actions are granted to them by designers and 
policymakers, but is also about their ‘feelings’ and whether they take consideration of 
relevant information when voting, proposing and commenting (Mäkinen, 2006; Fung and 
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Wright, 2001; Fisher, 2012). I have developed this specific definition of digital empowerment 
from theories of (digital) empowerment (Mäkinen, 2006; Fung and Wright, 2001; Fisher, 
2012; Barry, 2001). First, developing a sense of engagement amongst users is regarded by 
Mäkinen (2006) and Fisher (2012) as a staple in increasing the degree of (digital) 
empowerment. In an early investigation of the impact of digital technology on empowerment 
in Finland, Mäkinen (2006) noted that by feeling part of the wider community or society, 
users can increase their motivation to take part in political and other forms of social 
participation. Fisher (2012) also illustrates that when it comes to developing more 
empowered practices of political participation, having a sense of engagement is even more 
crucial than having a strong participatory capacity because it is more difficult to motivate 
users to participate in digital political participation (for a lot of hidden costs) than to build 
their participatory capacity.      
 
Apart from a sense of engagement and motivation, having a capacity to learn and make an 
informed and collective decision-making is another important pillar for empowerment. In 
developing the idea of ‘empowered participatory governance’, we can see both Fisher (2012) 
and Fung and Wright (2001) note that learning to be able to communicate and deliberate are 
key factors for citizen empowerment. In particular, Fung and Wright (2001) highlight the 
central role of collective feeling when it comes to making a decision (voting) in political 
participation. They claim that empowered political participation requires that participants are 
able to make ‘collective’ decisions between alternative projects through voting; a collective 
decision is one which does not just revolve around consideration of self-interest but also 
around having considered the ‘reasonableness, fairness, or acceptability’ of other options 
(Fung, and Wright, 2001, p. 20). Though he does not explicitly mention political activity, in 
exploring the empowering effect of using interactive devices in museums, Andrew Barry 
(2001) proposes that citizens are likely to learn how to participate and be empowered as 
subjects through using and interacting with digital systems. He describes how such 
empowered subjects are not disciplined by technology but are enabled to co-produce new 
ideas and thoughts through interactivities with digital devices (Barry, 2001, pp. 129, 136, 
151). 
 
To recap, within the goals and confines of the two DPPPs as sites for providing the ability to 
conduct digital political participation (as in voting, commenting/proposing), I see the concept 
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of empowerment as an enabling situation in which participants can feel a sense of 
engagement and learn to make collective actions, such as proposing and voting, which take 
into consideration information which has been provided to them about the feelings of other 
users through the interaction of users and the digital interface. As we are going to see in the 
following sections, I will stress the importance of understanding how unexpected actions of 
users and algorithms can play a role in influencing UI assemblages. I argue that the dynamic 
UIs of the two DPPPs produce a fluid and changeable situation in which new possibilities for 
digital empowerment are being produced whilst others are becoming constrained. In one 
sense, the dynamic UI can offer new possibilities of empowerment by enabling users to feel 
part of an online participatory community and to learn to make informed and collective 
decisions on voting and proposing/commenting. On the other hand, in other instances the 
dynamic UI can introduce limitations on empowerment by disabling and depriving users’ 
capacity to vote and propose/comment. To put it simply, my focus on the dynamic UI as an 
assemblage of co-actions of users and algorithms located in wider political contexts shows 
the potent implications for empowerment that a digital interface can provide within the 
context of digital political participation.  
 
To elaborate my argument with a detailed analysis on the effects of the dynamic UI on 
empowerment, I will use the analytical devices of ‘thresholds’ and ‘barriers’, which I borrow 
from Ash et al. (2018a)’s analysis of interface design in an online credit system. Ash et al. 
(2018a, pp. 1138, 1140) describe how the interface design ‘modulates’ users’ behaviour and 
emotion by mitigating frictions (emerging emotional or technical obstacles) in ways which 
allow users to apply for a loan in an interface of an online credit system. Importantly, these 
analytical devices allow me to illustrate the ways in which the dynamic UI enables and 
disables user actions (and thus empowerment) in digital political participation. I use the term 
‘thresholds’ to denote how the dynamic UI enables users to feel engaged, motivated, and 
reflective in conducting digital acts of political participation and thus open up possibilities in 
digital empowerment. I use the term ‘barriers’ to indicate limitations that the dynamic UI 
places on empowerment. The word ‘barriers’ suggests a ‘hostile’ situation in which the 
dynamic UI in some way confuses or disables users’ participatory capacities, generally seen 
in these cases as the ability to vote and comment/propose. These barriers are referred by Ash 
et al.’s (2018a, p. 1138) as ‘frictions’, which are defined as: 
a series of bodily and technical obstacles or hesitancies that…..stop a user 
138 
 
from completing a task within a digital interface, such as choosing a 
service or buying a product [highlighted by myself]. 
 
Additionally, I will note that the dynamic UI assemblage can impose a further limit on digital 
empowerment because the ‘participatory power’ of a given user — seen as the ability of a 
user to make decisions which can have a real impact in policymaking — is unevenly 
distributed amongst all users. I will describe how this unevenly distributed participatory 
power amongst users results in the favouring of small groups of powerful users, which I will 
term ‘princelings’. What this power imbalance indicates is a basic inequality in users’ 
participatory knowledge and capacity to take part in digital political participation. This shows 
a further limitation of the dynamic UI assemblage in terms of digital empowerment.  
 
I now outline how I am going to develop my argument in this chapter. In Section 5.2, I will 
illustrate how the dynamic UI design of Decide Madrid acts to create barriers which reduce 
users’ capacity to vote and propose and to produce soft thresholds (Ash et al., 2018a) which 
highlight suggested information which enables users’ capacity to make informed and 
collective decisions in voting and proposing. In Section 5.3, moving to the dynamic UI of 
vTaiwan, I will offer a detailed illustration of how vTaiwan’s UI manifests effects of 
gamification (Hassan, 2017) to increase users’ sense of engagement and thus conduct 
collective and informed actions of ‘voting’ and ‘commenting’. However, at the same time as 
this both of the dynamic UIs also produce barriers which confuse and disable users’ capacity 
to vote and comment. In Section 5.4, I disclose how the ‘participatory power’ of individual 
users is not evenly distributed, meaningful more powerful users emerge known as 
‘princelings’. Last but not least, this chapter concludes by identifying the implications of the 
dynamic UI assemblage of the two DPPPs for digital empowerment and discusses how 
understanding this better can make an important theoretical contribution to recent 
understandings of digital (political) participation.  
 
 
5.2 Decide Madrid’s dynamic UI 
 
This section aims to explore the ways in which Decide Madrid’s dynamic UI enables and 
disables users’ capacities to vote and propose and thus both creates and limits possibilities for 
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empowerment. By using the analytical devices of ‘soft thresholds’, I am able to detail how 
the dynamic UI indicates a possibility of digital empowerment for users by gently guiding 
and informing them whilst they are conducting collective actions (making proposals). The 
soft threshold connotes a ‘double management’ (Ash et al., 2018a, p. 1141) of users, 
encouraging users to continue to make an informed decision in digital political participation 
in terms of ‘what to propose’. Firstly, the dynamic UI encourages users to continue to 
conduct an informed action of voting and proposing. Secondly, the dynamic UI purposefully 
pauses and informs users with other similar proposals in ways to make an informed action in 
writing proposals.  
 
Whilst the dynamic UI offers potential to empower the user, it also has the potential to 
constrain their digital empowerment through the creation of ‘barriers’, where the dynamic UI 
does not work to guide users but rather becomes a technical/emotional obstacle to the ability 
of users to conduct important practices of empowerment such as voting and proposing.  
Describing the consequences of the existence of such barriers is important as they appear in 
both the interface of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan, serving to confuse and disengage the user; 
however in each case the specific nature of the barriers differs.  
 
 
5.2.1 Soft thresholds: making a collective proposal  
 
This section will employ the analytical device of ‘thresholds’, taken from Ash et al.’s (2018a); 
it will emphasise how the UI design in Decide Madrid creates soft thresholds which can 
potentially offer a possibility of digital empowerment through encouraging users to make an 
informed action in writing a new citizen proposal. It will describe how Decide Madrid’s UI 
design attempts to mitigate frictions — obstacles obstructing a user’s ability to navigate the 
interface — through the soft threshold of an automatic suggestion function designed to 
reduce the chance of very similar/repeated proposals appearing to the user within the 
interface. This effect of a soft threshold on users is called by Ash et al. (2018a, p. 1140) as 
‘double management’. A soft threshold not only pauses and gives users specific information 
but also ‘encourage[s] the user to cross or move beyond’ (Ash et al., 2018a, p. 1141).  
 
The need of a user to navigate her way through highly repetitive comments and proposals has 
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been seen as an important aspect in digital political participation, and this is not limited to the 
two DPPPs under study. In a similar vein to vTaiwan-Pol.is and Decide Madrid, Farina et al. 
(2011) analysed online participation in the USA and found that there were 
hundreds of thousands of duplicate and near-duplicate “e-postcards" that 
express passionate support or opposition, and not much more – [which] 
have become the poster child for public participation that completely 
misses the point of the process (Farina et al., 2011, p. 417). 
 
For the various groups I spoke to, including researchers (Farina et al. (2011), politicians 
(interview with Felicity) and practitioners (interview with Bryon and Matthew), this situation 
of unnecessary duplication was seen as not at all helpful for progressing the participatory 
process, not only because of their duplicated contents but also because of their generally 
highly-emotive nature.  
 
In the digital participatory process, users of Decide Madrid have tended to write new 
proposals with the same or similar content to other existing proposals. In a presentation 
entitled ‘constructing collaborative communities’ for Decide Madrid, Saulière et al. (2018a) 
argue that the highly repetitive nature of citizen proposals produces unnecessary competition 
and frustration between citizen proposals: 
….the participation is given individually, uninformed and fragmented; 
hindering the operation of the mechanism. The participants are shown to be 
unmotivated due to the perception that their proposals generate no change 
and frustrated by the amount of duplicate content and the difficulty of 
adding knowledge….[highlighted by myself] [no page indicated in the 
presentation]. 
 
The high rate of repetition can be also found by looking at data on the 2016 participatory 
budget process, where a large percentage of proposals shared the same descriptions of Madrid 
City. Almost one-fifth of proposals were about public libraries and cultural centres; one-tenth 
were about proposals for bike lanes, one-tenth were proposals for sport centres; one-tenth of 
proposals were for green energy and spaces, and almost one-tenth of proposals were for 
pedestrian pavements (Decide Madrid, no date). 
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To mitigate this friction, the designers of Decide Madrid purposefully designed an automatic 
suggestion function whereby ‘similar proposals’ which already existed would be highlighted 
by search algorithms to a user who was in the process of writing a new proposal. Mike,26 a 
key advisor for Decide Madrid platform, described the ‘similar proposals’ auto-suggestion 
feature to me: 
from the very beginning the platform [searching algorithms] tells you these 
five...other proposals that have similar titles to your proposal…and then it 
already shows you what other people write similar things… why don’t you 
take it into consideration. 
Figure 9: the automatic suggestion function which highlights ‘similar proposals’ (source: 
https://decide.madrid.es/proposals/new, access at 03/03/2019) 
 
What Mike describes is that when participants type in a potential title for their proposals, a 
search algorithm will automatically look for proposals using similar wording and highlight 
them to users via its interface. As a result, other proposals made by participants who share 
similar keywords will come into view, as shown in Figure 9. When a user types a word, such 
as ciudadana (‘citizen’ in English) in her citizen proposal, the search algorithm will 
 
26 Interview at 05/07/2018 
142 
 
automatically suggest other proposals which share the keyword ‘citizen’. This automatic 
suggestion interrupts a user when they are writing a proposal by visualising other similar 
proposals. Users are paused at this moment to consider similar proposals through the 
automatic reminder made by a search algorithm before they decide to continue writing their 
proposals. This automatic suggestion is reminiscent of what Ash et al. (2018a, pp. 1143, 1144) 
describe as ‘the slider threshold’, which intend to slow down and open up the process of loan 
applications by allowing the applicant to experiment and play with different schemes whilst 
showing the interest rate and maximum loan. In Decide Madrid, the function of automatic 
suggestion works as a soft threshold which carves out time and space for users to propose a 
new idea without repeating the same ideas which have been addressed in existing proposals 
(for Decide Madrid).  
 
Importantly, this automatic suggestion is not intended to discourage users from completing 
their proposals. It is to suggest and guide users to write a new proposal without duplicating 
content which already exists. In doing so, this automatic suggestion attempts to mitigate the 
friction of repeated citizen proposals.  
 
I stress that through the creation of this soft threshold the dynamic UI can produce new 
possibilities for digital empowerment; this is because by highlighting the existence of similar 
content already inputted by other users, it encourages a user to make an informed action in 
creating a new citizen proposal. The dynamic UI creates a ‘nudging’ effect on users by 
redirecting the attention of users to similar proposals. Understanding of nudging effects, 
originally derived from studies of behavioural economics, have been employed via ideas of 
‘digital nudging’ to explain how interface design can influence users’ behaviour and 
decision-making actions in predictable manners in crowdfunding websites (Schneider, 
Weinmann and Brocke, forthcoming). In the context of DPPPs, similar ‘nudging’ effects can 
be seen in the dynamic UI of Decide Madrid, where a soft threshold is introduced to remind 
and inform users to make proposals collectively. This soft threshold not only stops users from 
writing a proposal individually in the course of participation but also ultimately guides users 
to propose a collective proposal which has considers other similar proposals at sight.  
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5.2.2 Barriers in digital empowerment: feelings of disengagement and frustration      
 
I will use examples from Decide Madrid to illustrate how the design of its dynamic UI can 
create implications for digital empowerment, due to the ability of the interface to hinder a 
users’ capacity to vote and propose. The UI design of Decide Madrid frustrates or confuses a 
large number of users due to a convoluted participatory process and the use of 
difficult-to-grasp terminologies. Due to the convoluted interface design, many users cannot 
work out how to propose a citizen proposal in way which locates it within the right 
participatory processes; in addition, they cannot understand how to comment or vote on other 
users’ proposals. I describe convoluted interface design as a ‘barrier’ to digital empowerment 
which results in users becoming disengaged and frustrated.   
 
The overly-convoluted design of Decide Madrid UI 
The overly-convoluted design of UI in Decide Madrid acts as a barrier in digital 
empowerment because users are deprived of the participatory capacities of voting and 
proposing that were formally granted to them in the design process. As specified in a usability 
report conducted by Torresburriel Estudio in September 2017, Decide Madrid suffers from a 
convoluted interface where users might require additional instructions or technical guidance 
to help them to participate. The report points out that: 
users perceive a certain complexity on the web and it is an aspect that must 
be taken into account, and that users consider the web to be somewhat 
complex in its usage…and that users perceive insecurity (with doubts) in 
the management of the web (Torresburriel Estudio, 2017a, p. 1). 
 
This example shows that the dynamic UI of Decide Madrid is too complicated for users to 
understand how to practice their capacity in terms of voting and proposing in in a right 
participatory process. Another usability report, written by Torresburriel Estudio, also 
indicates that the key terms for different participatory processes are not easily-distinguishable 
in the interface. It indicates that: 
the vast majority of users selected for the test did not distinguish between 
‘debate’ and ‘proposal’, being equivalent terms for debate process and 
citizen proposal process. In addition, other terms like ‘expense project’ 
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were also not all clear, since many users do not linked to participatory 
budgets (Torresburriel Estudio, 2017b, p. 7). 
What this report points out is that there are too many participatory processes with very 
similar names going on within Decide Madrid’s interface. The expression of each 
participatory process is not distinguishable to a casual user engaging with the UI. For 
instance, the section name of the specific participatory budgeting projects is ‘expense project’ 
(‘proyecto de gasto’ in Spanish) in the interface, which a large number of users find difficult 
to link to the term ‘participatory budget process’ (‘Presupuestos Participativos’ in Spanish), 
which is the name of the wider process which the expense projects are a part of. Also, many 
users find it difficult to differentiate ‘citizen proposals’ from ‘debates’ (‘propuestas’, ‘debates’ 
in Spanish). These terms and expressions which are applied by Decide Madrid to 
participatory processes serve to confuse users rather than to shed light on what participatory 
processes are available. In addition, the usability report published by Torresburriel Estudio 
(2017b, p.16) also points out that the button of ‘create a proposal’ is buried alongside other 
functions at the right-hand side in the UI of Decide Madrid, which makes it less visible to 
some users (see Figure 10). 
 
 
Figure 10: This screenshot of Decide Madrid indicates that the button of ‘create a proposal’ is not visible enough 
for users, highlighted and modified in a red frame by myself (source: https://decide.madrid.es/proposals, access 
at 01/09/2019) 
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These reports show that the over-convoluted UI of Decide Madrid has become a barrier for 
users which has to be ‘overcome’ to complete actions of political participation such as 
creating a participatory budget proposal. When I was observing and taking notes during the 
usability test of Decide Madrid in Madrid City Council, one of the tasks for users was to 
propose a participatory budget proposal. I saw that six out ten users were confused by the 
difference between a citizen proposal (‘una propuesta’ in Spanish) and a participatory budget 
project (‘un proyecto para los nuevos presupuestos participativos’ in Spanish). They got lost 
in the UI and struggled to find the right place to propose a participatory budget proposal. 
After working on the problem for a while, two of them were still unable to create a 
participatory budget proposal. This observation from the usability test is in consistent with 
the report ‘Digital Analysis of Decide Madrid’ which suggests that a large number of 
participants might not know there are two different participatory processes: the citizen 
proposal process and the participatory budget process (Saulière and Díez Escudero, Rebeca 
Abellán, 2018b, p. 12):  
 only 2% (262) of the users who have made a citizen proposal have also 
made a proposal in participatory budgets. This may mean that the users 
who take part in citizen proposals do not know about the existence of 
participatory budgets, that they do not understand the dynamics of the 
different mechanisms of Decide Madrid, or that there is greater 
accessibility which makes citizen proposals easier for users to propose a 
project than the participatory budget. 
The over-convoluted design can also lead to a reduction in the number of users taking part in 
digital political participation. A report written by Participa Lab indicates that very few 
participants took part in writing proposals in the process of the participatory budget in 
comparison to the process of citizen proposal in both 2016 and 2017 (Saulière andDíez 
Escudero, Rebeca Abellán, 2018b, pp. 10–11). In 2016, 479 users wrote one or more than one 
proposal in the process of participatory budget; however, 4952 users wrote one or more than 
one proposal in via the citizen proposal function. In 2017, 438 users wrote one or more than 
one proposal in the participatory budget process, yet 4818 users wrote one or more than one 
proposal in the citizen proposal process. Importantly, this gap of the number of users between 
two participatory processes suggests a reduction in the number of users taking part in the 
participatory budget process.  
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I highlight that these examples show that UI design can work to add ‘barriers’ to digital 
empowerment because a large percentage of users are not only deprived of their capacity in 
voting and proposing via the interface, but also develop feelings of frustration and 
disengagement.    
 
The most active ranking algorithms 
 
Looking at the example of Decide Madrid’s ‘most active’ ranking algorithms shows how the 
design of UI has set up barriers to digital empowerment, in terms of contributing towards the 
likelihood of a user becoming disengaged and discouraged from voting. Replicated from 
those used within the Reddit website (an online forum), these ranking algorithms were 
designed to ascertain ‘hot’ citizen proposals (those have obtained the highest amount of 
supports from users) in an attempt to keep Decide Madrid users interested in evaluating and 
proposing. However, in practice, this use of ranking algorithms within the UI discourages 
users from conducting more evaluation on citizen proposals because ranking algorithms do 
not select the ‘hottest’ proposals but only the most ‘recent’ proposals.  
  
It is clear that the ‘most active’ ranking algorithms were intended by design to show the 
‘hottest’ citizen proposals to users: they are literally named as ‘hot_score’ in the Decide 
Madrid source code (available on Github27). Here, the ‘hottest’ citizen proposals refer to 
proposals which are both new and highly supported by users. Mike, a key actor in Decide 
Madrid, describes how these ranking algorithms can sort out and visualise the most important 
citizen proposals from thousands of other proposals on the UI. Mike notes that the algorithms 
are very important for they sort out and visualise the ‘hottest’ citizen proposals on the UI for 
users and thus keep them engaged whilst evaluating citizen proposals. In Mike’s words:  
the active [the most active ranking algorithms sorted] proposal is very 
important. Since we have thousands of proposals the first one you show in 
the list is going to have more attention and more likelihood getting 
supported and so on. And you have to choose which one you are showing of 
 
27 
https://github.com/consul/consul/commit/ef835bef1c803170091e99cd19a448149ffe43ae#diff-f6bf9b67a80a3
607668a4df3f12e4498, access at 30/09/2019 
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course you can choose like this general orders in like top support or the 
new ones but they are not very efficient because the new ones show 
contents that could be not interesting at all that just being created…. The 
[most active ranking] algorithms that we have now has too much weigh on 
new things…..28 
 
What Mike emphasises in the interview is that the ‘most active’ ranking algorithms do not 
work properly in selecting and visualising the hottest citizen proposals within the Decide 
Madrid’s UI, because what this UI shows to the user are not the ‘hottest’ but merely the most 
recent citizen proposals. Such dynamic visualisation within the UI does not serve to keep 
users in a state of engagement where they feel interested in conducting more evaluation. 
Similar to the previous example, this feature of the UI becomes a barrier for users to 
continue to take part in digital political participation because it does not really sort out what 
Mike describes as ‘both new and popular’ citizen proposals which can encourage users to 
continuously vote on proposals.   
  
Taken together, I employ these two examples — the most active ranking algorithms and the 
convoluted design — to account for the moments when the UI design functions as a barrier to 
digital political participation, either by interrupting or discouraging users from conducting or 
completing actions of political participation. The existence of barriers signifies a particular 
form of discontinuity through which the interface design discourages users from further 
engagement with the interface. The existence of barriers also shows that there are more 
moments when the interface of Decide Madrid does not guide users to complete their actions 
of political participation on a continuous basis. The existence of barriers is described by Ash 
et al. (2018a, p. 1142), who state that when interface design  
 
Fail[s] to manage these frictions…the necessary transitions are not made 
and the threshold disappears. In this case, the user may hesitate to apply or 
not apply [the loan application] at all. 
  
The existence of barriers highlights the important implications that UI design has for actual 
 
28 Interview at 20/11/2018 
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practices of digital political participation within Decide Madrid, because the UI is a key site 
for users to learn and practice their capacity in digital political participation. UI design can 
impose a critical limitation in digital empowerment precisely because users get lost, feel 
frustrated and disengaged in the process of digital political participation and do not wish to 
further conduct actions of political participation. For instance, since the establishment of 
Decide Madrid platform in 2016, there have been only three citizen proposals achieving more 
than 1% support of the whole population in Madrid. Also, the report ‘Digital Analysis of 
Decide Madrid’(Saulière and Díez Escudero, Rebeca Abellán, 2018b, p. 28) indicates that 
there was a significant lack of evaluating action in citizen proposal process during 2016-17: 
  
73% of the citizen proposals do not reach 100 votes and 99% do not reach 
1,000 votes. Only 4 citizen proposals have reached more than 50% of the 
votes that are needed [50% out of 27662 votes]. 
 
Considering how the process UI design sets up such barriers for users to take part in digital 
political participation, I argue it does not necessarily offer a ‘definite’ possibility for 
empowering users as it does not offer a stable enabling environment where users can act as a 
subject in practice their political participation. Rather, it enables an uncertain, ‘vacillating’ 
space in which users both experience being disabled and enabled depending on the particular 
alignments of software designers, users and algorithms which exist at a given period; this 
produces a cycle of possibilities and limitations.  
 
5.3 vTaiwan’s gamified UI 
In this section, I use the dynamic UI in vTaiwan as an example of how a highly dynamic UI, 
due to its deployment of Machine Learning algorithms, can create a fluid situation where on 
the one hand new possibilities for digital empowerment exists but on the other hand, these 
co-exist alongside significant limitations on empowerment. We could also describe this 
situation as volatile: VTaiwan’s UI can both enable users to feel a sense of engagement and 
make an informed action of voting and disable users from practising their capacities in 
‘proposing’ and ‘voting’. On one level, vTaiwan’s dynamic UI opens up new possibilities in 
digital empowerment as users can make an informed and collective action of voting and 
commenting whilst considering other users’ opinions, and can feel a sense of collective 
engagement as part of the ‘community’. VTaiwan’s UI suggests and encourages users to keep 
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up evaluating or/and writing comments and to think and act through different opinions. On 
another level, the same UI is likely to disable users from ‘commenting’ and ‘voting’ by 
generating glitchy and inconsistent information set for a user to view. It, therefore, restricts 
the ability of a user to conduct their collective and informed actions in digital political 
participation.  
 
As I will explain, in contrast to Decide Madrid, vTaiwan’s interface is less stable which 
makes it more prone to glitches yet also offers distinct additional possibilities for political 
participation: these involve creating a sense of engagement and providing information on the 
different Opinion Groups relevant to the topic under discussion. Both a sense of engagement 
and the ability to easily obtain relevant information has been considered as effects of the 
‘gamification’ of political participation (Hassan, 2017; Sgueo, 2017). Despite no agreement 
on what elements can be considered as ‘gaming’, gamification is broadly conceived as ‘the 
use of elements taken from video games in the design of no-gaming platforms, to increase 
user engagement and to enhance the user experience’ (Hassan, 2017, p. 252) under the 
context of policy-making and civic engagement platforms.  
 
5.3.1 How gamification can provide a better sense of engagement and encourage collective 
action    
 
The dynamic UI of vTaiwan offers a new possibility of digital empowerment by crafting a 
sense of engagement for users as part of the online participatory community. Digital 
empowerment, as I have defined in Section 5.1, is an enabling situation where users feel 
engaged as part of the online participatory community and thus motivated to make a 
collective action in voting and proposing. Here, it is because of the ‘gamified’ effects of 
vTaiwan’s UI that enables users to feel a sense of engagement. and motivated towards taking 
part in political participation. These gamified effects are what Hassen (2017, p. 249) terms as 
‘a utilisation of motivational affordance’.  
 
For the software engineers of Pol.is Inc. and civic hackers who employ Pol.is in vTaiwan 
platform, the idea of creating a sense of engagement through introducing elements of 
‘playfulness’ into the UI design was seen as being particularly important in terms of 
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encouraging digital political participation. Felicity29, a key civic hacker in vTaiwan, claimed 
that vTaiwan’s UI is a game-changer in digital political participation because it turns political 
participation which is often perceived as ‘boring’ or ‘serious’ into something fun, engaging 
and playful. In her own words:  
When you have thousands of people with more than a hundred comments, if 
you don’t use this visualisation method, no one would be patient enough to 
view all of comments. [Question: Do you think Pol.is has possibly changed 
the way that public participation conducts] It just to save time, to make it 
fun and playful….it is not fun if you need to read like 5000 comments. 
 
What Felicity claims is that the vTaiwan’s dynamic UI can create a sense of playfulness and 
engagement for users. But how does the dynamic UI create a sense of engagement? How 
does it make users feel as if they are ‘gamified’? The dynamic UI emphasises where a user 
stands in relation to other users as different ‘Opinion Groups’ (see Figure 11). A user is 
converted into a ‘moveable’ picture-icon (known as an ‘avatar’) sitting within a particular 
Opinion Group. Software engineers in Pol.is explained to me that the interface deliberately 
visualises a photo of the user and their friends or politicians to create a particular sense of 
engagement, a sense of gamification. Users can see their own position as a moveable avatar 
in an Opinion Group, located in relation to other users who they are related to or know in 
everyday life (friends, politicians) in the same or different Opinion Group. Users can see 
themselves moving from one Opinion Group to another remaining in the same Opinion 
Group throughout sequential actions of evaluating or writing comments.  
 
 
29 Interview on 05/01/2018 
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Figure 11: an example of ‘avatars’ (see photo-icons in the Opinion Groups) in vTaiwan-Pol.is’ dynamic UI 
(Source: a screengrab from the vTaiwan platform) 
 
Chandler30, a software engineer in Pol.is Inc., explains that visualising an image of users is a 
classic engagement tool, which aims to create a sense of engagement: without having to 
provide a lot of explanation to a user, users can understand their position relative to other 
people’s opinions by visualising Opinion Groups within the interface, which will encourage 
them to vote more. In his own description:  
if we show the profile images then you will be able to see there are people 
not just to sort like interpret that somewhere…[talking about if there is no 
such visualisation]. Putting people’s images in there it went from people 
being able to get it when you took a minute to explain it to them to people 
just instantly vote on few comments and they see their twitter images 
showing up and that’s where I am in the conversation and where the [other] 
people are. It went from leading explanation to something just happen 
(highlighted by myself). 
 
For Chandler, the existence of a visualised interface was key to providing users with a sense 
 
30 Interview on 15/10/2018 
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of engagement, where users ‘intuitively’ find themselves part of the online participatory 
community in relation with their friends or public figures. As a result of gamification, he 
claimed that users are more likely to continue to submit and votes on more comments.   
 
The claim from Chandler that the visualised interface of vTaiwan can create a sense of 
engagement by encouraging users to evaluate or write more comments was further evidenced 
by an experiment in Taipei City which Diana31, a consultant at Pol.is Inc, told me about in an 
interview. She described how she went to Taipei City to interview users who took part in the 
experiment. During the experiment, she said users were given two interfaces: one with 
visualisation and one without visualisation. She pointed out that the visualised interface made 
users vote or comment more (which she describes as ‘more interaction’ indicated in the quote) 
and she very much preferred the visualised interface because 
 
it gives the participants a sense of participation, more interaction so that 
changes the experience of participants….. I like, I very much prefer the 
opinion group visualisation, I do feel like it gives people a sense of 
participation [engagement]. 
 
This example shows how the dynamic UI can encourage users to evaluate more comments 
via gamification effects. As Hassen (2017, p. 259) notes, one of the key effects of gamified 
civic engagement is to positively motivate users to become active participants. It is in this 
sense I argue that vTaiwan’s UI opens up a new possibility of digital empowerment because 
users are potentially feeling a sense of engagement and thus are encouraged to keep up 
evaluating more comments. As Fisher (2012) and Mäkinen (2006) remind us, a sense of 
engagement plays a key role in digital empowerment for it can motivate users to take part in 
(digital) political participation. They highlight that feeling engaged as part of a wider 
community is more important than having the ‘right’ set of participatory capacity. In 
particular, Fisher (2012, p. 459) mentioned the less-educated citizens are highly engaged in a 
participatory budgeting project which was conducted in Proto Alegre.  
 
However, this example only explains part of the effects of gamification within vTaiwan’s 
 
31 Interview on 25/09/2018 
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dynamic UI; it can also inform and urge users to reflect upon specific information in terms of 
the visibility of different Opinion Groups related to the issue under discussion. Users can see 
different viewpoints towards a given issue, which can possibly aid them in reflecting upon 
their opinion. Hassen (2017, p. 260) explains this particular gamified effect as ‘the provision 
of information related to real-life concerns’ which encourages users to reflect upon their own 
experiences and opinions.  
 
By dynamically visualising changing attitudes towards different ideas via the interaction 
between user data and the algorithms within the UI, vTaiwan encourages users to think 
through different ideas rather than working out stances on complex issues by themselves. 
This UI effect is considered by both my contact Felicity and theorists of participatory 
democracy (Fung and Wright, 2001) as a key staple in creating empowerment within (digital) 
political participation. For Felicity, it is important for users to understand and reflect upon 
‘both sides’ of the topic in discussion. Felicity pointed out to me that often people are 
entrenched to their own ‘comfort zones’ without being aware of different opinions.  
 
Chandler32, the software engineer from Pol.is Inc., Pol.is visualises ‘people who are on both 
sides of the process [of participation]’. For him, the key message of a visualised interface 
which changes due to incoming user data is that it is ‘making it possible to listen to lots of 
people and really digest and synthesise what it is they are thinking and saying’. He notes that 
by singling out and visualising different voices as ‘Common Opinions’ from different 
‘Opinion Groups’ in the interface, Pol.is is doing something that social media does not. He 
unpacks this statement in detail:  
 
Internet and social media make it possible for people to say loads of stuff 
and now they make it possible for someone to become well-known for 
that…but without the ability to take a step back and look at that big-picture 
and really see how contextually really things fit together. You just lost in the 
sea …and we recognise the ‘tech’ that makes it possible again for lots 
people say lots of stuff but not for us to listen to people saying lots of stuff 
and that was really the part we start to change. To make people aware of 
other people. 
 
32 Interview on 15/10/2018 
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By visualising and showing different viewpoints, the dynamic UI in vTaiwan presents a type 
of discontinuity; it holds users at a pause which makes them think about ideas and opinions 
in digital political participation which have been submitted by people with different ideas 
from themselves. When writing or evaluating a comment, users are interrupted by different 
Common Opinions across and within Opinion Groups that are popping up and visualised in 
the UI. These visualisations of opinion are able to change dynamically as more user data is 
inputted into the system. This effect of the UI is also addressed by Simon et al. (2017) in their 
report ‘Digital Democracy’. They point out that the visualised interface provides a possibility 
for users who share the similar opinion to become aware of themselves in relation to other 
Opinion Groups (Simon et al., 2017, p. 41). They note that this possibility is very different 
from a traditional forum, which only rewards the most ‘liked’ opinion (Simon et al., 2017, p. 
41).  
 
Importantly, the dynamic UI in vTaiwan offers a new possibility for increasing citizen 
empowerment as it means that users may not just vote in terms of their individual interest but 
for what is sensible and reasonable within the whole online participatory community. Fung 
and Wright (2001) have highlighted that the ability of a group to vote collectively or make a 
collective decision which goes beyond reflecting the interests of the individuals who take part 
in the vote plays a significant role in delivering empowered political participation. Here, the 
difference is that vTaiwan’s UI does not create the same enabling environment as what is 
made possible within a physical venue for deliberation; this is because users have already 
been deprived of the capacity to deliberate in this way due to limitations imposed during the 
design process of vTaiwan (see details in Section 4.4.1).  
 
To sum up, as I have shown in this section, vTaiwan’s UI suggests new possibilities for 
digital empowerment because it creates pathways which enable users to feel engaged and act 
(vote/comment) collectively through considering different ideas in the process of digital 
political participation, Firstly, by offering a sense of engagement for users, users ‘feel’ more 
motivated to take part in digital political participation because they want to know which 
Opinion Groups they belong to in relation to other participants. Willingness and motivation to 
participate in political participation has been regarded as a key pillar in increasing citizen 
empowerment. In Mäkinen’s (2006) elaboration of ‘digital empowerment’, she notes that it is 
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important for citizens to feel included and have a feeling of belonging because they are more 
likely to participate and make collective actions in political or social activities. In a similar 
view to Mäkinen (2006), Fischer (2012) points out that increasing the motivation of citizens 
to conduct political participation is more important than being capable to participate in itself. 
This constitutes what he calls as ‘empowered participatory governance’.  
 
Secondly, by providing the ability to view different ideas and see how opinions on those ideas 
differ and change across groups over time, vTaiwan’s dynamic UI creates a new possibility 
for digital empowerment because users are encouraged to reflect upon their positions in the 
discussion and thus learn to make a collective decision in voting and commenting. Fung and 
Wright (2001) have addressed that making a collective decision is key in carrying out an 
empowering practice of political participation because participants are given the ability to 
vote in a way which transcends their own individual interests. Here, we can see how the UI is 
a political interpretation of what Andrew Barry’s (2001, p. 148) description of the 
empowering possibility that digital devices can offer by designing interactivities which guide 
citizens to learn and work with others.  
 
In the following section, I will stress how the algorithmically-visualised interface of vTaiwan, 
whilst offering potentialities for user empowerment, at the same time also acts as an 
‘emergent barrier’ which disables users from ‘voting’ and ‘commenting’. In Ash et al.’s 
(2018a) terms, this indicates the existence of specific forms of discontinuity in which the 
interface fails to modulate users’ action and emotion: these instances can be termed ‘glitches’. 
These ‘glitches’ highlight that what Ash et al. (2018a) refer as frictions — both technical or 
emotional obstacles in digital political participation — are not always modulated by or are 
under the control of the interface.  
 
 
5.3.2 Glitches as emergent barriers  
I first encountered a glitch in the interface of vTaiwan-Pol.is on the 7th of November 2018. At 
that time, I was browsing through a new participatory case on ‘opening up data in the public 
sector’ in vTaiwan-Pol.is, which had been launched between 1st October and 30th October 
2018. Although the official period for the consultation had passed, I was curious about 
whether there were new comments and votes still appearing on the interface of vTaiwan. 
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Interestingly, as I entered the interface of vTaiwan-Pol.is at 12:00 and at 14:47 on the 7th of 
November, I realised that in a short period of time vTaiwan’s interface had configured two 
very different visualisations of Opinion Groups. I consider these two different visualisations 
to be examples of ‘barriers’ in digital empowerment, as they confuse and possibly stop users 
from voting and commenting by providing inconsistent information.  
 
At 12:00, there were only two Opinion Groups (A and B). Opinion Group A highlighted that 
governments should establish open data regulations and make it easier for citizens to know 
where to assess to open data; whereas Opinion Group B stressed that the Taiwanese 
government should adopt structural management on its open database and monitor the quality 
of open data via setting up a consultancy team at the central government and other necessary 
measures on advocating the usage of open data (see Figure 12).   
 
Figure 12: vTaiwan-Pol.is participation at 12:00 7th of November in 2019 (Source: 
https://polis.pdis.nat.gov.tw/5nckzdszrc, assess at 07/11/2019). 
 
However, vTaiwan’s UI visualised the number of Opinion Groups as four at 14:47, as 
indicated in Figure 13. This shift in UI visualisation showed a significant change in the 
number of Opinion Groups, which changed from two to four within a short time. Looking 
closely, in Figure 13, there was a difference between the number of Opinion Groups indicated 
in visual clusters (4: A, B, C, D) and the number of Opinion Groups indicated in Common 
Opinions (2: A, B). This difference in the number of Opinion Group showed inconsistent 
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information for users. How many Opinion Groups were there? Was it four or two?  
 
 
Figure 13: The glitchy moment at vTaiwan’s digital political participation at 14:46, 7th of November in 2019 
(source: https://polis.pdis.nat.gov.tw/5nckzdszrc, assess at 07/11/2019). 
 
Encountering this confusing situation, I went to ask Linda - who I know to be a key facilitator 
in vTaiwan - about why the UI was changing inconsistently. She replied to me that other 
participants and herself were aware of these two strange configurations in the interface of 
vTaiwan-Pol.is. The appearance of these different configurations was not seen only by me 
but also by other participants. If other participants shared the same experience as me, it can 
be inferred that these different configurations are not just a one-time event that takes place in 
my encounter with the interface, but also exist in other participants’ encounter with the 
interface. Importantly, I understand this inconsistent information as friction mainly because it 
confuses participants such as Linda and me, who have no idea either why it happens or how 
to proceed with the participation accordingly. What this inconsistent information represents is 
a barrier in digital political participation.   
The number 
of Opinion 
Groups: 2 
The number of visual clusters of Opinion Groups: 4 
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As Linda told me that vTaiwan has no idea why these two different configurations happened, 
I went to ask Felicity, who is a highly-skilled leading civic hacker, why this friction appeared 
in the interface. Felicity replied to me in an email that she would call this splintered 
information an example of ‘glitches’. She explained that glitches happened when algorithmic 
calculations in the background of the interface did not synchronise with new emerging 
actions of political participation, namely new user-generated data. In other words, the glitch 
is the consequence of a disconnection between the algorithmic visualisation and new 
user-generated data; algorithmic calculations do not fully update with new user-generated 
data. If we go back to Figure 13, we can clearly see this disconnection from the difference 
between the number of visual clusters and the number of Opinion Groups, which as a result 
creates a barrier for participants. In other words, this glitch did not take place at the start of 
digital political participation, rather it emerged in the particular moment of disconnection or 
de-synchronisation between algorithmic calculations and new user-generated data. In the 
judgement of both Linda and myself, this glitch has a direct impact on digital political 
participation because it creates a barrier for users to fully grasp and understand the 
information in the interface. Therefore, users might not know which information to believe 
and not be able to conduct the aforementioned collective actions of voting and commenting 
with a consideration of others’ opinions.  
 
Glitches are also likely to emerge where there is some form of ‘extreme’ engagement with 
the interface: for instance, when a large volume of users submit or/and evaluate comments in 
a short period of time or almost at the same time, or when a participant submits one hundred 
comments without voting or votes yes on every comment. Diana33, a consultant from Pol.is 
Inc, indicated to me that as the visualised interface highly depends on having the requisite 
computing power to process incoming user-generated data, any extreme engagement with the 
interface from users could trigger a glitch in the visualised interface as this would potentially 
overload the ability of the algorithms to process the data. Diana strongly evidenced that 
glitches are barriers in digital political participation because they prevent users from 
receiving stable and consistent information. Diana says that it is better to provide an 
appropriate and stable amount of information which can be fully understood and perceived by 
participants. In Diana’s words: 
 
 
33 Interview on 25/09/2018 
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Once the comments coming in and the opinion group is changing a lot that 
visualisation gets very unstable especially in mobile and so we have been 
finding the balance between making people feel that the Pol.is giving them 
enough information and making this [participation]. If you have too many 
participants the visualisation does become unstable. 
 
The visualised interface can, therefore, emerge as a barrier which disables users’ ability to 
conduct acts of political participation because it confuses users with inconsistent information 
in a glitch moment. It can discourage users from completing their actions or further engaging 
with the interface. This barrier, thus, evidently verifies Rose’s (2016, p. 343) argument that 
‘the interfaces do not always work smoothly’. The fact that the interface can emerge as a 
barrier during such a ‘glitch’ situation backs up the argument that ‘frictions are inherent to 
the interface’ (Rose, 2016, p. 343).  
 
Ultimately, I argue that vTaiwan’s UI creates waves of possibilities and limitations on digital 
empowerment, by both enabling users to feel engaged and make collective decisions and 
disabling users from commenting and voting in digital political participation. What the 
existence of such waves suggest is that vTaiwan’s ability to offer digital empowerment is 
characterised by fluidity and volatility which is inherent in the way its dynamic UI operates. 
One the one hand, in the previous section, I have explained how new possibilities for digital 
empowerment are produced for users, who are able to feel a sense of engagement and act 
collectively with other participants in voting and commenting due to the dynamic UI in 
vTaiwan. On the other hand, such empowering possibilities are affected by the highly 
unstable dynamic UI configuration between users and algorithms at the same time. This 
instability suggests the volatile state of digital empowerment when it emerges as moments of 
‘glitches’ when the UI provides inconsistent information for users and thus either decreases 
their motivation to further participate or prevents them from acting collectively with other 
participants.  
 
 
5.4 Unevenly distributed ‘participatory power’: ‘princelings’  
In this section I will focus on how the dynamic UI assemblage further imposes a limitation on 
digital empowerment due to the imbalances of ‘participatory power’ which exist between 
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users, which mean that certain users have much more power than other users. Here, 
‘participatory power’ equates to the ability of a given user to make a real impact in 
policymaking processes. As we are going to see from the results of digital political 
participation, those people who acquire the most participatory power are the ones who have 
the greatest knowledge and capacity to make the dynamic UI work in their own interests 
rather than in a collective interest. This result in an unequal situation where participatory 
power is mostly in the hands of active and well-educated citizens and/or the organisations 
they represent; I will describe the most powerful users as ‘princelings’. The existence of 
unevenly distributed ‘participatory power’ indicates another limitation on digital 
empowerment; as users are not given equal power to influence the outcome of digital political 
participation, this increases the likelihood that users will work for their own interests rather 
than for the collective good. These two risks are both mentioned by Fung and Wright (2001) 
as they develop their idea of empowered participation, which says that that empowered 
political participation requires that decisions are made collectively and on the basis of a 
balance of power between participants.  
 
‘Princelings’ tend to exercise ‘participatory powers’ at the expense of others, or at the 
expense of others. I have found that groups of active citizens or collectives such as NGOs and 
other organisations tend to emerge as ‘princelings’ in digital political participation. These 
‘princelings’ constitute a significant part of the winners of the participatory budgeting process 
(for Decide Madrid) and are the major contributors of proposals (for vTaiwan) in digital 
political participation. ‘Princelings’ have a greater capacity to ensure their proposals or 
comments become more important than other users by getting more positive votes throughout 
the process of digital political participation; therefore, they gain greater participatory powers 
than others.  
 
In Decide Madrid, Mike (the political advisor), Sandra, Paul (researchers) and Jean (the 
former software engineer) have noted that proposals which are submitted and written by 
collectives such as NGOs, local forums or associations are more likely to gain support and 
positive votes; therefore they tend to become the winners of a participatory budget. Examples 
of collectives which can be described as ‘princelings’ include an offline association of parents, 
offline local forums for the official 21 districts in Madrid City (the more active ones are 
Chamberi, Salamanca and Hortaleza), Rabbit Rescue Spain, Canine Park in Latina, 
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Ecologists in Action, Aluche Neighbourhood Association, Association against Light Pollution, 
Plena Inclusión Madrid34 and the Neighbourhood School of Orchestra35.  
 
Looking at the results of user voting on participatory budgeting proposals on the Decide 
Madrid website, we can see that in 2016 22% of the winners of participatory budgets were 
organisations and in 2017 37% of the winners of participatory budgets were organisations. I 
note that the real number is probably higher because some of the proposals were anonymous 
and did not indicate if they had been proposed by an organisation. Mike said that the 
proposals of these organisations are more likely to receive more votes because they know 
how to disseminate their proposals amongst and beyond their networks. For instance, the 
former software engineer, Jean, was very surprised that a collective composed of parents of 
schoolchildren won a participatory budget vote to create a rugby field in a particular district, 
as rugby is not a very common sport in Spain.  
 
In the report ‘Digital Analysis of Decide Madrid’, Saulière et al. (2018) indicate that users 
(both individual and organisations) who are able to initiate a digital campaign in Twitter for 
their proposals are more likely to gain support for their proposals. Based on a digital analysis 
of hashtags related to Decide Madrid, they find that  
the most popular proposals on Twitter (if they are viable) have managed to 
achieve the necessary support to move on to the next phases, which gives us 
clues to think that the digital strategy is fundamental to mobilize a network 
to support a given initiative (Saulière et al., 2018, p. 20). 
 
What they point out is the fact that the power that ‘princelings’ can summon and gather via 
their greater knowledge and ability to access wider networks tends to make their proposals 
dominant over other proposals. Here, I highlight that the existence of ‘princelings’ raises 
critical questions in digital empowerment. Is it fair that some users are more capable of 
getting votes for their participatory budget proposals than others? This question calls to mind 
Fung and Wright’s (2001) work on how the pre-existing social-economic and political stature 
of any given participant in a participatory budget determines their participatory capacity and 
knowledge; when the positionalities of all participants are taken into account, this clearly 
 
34 Federation of Organizations in favour of people with Intellectual Disability in Madrid 
35 Escuela del Barrio Orchestra Association 
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impacts on the overall quality of the participatory budgeting process.  
In vTaiwan, civic hackers or citizens who are more active-minded know how to navigate via 
the interface better than other users. Gwen36, a vTaiwan participant who was also a contract 
worker for a government institution, told me that because she understands that the purpose 
of the vTaiwan-Pol.is is to single out a unique idea with supports from a different range of 
participants, she had the capacity to make her comment very clear and ‘agreeable’ to 
different participants, which would maximise the chance it would be voted positively and 
gain valuable comments. Participants like Gwen likely gain an advantage in digital 
participatory processes as they have the capacity to make the interface work in their interest. 
This coincides with what Paul37 pointed out in his earlier commenting on cultural frictions: 
If people do not understand how they work, some people will be able to 
make a profit out of them and some people will not…exactly, like how you, 
how meant votes you have to receive per day to keep tour proposal at the 
top….Some people know how to do that, and how to use marketing 
campaigns to maximise it, and some don’t. Like in real life, some people 
know how to put their topics up to the agenda. When you have to take a 
decision to implement, in most cases the simplest option is the best idea. 
Making things too complex means you need too many skills to understand 
it38. 
 
What Gwen and Paul both indicate is a new division amongst users in digital political 
participation. Users, such as Gwen, can become ‘princelings’ if they have a better capacity to 
participate through the dynamic UI than other users. This division further accounts for what 
Steve Graham (2004, p. 324) terms ‘urban digital divides’. Graham claims that the urban 
digital divide is not only about uneven access to the internet and technical devices but also 
about how software and algorithms marginalise certain citizens from the ability to access 
urban spaces and services. In the context of digital political participation, a precise 
knowledge of how the algorithmically-visualised dynamic interface works to prioritise urban 
proposals and comments will give users an advantage in making their comments or proposals 
 
36 Interview conducted on 28/06/2018 
37 Interview on 27/11/2018 
38 Interview conducted on 15/12/2017 
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matter than others. Mike39, a key actor from Decide Madrid, stressed that a divide can be 
created by not making algorithms understandable to users. He calls this divide a ‘bias’ and 
describes that:  
the problem is when you introduce an algorithm that is not clear at all 
about how it is using[working] then the user cannot understand what is 
happening behind the algorithm…Without knowing [how algorithms work] 
could produce bias that some proposal might get more supports whilst 
others not [because some users know how algorithms work whilst others do 
not]…if you use too complicated formula, nobody will understand….what it 
is [participation]…in that sense to have algorithms open is not enough. 
 
Additionally, some cases in vTaiwan show that only having a small number of well-educated 
users challenges the self-claimed idea that the platform represents the views of ‘the 
community’ and ‘the public’. If every participant is a ‘princelings’, then where is the public? 
Gwen40 notes when there is a lack of participants, the so-called ‘community’ is simply a 
collection of ‘princelings’:  
I feel some part of vTaiwan is a bit ‘guilty’, well, for example, we said 
about the public and the community, but there are not many people 
there…we did not give polis to anyone….I know Felicity sent the link of the 
polis to Taxi associations, Taxi line [like What’s app] groups for Uber Case. 
But I usually don’t do this for most of the cases [for participation], this is 
why sometimes there are not many people attending to the 
Pol.is-participation because we have not done enough promotion…..  
 
If every participant is a ‘princeling’, where is the voice of the public or citizens in so-called 
‘public’ participation? Here vTaiwan shows that when the participatory platform is not used 
by enough users to submit ideas and comments, the process of digital political participation 
becomes primarily dominated by a very small group of ‘princelings’. It is highly questionable 
whether ‘princelings’ are representative of the public interest, especially when the proposals 
submitted by ‘princelings’ clearly focus on ‘trendy’ issues in the digital tech space rather than 
 
39 Interview on 18/10/2017 
40 Interview on 28/06/2018 
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reflecting the wider concerns of less well-informed citizens; see Abers (2000), who pointed 
out how such a situation amounts to ‘clientelism’ in participatory democratic projects. 
 
In comparison with the ‘princelings’ in vTaiwan, I note that it is important to mention that 
those active in Decide Madrid are more diverse in composition and include such 
organisations as associations for promoting animal protection and protecting the rights of the 
disabled. Even though ;princelings’ exist and dominate the participatory process in both cases, 
the difference between Decide Madrid and vTaiwan lies in the diversity and quantity of 
proposals between two cases; this suggests that participatory power is diluted and distributed 
among different ‘princelings’ not centralised in one organisation.  
 
What these examples suggest is that due to effects stemming from how the dynamic UI is 
constituted via interactions between users, user data and algorithms, there is an unequal 
divide of participatory power amongst users. ‘Princelings’ are likely to benefit in digital 
political participation because their knowledge and capacity to get their proposals or 
comments supported via both online and offline networks outside of the UI of Decide Madrid 
and vTaiwan, such as Twitter. They are capable of making the dynamic UI work towards 
their interests due to their greater knowledge. For example, some ‘princelings’ such as Gwen 
are able to make the interface work for them by proposing an easily-agreeable comment. 
Some ‘princelings’ disseminate their proposals through Twitter, and other offline networks, 
because they know their proposals need positive votes as many as possible to stand out in the 
interface.  
 
Here, it is clear to see that the presence of ‘princelings’ further jeopardises the ability of 
DPPPs to enhance, digital empowerment because participatory power, in terms of making an 
influence in policymaking, is not evenly distributed amongst all users. Some users hold better 
knowledge and capacity to make their proposals get more votes than others by understanding 
how the dynamic UI work. This is not what Fung and Wright (2001) would conceive as 
empowered political participation, as ‘princelings’ are largely focused on their own interest 
instead of on making ‘collective’ proposal or votes in consideration of other users’ interest. 
What this means is that there is a need to question the ‘participatory power’ gained by 
‘princelings’ within DPPPs.  
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5.5 Fluidity and volatility in digital empowerment  
 
Here, I conclude this chapter by explaining why my situated examination of digital 
empowerment with a focus on the dynamic UI is particularly important. Through the use of 
the situated lens, I have examined and compared the effects of the dynamic UI on digital 
empowerment within the context of two DPPPs, Decide Madrid and vTaiwan. I view the 
user-interface relationship as a UI assemblage, which is defined as a transient, lively and 
ongoing arrangement of users, software engineers and algorithmic visualisation located 
within wider political contexts. Taking the dynamic nature of the UI into account within this 
assemblage, I argue that the two DPPPs offer a fluid and volatile state of digital 
empowerment, in which users can be both enabled to feel engaged and have the capacity to 
make collective and informed action of voting and proposing as well as potentially being 
disabled and disengaged from digital political participation by the dynamic UI.  
 
My ‘situated’ analysis of the dynamic UI’s impact on digital political empowerment directly 
contributes to what Isin and Ruppert’s (2015, p. 82-83) suggestion of a lack of focus on 
empirically-account of digital political participation in studies of the digital citizen. Isin and 
Ruppert (2015, p. 85) point out there is so much about ‘the potential of citizens’ who produce 
and consume ‘political content – political positions, opinions, demands, claims’, yet the 
current research focusing on digital participation is confined to the discourse of ‘digital 
divide/inclusion’, which sees digital participation no more than ‘a matter of access, skill and 
usage’41 (also see Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal, 2008). Here, my focus on the dynamic 
UI has provided an empirical and theoretical contribution to renewing and enriching the 
current understanding of digital participation as social relationships (Beer, 2009) and 
functional demands and skillsets (Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal, 2008). This ‘situated’ 
sketch of digital empowerment provides empirical evidence of how users and their data 
interact with the dynamic UI within an assemblage located in a specific political context. 
 
Building from Rose (2016) and Ash et al. (2018a) who argue that the digital interface can 
play a crucial role in affecting digital participation and everyday practices; I demonstrate and 
detail the ways in which two different dynamic UIs can create different sets of possibilities 
 
41 This includes a set of technological competence, information literacy and the Internet affordability, which 
can be improved and worked on by governments, corporations and civic organisation (Mossberger, Tolbert and 
McNeal, 2008) 
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and limitations in digital empowerment due to their differential effects. Whilst both Decide 
Madrid and vTaiwan dynamic UIs produce barriers which confuse and disable users’ 
capacity to vote and comment, they also produce different possibilities for users to be 
empowered in digital political participation. The dynamic UI design of Decide Madrid acts to 
create soft thresholds (Ash et al., 2018a) which highlight suggested information which 
enables users’ capacity to make informed and collective decisions in voting and proposing. 
vTaiwan’s UI manifests effects of gamification (Hassan, 2017) to increase users’ sense of 
engagement and thus conduct collective and informed actions of ‘voting’ and ‘commenting’. 
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Chapter 6 (Re)assembling political decisions in urban policymaking  
 
6.1 Introduction: the assemblage of algorithmic decision-making  
In this chapter I attempt to answer two questions: (1) what effects do the DPPPs under 
study — Decide Madrid and vTaiwan — have on decision-making in wider policymaking 
processes in which they are located? ; and (2) how do Decide Madrid and vTaiwan differ in 
terms of their general approach towards decision-making? I will continue my deployment of 
a situated lens to examine the assemblage of algorithmic decision-making, defined as the 
process of making political decisions via algorithmic interactions with users, which are then 
(re)interpreted by humans located within wider urban policymaking processes. Here, political 
decisions specifically refer to the process of legitimisation through which urban subjects can 
receive political support such as funding, legislative time or incorporation into policy. I will 
indicate how this assemblage produces both ‘inclusion’ of certain urban issues through 
legitimisation and ‘exclusion’ of others through the operation of the decision-making 
assemblage, and in doing so question whether such assemblages produce better (fairer and 
more empowered) decisions in urban policymaking. In the conclusion, I will also discuss 
another view of legitimisation, which focuses on how the state uses (digital) political 
participation as a means to maintain and reassert its political power and legitimisation (Juárez 
Toledo et al., 2007; Chadwick, 2001; Meijer and Zouridis, 2004; Jiang and Hu, 2009, p. 175).  
 
This chapter will focus on two case studies: the 2016-17 participatory budgeting processes in 
Decide Madrid and the 2015 Uber consultation in vTaiwan. By employing the method of 
‘digital flashback’ (see details in Section 2.4.1), I was able to track how user data on these 
issues interacted with algorithms to produce specific outcomes, stressing how the assemblage 
of algorithmic decision-making is constituted by algorithmic interactions with users and by 
moderators and politicians within wider policymaking processes.  
 
In this chapter I explore the implications of the use of algorithmic calculations in political 
decision-making through a discussion on what constitutes fair decision-making, incorporating 
insights taken from theories of participatory democracy (Fung and Wright, 2001; Baiocchi 
and Ganuza, 2014). Here, I take their idea of fair decision-making as a point of reference to 
question and open up the discussion on what can be considered as fair decision-making. Both 
Fung and Wright (2001) and Baiocchi and Ganuza (2014) have suggested that fair and 
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empowered decision-making in participatory budgeting project needs to meaningfully 
devolve decision-making powers to participants. Participants’ decisions should have a real 
impact in policymaking processes (Fung and Wright, 2001; Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014). In 
particular, Fung and Wright (2001, p. 26-27) have asserted that equal and fair 
decision-making should be based on ‘rules of deliberation’ rather than on merely ‘aggregating 
votes’ from participants; participants should learn, debate and reflect upon different 
perspectives before they make a decision.  
 
I argue that it matters to gain an understanding of how political decisions are made through 
the often ‘opaque’ human and algorithmic interactions which take place within DPPPs, 
because such processes tend to exclude certain urban issues and thus have implications on the 
ability to make empowered and fair decisions within political participation. As we are going 
to see, exclusions will occur within three consecutive steps through which urban issues are 
sorted and prioritised into political decisions within the two DPPPs under study. Firstly, users 
tend to focus on certain aspects of urban issues when generating urban participatory data (i.e. 
when they input votes, comments or proposals). Secondly, algorithmic interactions with user 
data within DPPPs determine and prioritise urban issues on the basis of different rules; whilst 
Decide Madrid’s algorithmic interactions prioritise the ‘most important’ urban issues through 
a rule of simple majority, vTaiwan’s interactions highlight urban issues through both the rule 
of simple majority and through a process by which different perspectives on issue are 
identified through the application of Machine Learning. Thirdly, what has been determined 
by these algorithmic rules will be reconfigured into political decisions by policymakers and 
moderators located within wider institutional and cultural contexts, which operate on the 
basis of norms external to the DPPP. As a result, urban participatory data which focus on 
specific urban issues, such as the need to provide public libraries and disputes between Uber 
and Taxi drivers, are discarded alongside the (re)configuration of political decisions.  
 
My use of assemblage thinking has three important functions. Firstly, it focuses attention on 
the importance of examining invisible, contextually fluid, unfolding and changeable 
processes of algorithmic calculations as they interact with user data (Amoore, 2019; Kitchin, 
2017; see how the situated lens is able to explain the fluidity of algorithms in Section 3.4.1). 
In announcing a digital turn in geographical research, Ash, Kitchin and Leszczynski (2018) 
stressed that ‘big data’ has to be understood through looking at how is sorted and processed 
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into new data as the result of algorithmic calculations. Their viewpoint has been addressed by 
Crampton (2016) and Amoore and Piotukh (2015a); without ‘careful attention to how it [data] 
is analysed, and to what can be said about the data on the basis of that analysis’, Amoore and 
Piotukh (2015a, pp. 4, 14) indicate that there is a risk of researchers being unable to fully 
understand the impact of algorithmically-mediated data processing on the governance of 
everyday life.  
 
Importantly, a situated lens pushes forward the understanding of the algorithmic calculations 
by situating them in relation to users and data and within wider political environments. It 
conceptualises the contextual fluidity (stemming from various contingencies) of algorithmic 
calculations (Kitchin, 2017) as living interactions between users, user-generated data and 
algorithms. It does so by not seeing algorithmic calculations as just ‘any form of calculation 
that takes input and yields desired output’ (Crampton, 2016, p. 141) but rather as emergent 
and ‘autonomous interactions’ between human and non-human [parts] which have their own 
autonomy (Anderson et al., 2012, p. 181). This autonomy of assemblage is described by Bennett 
(2010, p. 23) as ‘living, throbbing confederations’. Here, I specifically explain these 
‘autonomous interactions’ (Anderson et al., 2012, p. 181) through using Amoore’s (2013, p. 
130) reading of ‘life’ as ‘things [rather than objects] with a life that is never quite caught by the 
design of a security measure itself’.  
 
I use the term ‘living’ as an attempt to capture the ways in which algorithms prioritise certain 
urban issues over others by interacting with users who input data. The idea that they have ‘life’ 
or ‘a life of their own’ is an attempt to capture the fact that the effects of these interactions are 
contextually fluid and specific (Kitchin, 2017; Amoore, 2019) and thus go beyond the range of 
purposes which software engineers and policymakers could envisage. Amoore (2019, p. 6) 
argues that ‘computations are infinitely malleable and contingent on plural interactions of 
humans and algorithms’ and describes how ‘a small change in the weighting of probabilities 
in the model will transform the output signal’, Software engineers can never envisage the 
quantity, quality or timing of data which is to be inputted by users, nor at what time it is inputted, 
nor can they fully comprehend (in the case of vTaiwan) how Machine Learning algorithms act 
in response to incoming data (Kitchin, 2017). To clarify, I do not argue that such living 
algorithmic interactions are capable of doing anything without limit, as they are partially 
constrained due the specific capacities with which they were programmed during the design 
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process. Rather, I illustrate that the way in which (Machine Learning) algorithms act in response 
to incoming user data and thus generate the rules determining which urban issues matter. These 
algorithms, via their ability to process user information in non-deterministic ways, possess 
‘responsiveness’: the ability to react to external stimuli to produce effects in the outside world 
(Kitchin, 2017). This has been described as a necessary (but insufficient) characteristic of 
‘real’ biological life (Ferreira Ruiz and Umerez, 2018, pp. 495–496). Despite the fact that 
algorithms raise some interesting philosophical issues regarding the definition of what is 
‘alive’, I will confine my use of the term ‘life’ and ‘living’ to that of metaphor.  
 
Moving forward on this basis, we can see that there are different ‘ways of living’ which 
emerge via the results of various algorithmic interactions, depending on how much they can act 
unexpectedly beyond their design. I assert that interactions through Machine Learning 
algorithms (vTaiwan) manifest a more dynamic way of living than ranking algorithmic 
interactions (Decide Madrid) because of their ‘materially unstable’ nature (Mackenzie, 2006, p. 
177). Thus, I find assemblage thinking useful in explaining the ways in which urban issues are 
prioritised through what I term ‘living interactions’ between changing user inputs and the 
specific capacity of the algorithms (that is partially confined to what they were programmed). 
This approach will avoid the mistake of viewing algorithmic calculations as automatic, 
self-sustainable and non-human processes, which generate the same form of interactions in 
all circumstances and therefore prioritise identical urban issues.   
 
Secondly, by taking a comparative approach, a situated lens emphasises the contextual 
specificity of algorithmically-mediated decision-making processes. As a comparative 
approach indicates that in the case of the two DPPPs under study here, usage of a specific 
algorithm leads to contextually specific forms of interaction with users and urban 
participatory data, which results in particular outcomes in terms of which urban subjects 
are/are not constituted as issues of political concern. As a result, two different rules of 
selecting urban issues emerge from the DPPPs, which have been determined through 
interactions between particular sets of algorithms and user data. The comparative approach, 
therefore, adds the contextual nuance to our consideration of what are ‘algorithmic 
interactions’ and what are the ‘political impacts’ of algorithms by showing the difference 
between the two different sets of algorithms used in Decide Madrid and vTaiwan.  
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I develop my argument in four steps. Firstly, I show how users write and evaluate urban 
subjects to produce user data, which I define specifically as ‘urban participatory data’; this is 
done via the generation of votes, comments or proposals within Decide Madrid and vTaiwan. 
I then describe how users and urban participatory data interact with algorithms to select urban 
issues as worthy of concern and thus able to be made into political decision by policymakers 
to receive public resources of various kinds in the policymaking processes. Thirdly, I 
critically question whether these political decisions are fair and empowered by pointing out 
what are excluded from the making of political decisions.  
 
6.2 Urban participatory data: votes, comments and proposals    
The creation of user-generated data/content is considered to play a key role in generating the 
economic value of platforms such as Facebook and TripAdvisor (Van Dijck 2013; Orlikowski 
and Scott 2015). The study of how user-generated data is produced provides critical material 
for geographers exploring those facets of cities which most strongly engage with a 
user/citizen’s ideas, experiences and feelings (Graham, 2013; Shelton et al., 2014; 
Leszczynski, 2016). Here, I specifically focus on users who write and generate data for 
Decide Madrid and vTaiwan. I will refer to this as urban participatory data, seen as 
proposals, comments and votes, each of which contains particular urban subjects which users 
think are important to them.  
 
I will emphasise two key points around urban participatory data. Firstly, the creation of urban 
participatory data is a first step in creating assemblages of algorithmic decision-making; the 
user, through the formulation of an idea in her mind and the encoding of this idea via data fed 
into the DPPP, introduces a specific urban subject to the algorithm, which modulates it via 
calculations taken in relation to other user data with the result of either: the (re)assembly of 
political decisions (which I will explain in Section 6.3 and 6.4), or alternatively, with the 
delegitimisation of certain issues, which may then resurface outside the system (such as in the 
case of protests around Uber in Taipei City: see Section 6.4.3). Here, the specific ways in 
which data is modulated matters, as means of data modulation can imply the legitimation of 
radically different urban issues. Dalton (2019) points out that the same set of housing data 
can foreground different urban issues when used in different ways by software engineers and 
activists, such as by developing arguments against dispossession through the use of 
countermapping or by facilitating estate property transactions through the use of digital 
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platforms such as Zillow and Zoopla.    
 
In the context of DPPPs, urban participatory data is created by users, who are provided with 
the ability to comment on issues and evaluate different urban subjects by casting votes. In 
doing so, a user thinks up an evaluation of various urban subjects presented to her, and then 
turns this evaluation into data by casting a vote via the UI. This initial evaluation is important 
because it gives a specific value to urban subjects, which are then fed into the mathematical 
formulae deployed in the algorithmic calculation. For instance, by clicking on ‘agree’ on a 
particular participatory budget proposal advocating for building a new park for dogs, a user 
gives a value of ‘1’ to this proposal within the algorithmic system. It is the input of urban 
participatory data that makes it possible for algorithms to determine what counts as possible 
urban issues. Without the initial evaluation made by a user, algorithms will have no points of 
reference to interact with, thus, no possible issues will be configured. From here, we can start 
to see that algorithms have to work with users in prioritising the importance of urban issues.  
 
By highlighting the active role of users in creating urban participatory data, I want to note 
firstly that urban participatory data is very different to both what Kitchin (2014) called 
‘directed data’ and also to ‘automated data’, in which users are not consciously and actively 
involved in the processes of data generation. In the case of ‘directed data’ generation, as 
Kitchin (2014, p. 4) explains, the details of users (such as fingerprints and identity profile) are 
passively generated into data via methods of data collection such as CCTV, finger-scans, or 
thermal scans, none of which require the user to do anything other than be present as a 
subject to be monitored. Similarly, Kitchin (2014, p. 4) denotes ‘automated data’ as being 
‘generated as an inherent, automatic function of the device or system’, such as through the 
use of sensors, RFID chips, smart travel cards or GPS-embedded mobile devices; users do not 
play an active role because they are not consciously aware of their actions or behaviours, 
which are ‘automatically’ turned into data. As we have seen, in the two DPPPs under study 
here, users can actively express their ideas and judge other ideas by turning their thoughts 
into urban participatory data by generating input into the UI. Because of this key difference in 
how data is generated, the two DPPPs should not be seen as the same as other sensor-based 
platforms and surveillance technologies, which typically rely on algorithms for more limited 
functions, such as to give value to GPS data to forge connections between various data 
elements to identify persons of interest for security reasons (Amoore and Piotukh, 2015b, p. 
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344) or to control the infrastructural flows of city (Marvin and Luque-Ayala, 2017).  
 
Secondly, the fact that urban participatory data only presents fragmented and partial facets of 
urban issues is of importance to the study of DPPPs. This fragmentation imposes an initial 
limitation on the algorithmic configuration of political decisions by deciding which urban 
issue is worthy of being written down as urban participatory data (proposals or comments) 
within Decide Madrid and vTaiwan. It is clear to see that the urban participatory data 
generated by users of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan, despite differences in terms of the relative 
representation of the scope of urban issues, only cast partial views over the cities in which 
they are situated.  
 
We can see the existence of such fragmented data by looking at examples from our two case 
studies. In the case of Decide Madrid, by looking at 169 participatory budget proposals 
written by local residents and collectives in 2016, we can see that Madrid City is represented 
via a number of different urban participatory data; however, this is limited to specific urban 
subjects, such as public libraries, music and dance schools, elderly care centres, bike lanes, 
pedestrian pavements, recycling bins, LED lights, solar panels, public toilets, green spaces, 
the homeless, sexually-abused women, Alzheimer patients, dog parks, dog poo and 
abandoned urban animals (Decide Madrid, no date). In the case of the Uber consultation in 
vTaiwan, urban participatory data consists of 100 comments and approx. 46000 votes that 
were cast and inputted by 4592 Taiwanese users. From data on the Github website, where 
vTaiwan publishes its outcome of civic participation, we can see Uber is only understood in 
terms of limited perspectives, which include anonymous users asking the Taiwanese 
government to open the market to Uber, urging the Taiwanese government to express its 
position on Uber, thinking of Uber either as a service company or as a technological company 
or a platform, a political proposition against Uber as a sharing economy business, or calls for 
the Taiwanese government to publish all reports and investigation related to Uber 
(vTaiwan-Uberx-08-09-Tally, 2017).  
 
Such limited representation of urban issues seen in the case of inputs of urban participatory 
data into Decide Madrid and opinions around the Uber issue in vTaiwan data resonates with 
Amoore’s (2013, p. 63) description of the character of data in a surveillance system. She 
points out that whilst data can be selected, differentiated, and reintegrated to give the 
174 
 
appearance of a whole — from the projection of risks to definition of borders — such data 
can only present an incomplete and distorted representation of risks, a person or a border. 
Such partial representation of urban issues has implications in delimiting the scope of 
political decisions — which urban issues can be highlighted as worthy of public concern 
within policymaking processes — within the two DPPPs. 
 
These are further limitations which exacerbate the impacts of such partial representations of 
urban subjects. Whilst it is certain that proposals and comments can emphasise potential parts 
of cities which are perceived as important for users and local residents (which are not 
necessarily valued by policymakers), Decide Madrid has pre-defined which urban subjects 
can be turned into urban participatory data in a different way to vTaiwan. Importantly, such 
pre-restriction indicates that both the creation of participatory calculus and the configuration 
of the UI, despite having effects in citizen empowerment as I have shown in Chapter 4 and 5, 
have an implication in making wider political decisions because they affect which urban 
issues can be written on and advocated for within the confines of the two DPPPs.  
 
In vTaiwan, the algorithmically-configured issues are pre-restricted by the designers, who 
imposed a word-limit of 140 characters to the evaluation process (see Chapter 4), which not 
only reduced the ways in which users can say and express their ideas and judgements but also 
by extension which urban subjects can be narrated and judged within the system. In the Uber 
case, it is apparent that users are constrained in both saying what they feel and in explaining 
why comments made by other users are important or otherwise. There is a general lack of 
‘communication’ and ‘deliberation’ between users in terms of elaborating their views on 
urban subjects such as Taxi-drivers or Uber drivers that are relevant in the Uber consultation.  
 
In Decide Madrid, effects from the partial representation of urban subjects are further 
exacerbated by the existence of a large degree of repetition within proposals; there are many 
very similar proposals, which produce a large number of data containing very similar 
representations of urban issues. Almost one-fifth of proposals are about public libraries and 
cultural centres; one-tenth of proposals are for bike lanes; one-tenth of proposals for sport 
centres; one-tenth proposals for green energy and spaces; and almost one-tenth of proposals 
are for pedestrian pavements (Decide Madrid, 2016). The ways in which users think and 
write about Madrid City — even though their input covers a fairly diverse range of issues — 
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are largely confined to public facilities, infrastructure and urban sustainability. As a result, 
urban participatory data in the context of DPPPs can be limited due to self-recycling and 
repetitive representation of urban issues.  
 
In the next section, I illustrate significant differences in the ways in which algorithms interact 
with urban participatory data in Decide Madrid and vTaiwan, which as a result leads to the 
foregrounding of different ways of prioritising urban issues.  
  
6.3 Algorithmically-prioritised urban issues  
  
In this section, I show how a situated lens is able to explain the algorithmic calculations in 
terms of living interactions between users, urban participatory data and algorithms; these 
interactions function in a way which sorts certain urban subjects as legitimate issues of 
concern, whilst closing down possibilities for other issues by delegitimising them within a 
DPPP’s system. ‘Being prioritised’ as an urban issue in the cases described here means that 
this issue is more likely to be made into a political decision which receives part of a 100 
million Euro participatory budget (for participatory budgeting process in Decide Madrid) to 
be put to a referendum (for citizen proposals in Decide Madrid) Madrid), or to be the subject 
of a bill drafted in parliament (for vTaiwan).  
 
As I have detailed in Chapter 3.4.1, a situated lens stresses the contextual specificity and 
fluidity of algorithm-human alignments by reading it as the emergent interactions between 
heterogeneous parts which make up an assemblage. A situated lens refers the fluidity to the 
capacity of parts to changes or become unstable, and notes that in doing so the same 
components or actors can create different assemblages (Anderson et al., 2012, p.183, 186). 
This approach thus stresses the transformative potential inherent within an object which is 
composed of multiple assemblages, in this case DPPPs. Informed by assemblage thinking, I 
use the term ‘living’ as a metaphor which is able to explain and grasp the contingent, fluid 
and on-going character of algorithmic calculations due to the malleable human-algorithms 
interaction, which is influenced by changes in user-input, in the model of a calculation and in 
the wider environment (Amoore 2019, Kitchin 2017). The term ‘living’ can describe the ways 
in which algorithmic interactions operate; we can best understand them by proceeding as if 
they have a ‘life’ because what can be prioritised as urban issues changes throughout time 
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due to algorithms processing and calculating emergent votes and proposals that were 
generated inputted by thousands of users. From a vote to a proposal, algorithms respond and 
react to incoming urban participatory data to (re) prioritise urban issues. Considering 
Amoore’s (2013, p. 130) understanding of ‘life’ as data that acts beyond the design of a 
security system, here, we can see algorithmic interactions operating ‘as if’ they are alive 
because their operation goes beyond what was envisaged by software engineers in the design 
processes. To clarify, by living, I do not make an ontological claim that such algorithmic 
interactions act in the same capacity as biological forms of organic bodies (plants, cells and 
humans), nor they have a life of their own (Ferreira Ruiz and Umerez, 2018). Rather, they act 
as if they are alive because they have the ability ‘to animate, to act, to produce effects 
dramatic and subtle’ (Bennett, 2010, p. 6) by (re)prioritising urban issues.   
 
6.3.1 Decide Madrid: the ‘subtle life’ of algorithmic interactions   
 
In this section, I explain how algorithms interact with users and urban participatory data by 
looking at two cases in Decide Madrid: the 2016-17 participatory budgeting processes and 
the 2018 citizen proposal processes. I depict Decide Madrid’s algorithmic interactions as 
manifesting ‘subtle life’, which stresses that the ‘life’ is more subdued in comparison to 
vTaiwan’s algorithmic interactions, whose living patterns are more ‘dynamic’. This is 
because whilst Decide Madrid’s ranking algorithms interact with incoming urban 
participatory data (both proposals and votes) generated and inputted by users to produce 
decisions, these interactions can only make ‘incremental’ changes in the prioritisation of 
urban subjects whereas vTaiwan can produce more sudden changes. In Decide Madrid, 
ranking algorithms act ‘as if’ they are alive and operate beyond how they were programmed 
due to the processing and reprocessing of emergent votes and proposals that are generated by 
users; they take ‘clues’ from users which allow them to be able to build a hierarchy of urban 
subjects that are implicated and described in proposals via a rule of simple majority. For 
instance, a proposal for building shelters for abused women ranked higher than a proposal for 
a reforestation plan because it has received more votes from users. Without users generating 
data, the algorithms themselves would have nothing to interact with, and would therefore not 
be in a position to operate and determine what facets of urban subjects are to be prioritised as 
urban issues. Importantly, as users continue to generate votes and proposals over time, 
ranking algorithms have to arrange and rearrange current hierarchies of urban subjects 
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through constantly considering incoming data. It is by adapting and responding to incoming 
data that ranking algorithmic interactions act ‘as if’ they are alive.  
 
In contrast to a risk-based algorithmic system where users only play a passive role, such as 
being a subject which is ‘identified’ during algorithmic calculations (Kitchin 2014, Amoore 
and Piotukh, 2015b, p. 344). In Decide Madrid, users play an active role within the processes 
of algorithmic calculation. Ranking algorithms operate depending on particular values (1, 0, 
or -1) which are given and inputted by users to proposals. Here, users have a dual function: 
they can make proposals on which urban subjects (implicated in proposals) matter to them, 
which can then be voted or commented on by other users, or they can vote or give (positive 
or negative) comments on the proposals of other users. 
 
For Decide Madrid, I characterise the ‘life’ of the ranking algorithmic interactions as ‘subtle’ 
in the sense that one vote can only make a small change in how the ranking algorithms 
prioritise the hierarchy of urban subjects. During the process of the 2016-17 participatory 
budget, it took at least 1596 votes from users which were in interaction with ranking 
algorithms to prioritise those urban issues which were likely to be funded by Madrid City 
Council. In addition, I note that the algorithmic interactions do not just choose one single 
proposal that gains majority support but are able to choose more than one proposal which 
obtains majority support within a given participatory budget. As an example, 30 million euros 
was specifically ring-fenced for various proposals focusing on city-wide issues, the most 
popular of which received funding if they obtained majority support.  
 
As a result, in the 2016-17 participatory budget process, which evaluated multiple city-wide 
proposals, algorithms interacted with user data to prioritise 57 proposals (Decide Madrid, no 
date). These 57 proposals reflected the concerns expressed by the majority over various 
issues related to infrastructural, ecological, social and cultural dimensions of urban 
sustainability, such as proposals for LED lights, solar panels, bike lanes and infrastructures, 
electronic buses, more pedestrian pavements, ecological corridors, reforestations and greener 
spaces (Decide Madrid, no date). Other successful proposals focused on more marginal 
aspects of urban life, aiming to assign additional care to those physically, financially or/and 
socially excluded from particular parts of Madrid City, such as low-income families and 
homeless who are excluded from obtaining sufficient food, babies who are excluded from 
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using play-grounds in public spaces and Alzheimer patients who are excluded from receiving 
health and mental care (Decide Madrid, no date).  
 
Now, I use another case study — the Decide Madrid citizen proposal process — to delineate 
how algorithmic interactions with users again manifest ‘subtle life’. Here, ranking algorithms 
featured three citizen proposals that obtained majority support from users by highlighting 
them within a yellow banner (see Figure 14); this served as a way of driving additional 
attention from other users on these featured proposals. Similar to the process of the 
participatory budget, ranking algorithms arranged proposals based on the number of support 
that proposals received within a fixed time period. Ranking algorithms operate in a ‘living’ 
condition because they dynamically (re)count the amount of support that is given by users 
over a period of time. Again, algorithmic interactions are subtle because each interaction 
between ranking algorithms and a users’ vote can only result in a small change in the ranking 
of citizen proposals. Once a citizen proposal has accumulated a large quantity of interactions 
with algorithms over a period of time, its ranking position in the hierarchy becomes more 
difficult to be altered by an incoming new proposal, which may have only had time to receive 
a few votes.  
 
In the case study of citizen proposal process, we can see clearly that once citizen proposals 
received more than five thousand algorithmic interactions giving positive votes, they stayed 
unchanged at the top of the citizen proposal page for four months (during my online 
observation from July 3rd to October 30th 2019). From Figure 14 and 15, we can find that two 
featured citizen proposals — free transfers within different modes of public transportation 
and fines for not picking up dog poo — remained unchanged during this period. This shows 
that during this period no other proposals were able to collect as many ‘subtle’ algorithmic 
interactions with positive votes which allow them to displace any of three proposals that were 
already featured. What this suggests is that the algorithmic interactions within Decide Madrid, 
despite operating in a ‘living’ way, are making incremental changes in how urban subjects 
were ranked and prioritised, in comparison with vTaiwan, which has the capacity to produce 
much more radical changes in prioritisation. This is because algorithmic operations heavily 
depend on users inputting data to rank urban issues. As I will describe below, vTaiwan’s 
algorithmic interactions are ‘living’ in a more drastic way, which means that the ways in 
which urban subject prioritised are more changeable because the use of Machine Learning 
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algorithms enriches the potential effects of algorithmic interactions with users. We can see, 
then, that this has an implication in terms of the urban issues which can be configured within 
Decide Madrid: algorithmic interactions in Decide Madrid based on the rule of simple 
majority only highlight those urban subjects which receive simple majority support, whereas 
in vTaiwan Machine Learning algorithmic interactions prioritise urban subjects by their 
importance to different Opinion Groups (e.g. pro- and anti-Uber Opinion Groups). 
 
 
Figure 14: Screenshot of ‘featured’ proposals in Decide Madrid on July 3rd 2019. Featured proposals appear at 
top of citizen proposal frontpage (source: https://decide.madrid.es/proposals, access at 03/07/19). 
 
Figure 15: Screenshot of ‘featured’ proposals in Decide Madrid on October 30th 2019 (source: 
https://decide.madrid.es/proposals, access at 30/10/19). 
 
6.3.2 VTaiwan  
In contrast to the subtle changes to highlighting of urban subjects that algorithmic 
interactions make in Decide Madrid, Machine Learning algorithms42 in vTaiwan interact 
with users in a way which allows them to make drastic changes in highlighting urban subjects 
in relatively short amounts of time based on the input of potentially very small amounts of 
users. It can thus be said that in comparison to the subtle operation of ‘life’ within Decide 
Madrid, the operation of living interactions in vTaiwan is more dynamic and fluid. This can 
 
42 Including K-means and PCA algorithms 
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be illustrated when Machine Learning algorithms change the way in which urban subjects are 
prioritised by interacting and responding to only a small amount of votes and comments 
(which can range from a couple to a hundred). vTaiwan’s algorithmic interactions ‘live’ more 
dynamically precisely because the way they operate is more sensitive and adaptive towards 
‘environmental’ changes related to various fluctuations in the user base. Such Machine 
Learning algorithmic interactions have the ability to ‘change their mind’ in ascertaining which 
urban subjects are to be prioritised by reacting quickly to fluctuations in user-generated data. 
As a result, they can dynamically map out changes in user perspectives towards a given urban 
issue through the formation of ‘Opinion Groups’ (groups composed of different users sharing 
similar voting patterns) and ‘Common Opinions’ (opinions which are shared within and 
across different opinion groups) (see Figure 16). I will explain why the environmental 
changes in Machine Learning algorithmic interactions imply the potential for more 
empowered decision-making because they stress the different perspectives (not just he 
majoritarian viewpoint) towards an urban issue. 
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Figure 16: Screenshot of the Opinion Groups (in grey clusters) and of an inter-Group Common Opinion in Uber 
consultation (the common opinion shown in the diagram) (source: http://pol.is/3phdex2kjf, access at 
20/01/2019). 
 
In contrast to Decide Madrid’s ranking algorithmic interactions, which operate by a simple 
majority rule, vTaiwan prioritises preferences on urban issue under consultation through 
algorithmic interactions in two broad ways. Firstly, the algorithms highlight similar voting 
patterns on urban subjects amongst users by constituting ‘Opinion Groups’ from interactions 
with at least a thousand voting patterns (each user has one voting pattern, a thousand users 
have a thousand voting patterns). Each ‘Opinion Group’ is composed of users who share 
similar voting patterns on urban issues (see Figure 16). Secondly, from here, the algorithmic 
interactions go on to visualise what dimensions of urban issue matter within and between 
Opinion Groups: these can be described as intra-Group and inter-Group Common Opinions 
(see Figure 16). Intra-Group Common Opinions refer to the calculation of similar 
perspectives on urban issues through a process of sorting comments that receive majority 
support within Opinion Groups; inter-Group Common Opinions refers to the identification of 
shared perspectives on urban issues across Opinion Groups through identifying comments 
that receive majority support across different Opinion Groups. The first instance of 
algorithmic interactions, intra-Group Common Opinions, can be seen as an operation of a 
rule of sorting out different perspectives on an urban issue under discussion. The second 
instance, inter-Group Common Opinions, can be seen as an implementation of a rule of the 
simple majority because it singles out majoritarian perspectives on urban issue. Inter-Group 
common opinions are seen as so-called consensus across different Opinion Groups. 
   
Now, I will explain how this process works by looking at a specific case of consultation on 
Uber which was conducted using vTaiwan-Pol.is platform from 15th June to 15th August 2015. 
In this case, we can see more closely how Machine Learning algorithmic interactions are 
acting in a dynamic way as if they are alive. At the very beginning of the process, during a 
period from 15th to 17th June 2015, new data, including 22 new comments about Uber and 
hundreds of new votes, were inputted by 93 new vTaiwan users; the data subsequently 
interacted with the Machine Learning algorithms. By considering these incoming comments 
and votes, Machine Learning algorithmic interactions (re)configure the number of Opinion 
Groups from four (on the date of 15th) to three (on the date of 16th). By changing the Opinion 
Groups on the basis of changes in user data, the concern that ‘taxi and Uber drivers should be 
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able to work for different taxi companies’ disappeared as an inter-Group Common Opinion 
and the concern that ‘Uber cars should take insurances for their passengers’ appeared as an 
inter-Group Common Opinion. 
 
Here, we can see how Machine Learning algorithmic interactions are inherently ‘materially 
unstable’ (Mackenzie, 2006, p. 177) and act as if they are ‘alive’ because the ways in which 
they decide and prioritise both different and majoritarian perspectives on the Uber issue as 
both inter-Group Common Opinions and intra-Group Common Opinions cannot be envisaged 
by software engineers in the design stage. Instead of relying on pre-defined rules, Machine 
Learning algorithmic interactions decide and prioritise specific perspectives on Uber by 
configuring bespoke rules in individual cases depending on how such an issue is voted on by 
users. The Machine Learning algorithmic interactions are living because they generate the 
rules (both a rule of a simple majority and of finding different perspectives) in prioritising 
urban issue by constantly (re)computing the effects of incoming votes and comments. They 
have to recompute with new votes and comments generated by different users in real-time 
and are thus likely to adapt the current prioritisation of urban issues. This calls to mind 
Parisi’s (2013, p. 158) description of algorithmic procedures, which are shown to configure 
innovative rules to control and generate possibilities for architectural design. 
 
In the Uber case, the ‘living’ algorithmic interactions are exemplified by a shift of 
inter-Group Common Opinions, from focusing on the concerns of traditional taxi drivers to 
focusing on the risky status of Uber cars and passengers. This shift towards highlighting 
different perspectives on the Uber issue indicates a transformative moment: these new 
user-generated data interrupted what was previously assembled and prioritised, via a process 
of adaptation to user-generated data. This transformative moment exemplifies what 
McFarlane (2011) described as assembling and reassembling, because it allows ‘new 
agencies to take shape that we might not otherwise see’. It signifies a critical chance for a 
new perspective on Uber issue, in this case, the safety of Uber passengers, to be seen and 
recognised as a legitimate issue within policy-making processes. It is in this sense that the 
living algorithmic interactions rule shows the contextually fluid and unfolding nature of 
algorithmic calculations (Kitchin, 2017), which fluctuate ‘between accounts that emphasize 
the stability of assembled orders and those that emphasize dynamic change’ (Anderson et al., 
2012, p. 183). On the one hand, the fact that some perspectives on the Uber issue are 
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highlighted by algorithmic interactions does not change. On the other side, which perspective 
on the Uber issue can be determined as important can potentially change due to incoming 
data interacting with algorithms, which includes new votes or comments written and cast by 
participants.  
 
By the end of the consultation process, Machine Learning algorithmic interactions winnowed 
three Opinion Groups down to two (which I will call Opinion Groups A and B), which 
highlight the intra-group Common Opinions (the controversial urban subjects) that received 
the highest supporting rates within the two Opinion Groups. Thus we have two Opinion 
Groups each with a different set of intra-Group Common Opinions which are in conflict with 
each other. Here, I describe intra-group Common Opinions (controversial urban subjects) that 
were highlighted by the two Opinion Groups by the end of Uber-vTaiwan consultation 
process as follows:  
 
• The first intra-Group Common Opinion toward Uber in Opinion Group A sees Uber as an 
illegal business, as it has threatened the livelihoods of existing domestic transportation 
workers and jeopardised the safety of the public. By contrast, the ‘equivalent’ intra-group 
opinion in Opinion Group B does not care if Uber is an illegal mode of transportation, nor 
does it consider Uber a risky transportation/service.  
• The second intra-Group Common Opinion in Opinion Group A thinks Uber is a direct 
competitor to traditional taxis and feels that Uber should be registered as a transportation 
business [rather than as a platform/software business] liable to pay tax to the local 
government; Opinion Group B, however, prefers to take Uber over a conventional taxi 
and prefers Uber’s provision on the basis of it being of better quality/newer than a taxi.  
• The third intra-Group Common Opinion in Opinion Group A demands that the Taiwanese 
government has to intervene to control illegal Uber cars and drivers, feels all cars and 
drivers of Uber should be covered by insurance, and thinks Uber cars should be marked 
as ‘cars for carrying passengers’; the corresponding intra-Group Common Opinion in 
Opinion Group B, however, thinks Uber offers a win-win service for both passengers and 
drivers. 
 
Such living algorithmic interactions thus open up what forms and priorities for urban subjects  
are considered as relevant by different sections of the public, by emphasising and visualising 
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the existence of both the majoritarian and the conflictual perspective toward Uber as 
important urban issues. Such urban issues are configured by a confluence of Machine 
Learning algorithms and users which sort out and analysis tens of thousands of pieces of 
votes and hundreds of comments into different Opinion Groups, intra and inter-Group 
Common Opinions. Here, I note that what makes vTaiwan-Pol.is special and different to 
Decide Madrid is its ability to sort out the conflictual perspectives towards Uber. This 
conflictual aspect matters because it shows that vTaiwan’s living algorithmic interactions do 
not exclude the voice of difference perspectives towards Uber. Perspectives from both 
Opinion Group A and Opinion Group B are emphasised and retained. That is, Uber is not 
only seen as an entity which should be made illegal as it is dangerous to passengers and Uber 
drivers (by Opinion Group A), but is also seen as a legitimate and convenient urban 
transportation mode for passengers (by Opinion Group B).  
 
My conceptualisation of algorithmic calculation as living interactions between users, 
algorithms and data not only details but also further foregrounds the claim that contingencies 
(or the fluidities) in human-machine interactions in algorithmic calculation can result in very 
different outputs (Amoore, 2013, 2019, Kitchin, 2017) and, thus, highlight a different kind of 
urban issues. As noted in the previous examples, employing different algorithmic interactions 
leads to creating different ways in determining urban issues via both the rule of a simple 
majority and/or a rule of finding different perspectives). In vTaiwan, the living interactions 
(re)configure urban issues through the (re)generation of bespoke rules which rearrange both 
the number of Opinion Groups and inter/intra-Group Common Opinions in real-time. 
Opinion Groups related to Uber, for example, change by adaptation as the algorithm interacts 
with votes and comments being inputted into the system. It is the (re)generation of bespoke 
rules that allows for multiple possibilities for ‘transformative moments’ where new 
user-generated data, namely proposals or comments generated by participants are fed into 
algorithmic interactions, which in a short period can reassemble urban issues as in 
intra-Group Common Opinions and inter-Group Common Opinions regarding the case of 
Uber in vTaiwan; by extension opinion Groups are able to be quickly rearranged. This can be 
contrasted to Decide Madrid, where the potential for such transformative moments is much 
more strictly limited due to the use of the simple majority rule, which prioritises older 
proposals which have had more time to acquire a large number of votes.  
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Crucially, the specific living interactions between user and algorithms in vTaiwan, thus, 
indicate the existence of more empowered and fairer decision-making, because they highlight 
both majoritarian and controversial perspectives towards Uber issue. Fung and Wright (2001) 
have noted that it is important to include and highlight different viewpoints in making fair 
decisions in participatory budgeting processes. Though Fung and Wright (2001, p.19) and 
others (Pateman, 2012; Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014) note the important role that deliberative 
actions play for users with different and conflictual viewpoints to listen, exchange and 
persuade others, vTaiwan does not offer such actions of deliberation for users (see Section 
4.4.1). However, vTaiwan’s living interactions stress the existence of controversial 
perspective toward urban issues, which offers the potential to produce fairer 
algorithmically-informed political decisions.  
 
Here, considering that Amoore (2019) and Kitchin (2017) suggest the role of contingency 
should be considered as a major issue in studies of digital urbanism, the situated lens suggets 
two implications for digital urbanism by paying attention to contextually fluid and specific 
algorithmic interactions in the two DPPPs. If algorithms can potentially act in so many 
different ways, most previous claims which have been made about their use in digital 
technologies are not sufficient to explain the diverse and innovative potentialities within the 
interactions of users, Machine Learning algorithms and big data: this is the challenge of 
digital urbanism. Even though algorithms may share the same logic of anticipatory 
governance (Amoore, 2013; Leszczynski, 2016), not every algorithm necessarily implies 
‘raced’ or ‘classed’ consequences in urban governance and space (Leszczynski, 2016), nor 
does every algorithm impose the same form of diagrammatic control over cities (Marvin and 
Luque-Ayala, 2017). As we have seen, Machine Learning algorithmic interactions can 
prioritise conflicting views towards urban issues such as during the Uber consultation; this 
process is significantly different from the deployment of Machine Learning algorithms in 
other contexts such as surveillance in which potential illegal immigrants or terrorists are 
identified through a logic of pre-emption of risks informed by automatic and sensor-based 
data processed by algorithms (Amoore, 2013). The existence of different logics shown 
between platforms such as vTaiwan and algorithmically-mediated surveillance technologies 
is suggested by David Lyon (2010, p. 334) as being an important difference between what is 
made possible through new technologies used for surveillance and those used for democratic 
governance. 
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Seconldy, the situated lens implies that codes are certainly not ‘constantly in a state of 
becoming’, automatically transforming code/space (Kitchin and Dodge, 2011, p. X), precisely 
because each algorithm acts with its own ‘character’, governed though not determined by 
pre-defined programming rules. As shown in the example of vTaiwan, the prioritised urban 
subjects are only able to facilitate change in particular conditions when algorithmic 
interactions with new user-generated data produce a refresh of the previous rule on how 
similarities in voting patterns are sorted.  
 
 
6.4 ‘Human’ (re)configuration of political decisions  
 
In this section, I look at how urban issues prioritised through algorithmic interactions within 
DPPPs are incorporated into formal policymaking processes located in the wider institutional 
environments in which the DPPPs are located. This focus on the wider policymaking process 
is particularly important in order to facilitate questioning of the quality of political decisions 
made on the basis of issues selected via DPPPs. Are these ‘subsequent’ political decisions 
really reflective of the ideas of DPPP users as determined by the interactions between user 
data and algorithms? Are these political decisions fair? My research makes clear that the 
algorithmically-sorted issues are not smoothly translated into political decisions by politicians 
or civic officials; as a result, the ultimate policy outcomes are not equivalent to those which 
came out of the DPPP. This is because processes of policymaking involve translation and 
reintegration by policymakers, moderators and civil servants, who operate in institutional 
environments bound by their own internal norms and wider cultural contexts; this produces 
unavoidable changes in the meaning of the algorithmically-sorted issues.  
 
There has been little study detailing how algorithmically-sorted issues have been integrated 
into wider processes of political decision-making involving human beings possessing various 
roles, such as politicians, civil servants and public officials of various types. In a security 
context, Amoore (2013) critiques that decisions around immigration and citizenship made by 
the Home Office directly and simply apply algorithmic analysis of big data rather than 
judging each case within its own context. In her words, ‘the algorithmic security decision, we 
might say, is no longer a decision as such but only the application of a body of knowledge’, 
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because this decision is ‘knowledge-based, objective, and free of the fallibility of human 
judgment’ (Amoore, 2013, p. 163). However, we do not know how exactly immigration 
officers apply algorithmic output into their decision-making and implementation processes.  
 
By situating algorithmically-sorted issues within the policy-making processes of Madrid City 
Council and the Taiwanese Government, I indicate that the algorithmically-sorted issues 
produced as ‘raw output’ of DPPPs can undergo significant mutation due to the various types 
of ‘reinterpretation’ which they are subjected to due to human agency/interpretation. ‘Issues’ 
ultimately turn into ‘policy’ only through conscious decisions taken by human actors. Whilst 
Madrid City Council claims that it has a philosophy of translating the raw algorithmic output 
of Decide Madrid directly into policy, in reality the actual process of translating it into policy 
unfolds via a messy process of negotiation and execution. In vTaiwan, various layers of 
human ‘reinterpretation’ (moderator, civil servant, politicians) of the algorithmic possibilities 
occur within the legislative process, meaning the output can be very different to that 
produced within the DPPP. This focus on policymaking processes beyond the DPPP directly 
speaks to critical studies of data and algorithms (Kitchin, 2017; Kitchin and Lauriault, 2018) 
which point researchers towards the need to analyse any given algorithmic production of data 
within broader political, social, cultural and technical contexts.  
  
6.4.1 Two policymaking processes  
I will now discuss two processes of policymaking in the DPPPs under study in which user 
data interacts with algorithms to produce the ‘raw output’ which legitimates certain policy 
ideas. This ‘raw output’ then undergoes a further process by which it is interpreted by human 
actors in the policymaking space. For Decide Madrid I will discuss the results of the 2016 
participatory budget, and for vTaiwan I will discuss the outcome of the consultation around 
Uber in 2015-2016.  
 
For the 2016 Decide Madrid participatory budget process, an annual 60 million Euro budget 
was distributed via two categories: a district-based element (70%, 42 million Euro) and a 
citywide element (30%, 18 million Euro). From 2017 onwards, Madrid City Council 
increased the amount of budget available to 100 million Euros. There is an initial stage where 
users can propose, support participatory budget projects, a second stage where technicians 
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check the feasibility of participatory budget projects, and following with the voting stage 
where users can vote on those projects which are technically feasible and supported by users 
in the initial stage. The final stage will sort out which participatory budgeting projects 
receiving simple majority support from participants (as I have illustrated in section 6.3.1). 
After this voting stage, there is a bureaucratic policymaking process in which civil servants 
have to check the feasibility of participatory budgeting proposals again and confirm a certain 
amount of budget to the proposals by consulting with experts and technicians. Afterwards, 
civil servants have to create bidding announcements for each winning proposal (if it meets all 
legal and financial criteria) to find private providers to implement and carry out winning 
proposals into action plans. 
 
In the case of the Uber consultation in vTaiwan, the Taiwanese government and g0v (a civic 
hacking community in Taipei) preselected the issue of Uber as an issue which would be 
subject to consultation through vTaiwan. This is in contrast to Decide Madrid, which allows 
users the freedom to define the issues and does not give issues which have been pre-selected 
by the authorities. In this instance, the specific issue up for debate within vTaiwan was the 
issue of whether Uber should be legalised in Taiwan. There were two stages to the public 
consultation. Firstly, users were invited to express their views on the Uber issue by generating 
comments or voting on other existing comments; this was possible via the vTaiwan platform 
only. Secondly, after the result of online consultation via the vTaiwan platform, a working 
group, consisting of volunteers from the civic hacking community (g0v) and contracted 
workers from the Taiwanese government, will identify stakeholders who are relevant to the 
issue under consultation and invite them to a physical face-to-face consultation along with 
representatives from the Taiwanese government. In this physical face-to-face consultation, 
the moderator from the civic hacking community (g0v) would present the results of the online 
consultation and facilitate a stakeholder consultation (around the results of the earlier 
consultation). After the two stages of consultation, the Taiwanese government drafted a bill 
based on the results of the whole process, which would then be sent over to the Parliament. 
 
6.4.2 En route to action plans   
In the case of Decide Madrid, Madrid City Council made a strong commitment, backed up 
with significant resources, to implement and execute the algorithmically-sorted issues 
produced by the DPPP — i.e. those participatory budget proposals that gained majority 
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votes — into urban projects. During the four years in which various participatory budget 
processes have been carried out, Madrid City Council has committed to spending 360 million 
Euro on 132 proposals generated via Decide Madrid; in addition, it has deployed a lot of 
labour to conduct administrative work to turn these proposals into real projects. This entails 
(but is not limited to) making commitments on negotiating between different departments and 
the authors of the proposal (to track whether the proposals are being implemented faithfully) 
and designating staff to write contracts to implement the project. 
An important additional point is that Madrid City Council agreed to report on the progress of 
each proposal in a dedicated section within the Decide Madrid platform. This meant that the 
progress of each proposal was able to be visualised ‘en route’ to being actualised as a project. 
The progress of implementing each proposal can be viewed in the ‘tracking’ section of the 
proposal section nested within the participatory budget section of Decide Madrid. For 
instance, a citizen can follow how a successful 2016 participatory budget proposal— one that 
demands more charging points for electric cars in Madrid City — proceeded, including 
details of how it was contracted out to a private-sector provider and when it was finally 
completed (see the detail of this process in Figure 17).  
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Figure 17: Screenshot of a process of materialising a participatory budget proposal as a project (source: 
https://decide.madrid.es/presupuestos/2016/proyecto/3694#tab-milestones, access at 01/09/2019)  
 
After reviewing the process of execution of urban projects, I concluded that it was clear 
Madrid City Council was making the best endeavours to carry out what was demanded from 
proposals which were successful within the participatory budget section of Decide Madrid, 
even when there are legal and capacity-related constraints. A senior politician in the team of 
Decide Madrid, Peter, expressed to me that Madrid City Council strived to implement 
participatory budget proposals despite the various legal and capacity-related constraints 
which existed. Owing to its delineated constitutional relationship with wider elements of the 
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Spanish state, Madrid City Hall has a limited amount of political power to deploy in 
governing Madrid: key areas such as Education and Transportation, for example, are 
governed by the Regional Government of Madrid (as opposed to Ayuntamiento de Madrid / 
the City of Madrid). On top of this, some policymakers are not used to adopting citizens’ 
ideas: this is not how they have worked in the past. Considering these constraints, Peter 
stressed that the team of Decide Madrid spent a lot of time negotiating and persuading other 
parallel departments to execute proposals as best as they possibly could. To give one of many 
examples: whilst having no formal powers over education, Madrid City Council attempted to 
buy musical instruments for primary schools by working around the current legislation. In 
Peter’s description:  
schools belong to the regional government, not the local government. One 
of the proposals was to buy musical instruments for schools and we were 
not able to do so because it is out of our competencies, but we found a way 
which was to buy musical instruments for public libraries because libraries 
are governed by Madrid City Council and then lend them to the schools for 
free. We found our ways (laugh) and then that worked.  
 
We can see what has been algorithmically configured as urban issues — the participatory 
budgeting proposals which gain the simple majority support — mutate into an actualised 
present reality; as of now, most of the 2016 participatory budget ‘winning’ proposals have 
been executed and completed. New supported housing and facilities have been acquired for 
victims of gendered-violence, new public toilets and drinking fountains have been installed, 
new municipal nurseries built, new pedestrian pavements installed in Plaza of the Sun (Puerta 
del Sol), a new daycare centre for Alzheimer’s patients and a new shelter for special animals 
have been built (see Figure 18).  
 
For Decide Madrid, therefore, we can conclude that the ability of the DPPP to contribute 
towards providing citizens with empowerment through giving them the ‘participatory power’ 
to enable them to contribute to municipal policymaking in ways which they previously could 
not do, as this power was reserved for politicians and public officials (Baiocchi and Ganuza, 
2014). The prioritised urban issues which emerge via the living interactions between users 
and algorithms within Decide Madrid are having a real impact in Madrid City. For Biocchi 
and Ganuza (2014, p. 31-32, 36-37), an empowered practice of participatory budgeting is to 
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make sure decisions made by citizens concerns are fed back and incorporated into subsequent 
governmental policymaking processes. In what they term the ‘chain of popular sovereignty’ 
Biocchi and Ganuza (2014, p. 36) explain that decisions made by participants were protected 
and documented until their implementation. Here, by being committed to respecting and 
incorporating the urban issues which have been prioritised by the interactions between 
citizens and algorithms, Decide Madrid strongly aims at foregrounding the ability to produce 
meaningful political decisions. However, as Decide Madrid’s algorithmic calculations 
prioritise a majoritarian view on urban issues —  what Fung and Wright (2001) terms as 
‘aggregating votes’ — rather than seeking to make ‘collective’ decisions through deliberative 
rules, a crucial question emerges: is sticking to majoritarian rule really facilitating political 
decisions which are fairer?     
 
Figure 18: a collection of urban projects from 2016 participatory budgeting winning proposals (source: 
https://decide.madrid.es/presupuestos/2016/ejecuciones, access at 01/09/2019) 
 
 
Dog parks43 A municipal school for pre-school children44 
 
  
 
 
43 https://decide.madrid.es/presupuestos/2016/proyecto/4517#tab-milestones, access at 01/10/2019 
44 https://decide.madrid.es/presupuestos/2016/proyecto/5480#tab-milestones, access at 01/10/2019 
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A daycare centre for Alzheimer 
patients 45 
A new pedestrian pavement near Puerta de Sol 
(source: author’s own) 
 
 a new shelter for abandoned special species of animals46 
 
6.4.3 vTaiwan: human post-filtering of algorithmically-sorted issues 
In the case of vTaiwan, it is clear that algorithmically-sorted political possibilities undergo 
significant mutation as they encounter human interventions within the policymaking process 
once the ‘raw output’ of the DPPP has been produced. In contrast to Decide Madrid, where 
public officials acted on the basis that they were to respect the outcomes created by the DPPP 
as much as possible, in vTaiwan, this process of ‘post-filtering’ significantly constrains the 
potential of the DPPP to deliver fair and empowered political decisions.  
 
In the vTaiwan context, the whole policymaking process requires a face-to-face consultation 
with stakeholders (identified by policymakers and moderators) to be carried out after the 
online participation with citizens has been concluded within vTaiwan. Only after this physical 
consultation do officials draw up concrete measures, which may include drafting a new 
policy or revising current legislation. With regard to vTaiwan, the organisational culture 
within the wider institutional context the platform is embedded does not reproduce the same 
willingness to implement in full the raw output of the DPPP as exists in Madrid City Council; 
this means that it is the policymakers and moderators from the Taiwanese government and 
civic hacking community (g0v) rather than users who have the final say on deciding which of 
the algorithmically-sorted issues will be presented and incorporated into the policymaking 
process.  
 
45 https://decide.madrid.es/presupuestos/2016/proyecto/5177#tab-milestones, access at 01/10/2019 
46 https://decide.madrid.es/presupuestos/2016/proyecto/5578?spending=true#tab-milestone, access at 
01/03/2019 
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For example, within the Uber case, the outcome of the consultation produced strong 
intra-Group Common Opinions and relatively weak inter-Group Common Opinions; this 
reflected the controversial nature of the subject matter. However the existence of controversy 
in the Uber case — essentially, fundamental disagreement over whether Uber should be 
legalised (see details in Section 6.3.2) — was dialled down by politicians and moderators in 
the subsequent face-to-face consultation, reduced to a debate over a proposition for amending 
legislation which was much more favourable to traditional taxi drivers. As I will elaborate, 
this clearly shows that the ‘raw output’ of the DPPP, the issues sorted by algorithmic 
interactions with users, mutated into something else due to the imposition of political 
interests from outside the DPPP. This action of post-filtering has clear implications from an 
empowerment perspective on the quality of the political decisions that vTaiwan configures; 
both Fung and Wright (2001) and Baiocchi and Ganuza (2014) feel that real empowerment 
means that participants should be able to make political decisions with consideration of a 
wide range of different perspectives and which have a real impact in policymaking processes. 
By filtering out the existence of widely divergent/controversial perspectives of the Uber case, 
chances are lost for policymakers and stakeholders to be able to fully consider these 
perspectives when they are making political decisions.   
  
Gwen47, a contract worker who prepared presentations and summaries of the results from 
vTaiwan online participation for the face-to-face consultation, confessed to me that 
algorithmically-sorted different perspectives on Uber issue, the divergent intra-Group 
Common Opinions, would not be presented in the consultation. In her own words:      
I won’t put the opinions from the minority group [intra-Group Common 
Opinions] into the presentation…there are loads of discussion which will 
be deleted during the translation from data exported from Pol.is to the 
presentation in the face to face consultation…when it comes to the 
summarisation you need to delete and trim…like we only preserve the head 
of the octopus but not the legs as the head can represent the leg-comments, 
that is what they care about. 
Gwen points out that even though representatives of different Opinion Groups, or groups in 
 
47 Interview conducted on 26/02/2018 
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conflict would be invited to the consultation, the algorithmically-configured intra-Group 
Common Opinions from the online participation will not make it into the summary 
presentation in the face-to-face consultation.   
 
This intentional ‘reinterpretation’ of the algorithmically-sorted minority opinions was  
confirmed to me by Felicity, a moderator of the face-to-face consultation. Felicity said that 
she only presents what is common between different Opinion Groups, such as common 
feelings, ideas and suggestions, rather than emphasising the ‘different perspectives’ which 
have been sorted out by the algorithmic interactions. She expressed that  
if it is a comment that nobody agrees on, like a negative consensus, then 
maybe it's just a really bad idea. I don't actually present those,…a majority 
of people disagree with that. I shouldn't, strictly speaking, show it in the 
presentation, minority groups do get representation, but not those minority 
comments that are ignored by everybody. 
 
From the interviews I have conducted I concluded that it is clear to say that the civic hacking 
community and the Taiwanese government worked together to filter out different perspectives 
when presenting and incorporating the results of vTaiwan into wider policymaking processes. 
The case of the face-to-face consultation on Uber gives a vivid example of how the civic 
hacking community and the Taiwanese government strongly de-emphasised the antagonism 
between pro and anti-Uber factions which had been clearly apparent by looking at variations 
in intra-Group Common Opinions within different vTaiwan Opinion Groups. The intra-group 
Common Opinions of different Opinion Groups were very different from each other; they 
suggested fundamental disagreements between Opinion Groups on the basic issue of whether 
Uber should be legalised as well as strong divergence over the perception of various risk 
factors which Uber was suggested to pose which informed these judgements of (il)legitimacy. 
However, the moderators in control of the consultation process which occurred after the 
algorithmic interactions chose to completely ignore these facts and instead only presented a 
simplified set of bullet points which were solely based on the inter-Group Common 
Opinions — represented as ‘consensus’ — in practice this is the same as following a principle 
of simple majority. The set of simplified bullet points is shown here: 
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1. Drivers should be scrutinised in order to ensure the safety of passengers. 
2. The Ministry of Transport should take responsibility to control illegal cars functioning as 
taxis. 
3. The Taiwanese government should not be biased toward a particular business model. 
4. Uber should pay tax to the Taiwanese government. 
5. Uber should be treated like taxi companies where each driver has to show and display 
their licence and registration in their car. 
6. Non-commercial cars can only be used for ‘taking customers’ twice a day in order to fulfil 
car-sharing purposes and have to take out insurance. 
7. Drivers should be able to work for different taxi companies.   
 
After the conclusion of the face-to-face consultation, the Ministry of Transportation 
(MoT) — as the Taiwanese government had pledged — went on to incorporate the views of 
the vTaiwan from the face-to-face consultation into draft legislation which revised the current 
Transportation Act. However, it did so only on the basis of the conclusions in the bullet points, 
which as has already mentioned only represented a simplified majority consensus based on a 
human reinterpretation of the inter-Group Common Opinions. This set of conclusions, which 
did not seem to me to be strongly hostile to Uber, was somehow translated by the Ministry of 
Transport into an anti-Uber proposition (via a process which remains obscure to me despite 
having asked several senior officers in the Taiwanese Government why). It seems that the 
department chose to emphasise the anti-Uber strands of the consensus, which strongly 
implies that the civil servants responsible were minded/directed to view the document 
through the lens of external political imperatives surrounding the taxi driver protests. The 
subsequent press release from the Ministry of Transportation (MoT) demanded that a revision 
to the Transportation Act should mandate Uber to ‘pay tax, take insurance, take control’ 
(Ministry of Transportation and Communications, 2017). This clearly ignores the third 
inter-Group Common Opinion that the Taiwanese government should not be biased toward a 
specific business model.  
 
By observing this process, we can clearly see how the algorithmically-sorted issues created in 
vTaiwan undergo mutation, which is apparent in at least two ways. Firstly, controversial 
issues selected by the algorithmic interactions of vTaiwan — the intra-Group Common 
Opinions — were selectively reinterpreted by the moderator in the face-to-face consultation 
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(which dialled down the controversial dimension of Uber issue). Secondly, the simplified 
document for the consultation which stressed inter-group consensus was again reinterpreted 
by the Ministry of Transport into an anti-Uber proposition, in a move which seems to have 
been obviously intended to impose the ‘correct’ judgement of the ministry on the results of 
the consultation. However, as I will discuss in the next section, this attempt to erase 
controversial dimensions identified within the vTaiwan process would ultimately be 
unsuccessful; these controversial issues would make themselves known again ‘outside the 
system’ through the appearance of on-going protests in urban spaces, both on the part of taxi 
drivers, who remained displeased that Uber was being allowed to operate at all, and Uber 
drivers, who felt that the results of the vTaiwan process had unfairly discriminated against 
them.   
 
The case of Uber indicates that algorithmically-sorted issues can mutate as they cross various 
stages in the policy-making process. The conclusions of the platform — the ‘raw output’ —  
can be easily re-explained, translated or ignored by more powerful actors at play in 
policymaking, such as the civic hacking community and the Taiwanese government. 
Importantly, this example reinforces what has been highlighted in other critical studies of 
algorithms (e.g Kitchin, 2017) which have stressed that algorithmic calculations have to be 
understood within both technical and wider contexts. Lacking an understanding of either one 
of these contexts will significantly affect the ability to grasp the complexity of algorithms as 
they relate to data, users and other actors within wider contexts. Adding to Kitchin’s (2017) 
critical study, I note that this emphasis on analysing the effect of algorithmic calculation 
within the policymaking process has an important implication on the quality of political 
decisions. What has been considered as an important input in making a fair political decision 
by Fung and Wright (2001) — the strongly conflictual view on Uber which were identified 
by vTaiwan’s algorithms — can be post-filtered by policymakers and moderators before 
political decisions are made.  
 
 
6.5 Re/Deterritorialization: discarded urban participatory data stay within/resurfaces 
outside the DPPP     
I will now direct attention towards those urban participatory data which were excluded by the 
two DPPP decision-making assemblages. This will be done by conducting a close reading of 
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147 proposals in Decide Madrid which were not legitimated as urban issues in the 2016 
participatory budgeting process, and by highlighting conflicts between Taxi drivers and Uber 
drivers in Taipei which persisted in the world beyond the assemblage of vTaiwan. My study 
and comparison of two different sets of discarded data is important, as it shows two different 
types of algorithmic decision-making assemblage in a state between being deterritorialised 
and therefore emerging as ongoing protests in urban space and being reterritorialized in a way 
which reinforces algorithmic majoritarian rules. It therefore raises a challenging question for 
algorithmic decision-making: are the political decisions made through the two DPPPs fair and 
empowered enough?  
 
DPPPs, as much as security-related algorithmically-dependent systems, ‘close down what is 
partly-formed and render it actual’ (Amoore 2013, p 173). Here, we can see that Deleuze 
(1986) would describe the DPPPs decision-making assemblage as being (re)territorialised and 
deterritorialised. We can also see as relevant Amoore’s idea of ‘indeterminate life’. Similar to 
the Deleuzian notion of deterritorialisation, Amoore (2013) describes the concept of 
indeterminate life as referring to half-formed potentialities that are rejected and closed down 
through the operation of algorithmic devices (assemblages) in order to present a site of 
resistance to the reductive and determining power of algorithms. Giving the example of an 
algorithmic system designed for v-Bomb, such indeterminate life can be seen as ‘the 
contingent chances’ for lives in the targeted city that ‘are not amenable to calculation’ 
(Amoore, 2013, p. 75). Whilst to unveil such indeterminate life does not directly judge the 
decisions of algorithms per se, it offers a means of going beyond what an algorithmic system 
can imagine by highlighting ‘possible subjects, subjects as yet unknown’ (Amoore, 2013, p. 
156-7). 
 
For DPPPs, I note that such ‘indeterminate life’ entails but not limited to the whole system of 
the DPPP: whilst they necessarily include those ‘lost’ proposals which did not make the grade, 
they also includes proposals which did make the grade but got rejected by policymakers later 
on in the policy-making process, as well as those issues which did not even come to be 
inputted into the system in the first place. The algorithmically-mediated assemblage via 
which user proposals are evaluated and discarded by other users, can be read as Connolly’s 
(2011, p. 158) ‘seer dwelling within a nest of potentialities, jostling within and against each 
other during a forking moment’ in which multiple potentialities for urban participatory data 
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are determined into specific issues of legitimate public concern. This observation is 
supplemented by the realisation that discarded urban participatory data, such as a proposal in 
Decide Madrid or a comment in vTaiwan, do not disappear just because the systems do not 
consider them as issues worthy of concern: they remain potential spurs to future political 
actions, both within the platforms and outside them in urban spaces.       
 
6.5.1 Decide Madrid  
The discarded proposals I look at in this section are 147 city-wide proposals in Decide 
Madrid, a selection made from 5072 total proposals (although this full total includes 
district-wide proposals which are not analysed in this thesis) which were generated and/or 
evaluated out of a pool of 55185 participants (Decide Madrid, 2016). Study of the discarded 
proposals from Decide Madrid reveals how an algorithmic decision-making assemblage can 
reterritorialise its majoritarian rule and thus exclude other dimension of urban subjects. This 
is evidenced from looking at a wide array of local, everyday potentialities of Madrid which 
are closed down during ‘forking moments’ within the platform: these included articulations of 
the need for libraries, cultural centres and sports centres in particular neighbourhoods or 
municipal districts48 that reflect distinctive local knowledges and experiences. Though they 
have been rejected as issues of public concern, these proposals nevertheless highlight the 
important role these cultural facilities and spaces play in constituting the everyday life of 
some local residents. In particular, some proposals addressed what residents ‘feel’ about not 
being able to access cultural facilities and spaces. One proposal detailed the challenging 
experience of accessing public libraries for residents who live in peripheral districts:  
In the whole neighbourhood we don't have access to any library, only a 
reading room. The closest libraries are in Camp (municipal) or Aluche / 
Aviation (community of Madrid), so you have to take public 
transport. Peripheral districts are very discriminated against on the 
cultural issue; what in other neighbourhoods is part of everyday life, going 
through the library to study, in ours it is almost a luxury if there is no time 
and / or money for transportation.49 
 
This rejected proposal highlights the essential but neglected role that libraries play in the 
 
48 Neighborhoods such as Almagro, Gaztambide, Vallehermoso, Valdebebas. Districts or areas such as 
Arganzuela, Ensanche de Vallecas, Moncloa-Aravaca, Puerta del Angel, Alto de Extremadura, Villaverde. 
49 Retrieved from https://decide.madrid.es/presupuestos/2016/proyecto/5673. Access at 13 September 2019. 
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everyday life of residents. It is an example of widespread concern over the cultural life of 
Madrid, which is seen in 57 out of 147 discarded proposals under study, which ask for 
provision of facilities such as sports centres, music schools and dance schools for children. 
One proposal demands the creation of a music school that serves all the children in the area 
because ‘there is no music school nearby and parents who want to give this training to our 
children have to move far, with the consequent disorder if we do not have a car’50. Other 
proposals request swimming pools and sports centres for the neighbourhoods of Matadero, 
Valdebebas, Las Tables and La Elipa, because they can ‘improve the health of residents’51 
and ‘give residents the life that they need’52. Such concerns, related to the inability to access 
cultural spaces, highlight a wider desire to support marginal groups such as the disadvantaged, 
the disabled, and animals (Decide Madrid, no date).  
 
The rejected proposals indicate the existence of a minority perspective of urban issues which 
are excluded and dismissed by the algorithmic operation and therefore reterritorialises its 
simple majoritarian rule within Decide Madrid. What this implies for digital democracy is a 
fundamental issue around the exclusion of particular views via algorithmically-powered rules 
in policymaking processes, which in the case of Decide Madrid is done through a 
majoritarian rule. However, Machine Learning algorithms within vTaiwan-Pol.is, despite 
excluding comments which receive a high percentage of votes on ‘pass’, visualise both the 
minority and majority viewpoints on the Uber issue. Crucially, what this comparison shows is 
that attention must be paid to the algorithmic calculations underneath the interfaces of digital 
platforms under study in order to understand what is excluded in a given instance of digital 
democracy through its own algorithmic rule. 
  
6.5.2 Urban protests in Taipei City   
Within vTaiwan and the wider urban space in which it operates, indeterminate life can be 
shown to ‘break out’ after the face-to-face consultation (organised by the Taiwanese 
government and a civic hacking community, see details in Section 6.4.3) worked to post-filter 
(i.e. ignore) the algorithmically-sorted conflictual dimensions surrounding the Uber issue 
which were identified by vTaiwan’s algorithms in interaction with user data. This can be seen 
 
50 Retrieved from https://decide.madrid.es/presupuestos/2016/proyecto/3907. Access at 13 September 2019. 
51 Retrieved from https://decide.madrid.es/presupuestos/2016/proyecto/4352. Access at 13 September 2019, 
and https://decide.madrid.es/presupuestos/2016/proyecto/5079. Access at 13 September 2019. 
52 Retrieved from https://decide.madrid.es/presupuestos/2016/proyecto/3780. Access at 13 September 2019. 
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by the reality of on-going protests between Uber and Taxi drivers in central Taipei City, 
which have not been resolved since 2016 despite attempts to do close down the issue within 
the DPPP and the subsequent face-to-face consultation. Here, my point is not to indicate how 
the Taiwanese government rejects controversial issues (see in section 6.4.3) but to highlight 
how these rejected issues will tend to make themselves known in urban space as a form of 
deterritorialisation; for example, they emerge as on-going protests against the result of 
vTaiwan’s algorithmic decision-making assemblage. This then raises a challenging question 
for algorithmic decision-making: on what criteria should we evaluate the fairness of political 
decisions made through the algorithmic assemblage?    
 
From the perspective of the Taiwanese Government, Uber was classified as a ‘solved’ case on 
the vTaiwan platform in 2016 (vTaiwan website, no date). After the Uber consultation within 
vTaiwan ended, Uber made changes to its operating procedures in Taipei in return for the 
Taiwanese government allowing it to continue to have an operating license, which included 
agreeing to use cars from external rental companies and introducing verification to make sure 
drivers had correct insurance and owned a driving license. However, despite this agreement, 
the presence of Uber continued to remain an object of concern to ‘traditional’ taxi drivers; 
also, part of Uber’s operation continued to be in breach of legislation. On the 23rd of May 
2018, 3000 taxi cars protested against Uber in front of the Ministry of Transport. On the 31st 
of January 2019, around 3000 taxi cars drove slowly around the Cabinet Office in Taipei, in 
protest against what they claimed to be an inability to compete with Uber. Taxi drivers 
demanded the Ministry of Transportation place additional controls/sanctions on Uber and its 
drivers because they considered them to be an illegal transportation business under the terms 
of the Public Road Act in Transportation Management regulation (Strom News, 2019)53. On 
the 21st of April 2019, around 5000 Uber drivers protested in front of the Presidential Office 
in the hope that the Ministry of Transport would look at the issue of Uber’s use of a flexible 
and algorithmic calculation on the fee) when the revised Transportation Management 
regulation was produced (Technews, 2019)54. In this they were successful: after the revised 
regulation became effective in June 2019 (Inside news, 2019)55, Uber was banned from 
charging passengers via a flexible fee calculation.    
 
 
53 https://www.storm.mg/article/897140, access at 01/10/2019 
54 https://technews.tw/2019/04/24/uber-invalid-protest/, access at 01/10/2019 
55 https://www.inside.com.tw/article/17472-taxi-uber-103-1, access at 01/10/2019 
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This on-going protests about Uber signify that the issue was not ‘solved’ within the bounds of 
the DPPP, as the architects of vTaiwan-Pol.is might have hoped. However, is this a bad thing? 
The whole issue can be seen to foreground the democratic significance of the ongoing 
conflict between pro and anti-Uber Opinion Groups, which has been pointed out and 
visualised by algorithmic interactions within vTaiwan-Pol.is as intra-Group Common 
Opinions. By attempting to close down controversial protests by ‘gating off’ the Uber 
consultation within vTaiwan, the Taiwanese government and civic hacking community 
arguably inflamed the fire of the protestors further. Here, the presence of on-going protests 
outside of the DPPP point to disagreement against political decisions made through 
vTaiwan’s assemblage of algorithmic decision-making, a rejection to the Taiwanese 
government’s revision on the Transportation Act. Such protests question the consensus-based 
democratic future which vTaiwan advocates. The divide between Uber drivers and traditional 
taxi drivers did not go away or was ‘solved’ because of the one-time consultation via vTaiwan 
in 2015. By not considering the controversial dimension of Uber case in making the political 
decision, vTaiwan’s exclusion raises a crucial question: what should we make of these 
political decisions made through the assemblage of algorithmic decision-making? Are these 
decision fair enough in the view of participatory democracy? Especially, in a more 
controversial case like Uber, we have seen that both Uber drivers and Taxi drivers certainly 
do not think the algorithmically-informed political decisions are fair and equal.  
 
Viewing this result in the light of Fung and Wright’s (2001) idea of fair decision-making, we 
can see at least two reasons why stakeholders do not agree with vTaiwan’s political decisions. 
Firstly, it is policymakers in the Ministry of Transport who make the final political decision 
on how Uber is legalised in Taiwan, rather than stakeholders. This suggests a weaker 
devolution of decision-making power to key stakeholders like Uber drivers and Taxi drivers, 
whose voices and actions seem not to have any real impact in the vTaiwan policymaking 
process. Secondly, due to the use of ‘post-filtering’ — essentially the imposition of external 
political decisions over the results of the consultation — moderators and policymakers 
preclude and deemphasise the controversial viewpoints on the Uber issue in the hope that 
controversy would go away. However, we have seen that rather than making difficult issues 
disappear, the opposite result happened and they erupted into physical urban space (see 
Section 6.4.3). By not presenting the controversial viewpoints identified in vTaiwan as 
intra-Group Common Opinions at the face-to-face consultation, chances were lost for key 
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stakeholders to learn and reflect upon different viewpoints. In Fung and Wright’s (2001) 
discussion on making an equal decision in the participatory budget project, it is a must that 
practitioners should include and deliberate on the different and conflictual viewpoints on the 
issue; otherwise, decisions are likely to make in favour of interest groups who have more 
political influence. 
 
6.6 Conclusion  
I conclude this chapter by returning to the questions: (1) what effects do the DPPPs under 
study — Decide Madrid and vTaiwan — have on decision-making in wider policymaking 
processes in which they are located? ; and (2) how do Decide Madrid and vTaiwan differ in 
terms of their general approach towards decision-making? Via a situated lens, I have 
approached these questions here by examining the ways in which political decisions on 
legitimating urban issues are configured and reconfigured through the algorithmic 
calculations within policy-making processes in Madrid City Council and the Taiwanese 
government. The situated lens is effective in analysing the algorithmically mediated political 
decision, seeing them as generating intersections with users, user-generated data, 
policymakers and moderators located within wider institutional processes; as a result, 
particular urban issues are considered worthy of public concern. Here, the situated lens 
highlights both the contextual specificity and fluidity of the technical and political contexts in 
which algorithmic political decisions are (re)configured. Considering the contextual 
specificity and fluidity playing out within the assemblage of algorithmic decision-making  
matters for it shows how these two elements affect the fairness and empowerment of political 
decisions made by both Decide Madrid and vTaiwan. It is the situated lens that shows the 
quality of political decisions which highly rely upon the contextually unfolding interactions 
between users, data and algorithms, as situated within specific political institutions.  
 
I will make three points to elaborate on how a situated lens allows me to examine and 
compare the effects of algorithmic interactions with user data on the quality of political 
decisions.   
  
Firstly, a situated lens assists me in conceptualising the contextual fluidity and specificity of 
algorithmic calculations (Kitchin, 2017) as ‘living’ interactions between algorithms and users 
in making political decision. Here, the situated lens shows the living ways in which 
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algorithmic interactions with emergent user-generated data and thus act beyond the strict 
intentions of their design. In noting that understanding the role of contextual fluidity and 
specificity of algorithmic calculations matters - in terms of how users generated urban 
participatory data and how algorithms respond to emergent user data - Kitchin (2017) 
describes how this leads to different rules in (re)prioritisation of urban issues and thus has an 
implication in influencing the quality of political decisions. The different forms of 
algorithmic interactions between Decide Madrid and vTaiwan open up different sets of urban 
issues as objects of public concern. For Decide Madrid, urban issues are (re)organised largely 
based on how a simple majority of users write on and assess Madrid City. vTaiwan, by 
contrast, identifies both conflictual (intra-Group Common Opinions) and majoritarian 
(inter-Group Common Opinions) perspectives on urban issues on the basis of living 
algorithmic interactions with fluctuating user data. By highlighting the conflictual perspective 
on urban issues, vTaiwan’s living algorithmic interactions indicate the potential for creating a 
more empowered decision-making process.  
 
Secondly, I do not argue that algorithmic interactions themselves have the ability to make 
political decisions. Instead, the situated lens shows the importance of contextual specificity in 
terms of how politicians and other powerful actors at play can reconfigure political decisions. 
Importantly, such a focus shows how the quality of empowerment of specific political 
decisions might vary. By showing the different fate of two sets of urban issues in the 
policymaking process, I assert that the two DPPPs configure political decisions on a 
qualitatively-different basis. Despite Madrid City Council allocating an annual 60 million 
Euro budget for implementing urban issues as projects which are algorithmically-sorted 
through Decide Madrid in 2016, there is a limited commitment from the Taiwanese 
Government to guarantee that all algorithmically-configured issues will be presented at a 
subsequent face-to-face consultation/converted into a draft bill. To put it differently, as the 
wider political context in which vTaiwan operates and produces political decision can 
override and erase controversial viewpoints on the Uber issue prioritised and determined by 
the living interactions, a lesser degree of citizen empowerment is available. It is politicians 
and policymakers (rather than stakeholders) who have the ultimate power in making political 
decision.  
 
Thirdly, by drawing on theories of participatory democracy, I highlight that the 
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human-algorithmic (re)configuration of political decisions exclude other urban issues from 
being seen, stressed and prioritised as legitimate political decisions in policymaking 
processes; by highlighting this we can see how there is a way to question the fairness of the 
political decisions generated with the assistance of DPPPs. As we have seen in the case of 
Decide Madrid, libraries, cultural centres, sports centres and music schools — which are seen 
as an essential part of every life for significant amounts of local residents — are excluded 
from decision-making processes. In a more extreme case of the Uber consultation in vTaiwan, 
both Uber drivers and Taxi drivers surface in various ‘real-world’ urban protests against the 
political decision made by the DPPPs. Are these exclusions suggestive that taxi drivers and 
Uber drivers are able to be empowered to make fair political decisions? Building on Fung and 
Wright’s (2001) ideas of making equal decisions, I show the importance of not erasing the 
controversial perspectives of the Uber issue within vTaiwan and subsequent processes and 
also of the need to devolve decision-making power to participants/stakeholders. I consider 
these points are important as guidelines rather than hardcore criteria of an equal 
decision-making process because I consider the question of what constitutes a fair political 
decision open to discussion with stakeholders.  
 
On another note, it is vital to mention another perspective focused on the function of DPPPs 
in terms of legitimisation. DPPPs or non-digital mediated public participation have been used 
as a means to reinstate and support political power and legitimacy (Chadwick, 2001). This 
critique has not only been targeted at the deployment of (digital) political participation 
mechanisms by the British and American governments (Chadwick, 2001) but is also relevant 
in the cases of Chinese and Mexican government-led political participation projects (Jiang 
and Xu, 2009; Juárez Toledo et al., 2016). However, as Chadwick (2001) notes, political 
legitimisation as such is an ongoing process where the state or other political institutions have 
to constantly mutate their strategies, languages and symbols to maintain political legitimacy 
in terms of reasserting their power and status in society (Lipset, 1959) The short life of the 
two DPPPs under study here has not been able to prove the claim that they are essentially 
new ways to legitimate the state/local government, though politicians may desire them to be 
used in this way. This can be particularly seen in the case of Decide Madrid, where Decide 
Madrid did not guarantee winning the political election for the Carmera Administration in 
2019. This echoes Papagianni’s (2008) view on any given participatory project does not 
necessarily contribute to the process of state legitimatisation. 
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Finally, I would like to suggest the implications of using a situated lens, which speaks to 
wider debates whether to research outside or open up the ‘black-boxed’ algorithmic processes 
in digital urbanism (Field et al., 2020; Kitchin 2017). Considering the contextual situatedness 
and fluidity of algorithmically mediated political decisions, the situated lens speaks to 
Kitchin (2017) and Crawford (2016, pp. 89–90), who remind us that it is important to ‘look 
beyond algorithms as fetishized objects to consider them in relation to the developers in 
cubicle farms, the teenage hackers, the Amazon book buyers, the hoteliers on trip advisor, 
and the multitude of flesh and blood scenes where humans and algorithms engage’. It avoids 
a fetishistic analysis which does not see algorithmic calculations in the broader environments 
in which their operation and effects depend. It avoids the presumption that algorithmic 
technologies will inherently transform urban politics and spaces in the same manner, and by 
contrast highlights the different potentialities inherent within forms of algorithmic calculation. 
Whilst there are practical and methodological challenges to overcome in investigating the 
invisible and often confidential algorithmic systems, as algorithms continue to embed or 
intervene our everyday and different aspects of urban life, researchers should not shy away 
from using innovative methods and conducting inter-disciplinary collaboration to further the 
current understandings of digital urbanism without discrediting its algorithmic calculations.   
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Chapter 7 Looking forwards on digital empowerment and digital urbanism   
7.1 Revisit a situated account of digital political participation  
In the introduction to this thesis I set myself four research questions as the purpose of this 
thesis, which sprang from my positionality as an urban planner and geographer: 
 
1) What are the effects of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan on urban policymaking (in terms 
of making political decisions) and citizen empowerment? 
2) How do Decide Madrid and vTaiwan differ in terms of potential for citizen 
empowerment and approaches to making political decisions? 
3) How can the study of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan inform wider research on digital 
empowerment and on political impacts of algorithmically-powered devices in urban 
governance?  
4) How can we develop an analytical lens which allows for an understanding of DPPPs 
at the various levels they operate and facilitates us in making meaningful judgments 
on impacts on political decision-making and issues of citizen empowerment?  
 
I have developed a situated lens, which draws primarily on a fusion of assemblage thinking 
and theories of empowerment in ways to allow me to gain the explanatory power over the 
two DPPPs which will allow me to answer my research questions. This situated lens serves as 
an analytical lens which enables me to explore the fluid and contextually-embedded nature of 
digital political participation by breaking DPPPs down into three different assemblages 
(design, the dynamic User Interface and algorithmically-mediated decision-making). Each of 
assemblage has a distinctive agency which emerges through specific alignments with 
software engineers, algorithms, policymakers and users. All of assemblages are located 
within wider contexts of (urban) policymaking. Here, digital political participation is seen 
essentially as an on-going, mutable and extensive process involving algorithms, public 
budgeting, the allocation of other political resources such as legislative time and various 
human actors such as software engineers, users and politicians, all of whom are located 
within wider environments and embroiled with uneven distributions of participatory power 
and capacity amongst users. To this end, I assert that my account of DPPPs has problematised 
previous understandings of how digital participation has been understood, which have 
focused on whether citizens have access to appropriate literacy and technical skills and are 
situated within discourses of digital divide and the digital citizen (Mossberger, Tolbert and 
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McNeal, 2008; Isin and Rupport, 2015).  
 
The capacity of either of the two DPPPs to offer a fixed and stable degree of empowered 
political participation to the user is inhibited by the fluidities which manifest due to the 
changeable algorithm-human alignments. This understanding can offer a suggestive insight 
into the operation of these DPPPs in other contexts and more broadly can help towards 
understanding practices and theories of digital empowerment, political decision-making and 
ethics in the digital age. Most importantly, the fluid nature of such digital political 
participation does not make it particularly easy for researchers and politicians to grasp and 
sketch out a picture of it. What is more, this fluid nature indicates that it is rather difficult to 
maintain a high level of empowerment via a DPPP for an extended period of time because 
any degree of digital empowerment can be subject to ‘vacillation’ due to a wide range of 
factors, from governments withdrawing political legitimacy to software engineers making a 
change in UI design. That is to say, digital empowerment can be seen as a fluid situation in 
which its degree of empowerment changes through the coming-together and going-away of 
users, algorithms, software engineers and politicians who are located in wider political 
contexts.  
 
For instance, despite Decide Madrid securing a higher degree of digital empowerment than 
vTaiwan due to how its participatory calculus was structured and how the allocation of 
political resources was determined at the design stage (the assemblage of design), the degree 
of digital empowerment it offers users can be easily affected by changes in municipal 
administration and by the various barriers for users which can manifest when navigating 
through the convoluted UI. vTaiwan shares the same issue, as the degree of digital 
empowerment it offers depends heavily on shifting governmental allocations of resources and 
legitimacy, as well as on its dynamic UI which provides a fluctuating sense of engagement 
and potentially glitchy visualisations of different opinions on the issue under consultation. 
What this means is that in either DPPP it is difficult to ensure a more empowered practice of 
digital political participation, which I term as digital empowerment, for a long period of time.  
 
In the following sections, I will summarise my key arguments specifically regarding the 
implications of my study of DPPPs for studies of digital empowerment and digital urbanism, 
with a discussion on wider understandings of digital ethics. I will elaborate how my situated 
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account of DPPPs impacts on recent understanding of digital empowerment and digital 
urbanism, stressing that a situated account offers an inter-cultural understanding of digital 
empowerment and digital urbanism drawn from a comparative analysis of two DPPPs in 
different contexts, Spanish and Taiwanese. I will then propose a suggestion for areas of future 
study in ‘digital urbanism’ and ‘affective democracy’.  
 
7.1.1 Rethinking digital empowerment  
My approach to the analysis of DPPPs sees them as dynamic and open-ended combinations 
of human and nonhuman agencies which are located within three distinctive assemblages: 
design, the dynamic User Interface (UI) and algorithmically-mediated decision-making. The 
situated account highlights both the stable and unstable (vacillating) nature of digital 
empowerment. As a development of this point, I argue that the degree of empowerment that 
is offered by a DPPP — in this case, Decide Madrid and vTaiwan — cannot be seen as a 
priori but as emerging from and forged by specific human-algorithm relationships situated 
within the broader political and urban contexts which a DPPP such as Decide Madrid and 
vTaiwan have been developed in.  
 
In the design assemblage, we can see how the degree of digital empowerment for both Decide 
Madrid and vTaiwan is both stabilised and destabilised through the creation of democratic 
narratives and participatory calculus which occurs within wider political contexts. On the one 
hand, this design process stabilises the degrees of digital empowerment a DPPP offers in 
terms of (1) providing a certain degree of political and economic support, which can convert 
citizen’s participatory decisions into projects; (2) by determining the capacity to participate 
which a DPPP gives to users (i.e. the creation of specific participatory calculus in a given 
DPPP). These criteria have been considered as essential standards of empowerment by 
democratic theorists (Fung and Wright, 2001; Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014; Mäkinen, 2006; 
Fisher, 2012). On the other hand, at the same time, as I have mentioned, the degree of 
empowerment of a DPPP is entwined with the wider political and urban contexts where a 
DPPP’s life both began and terminated, and as a result, is constantly under threat of fading 
away when there is a change in the wider political weather. As of March 2020, the new 
conservative-governed Madrid City Council has already withdrawn all political resources 
(including annual 100 million Euro budgets, political will and administrative resources) from 
Decide Madrid; as a result, Decide Madrid does not offer the same degree of empowerment 
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as it was before. In a similar vein, the Taiwanese Government has re-shuffled its resources 
and interests from vTaiwan to another digital platform for political participation (namely 
JOIN) (interview with a senior officer, Gary, at the Taiwanese government), thus leaving 
vTaiwan with no new participatory activities and no further allocation of financial and 
political resources.       
 
With regard to the assemblage of the UI within both Decide Madrid and vTaiwan, I have 
demonstrated another facet of the fluid nature of the digital empowerment of the two DPPPs 
under study. Considering the dynamic nature of the UI assemblage, where algorithmic 
visualisations heavily rely on users’ inputs, here, the quality of digital empowerment is seen 
as fluid and volatile. Whilst the dynamic UI design of Decide Madrid acts to create soft 
thresholds (Ash et al., 2018a) which highlight suggested information which enables users’ 
capacity to make informed and collective decisions in voting and proposing, such UI can 
produce barriers which confuse and disable users’ capacity to vote and comment. Whilst 
vTaiwan’s UI manifests effects of gamification (Hassan, 2017) to increase users’ sense of 
engagement and thus conduct collective and informed actions of ‘voting’ and ‘commenting’, 
it can also disable users from conducting these political actions due to its glitchy 
visualisations.  
 
With regard to the assemblage of the algorithmic decision-making, I have illustrated how the 
quality of algorithmically-mediated political decisions is affected by contextual specificities 
and fluidities which are associated with algorithmic-human alignments. I have shown that it 
is the living nature of algorithmic interactions with users that makes it possible to prioritise 
both the majoritarian and conflictual viewpoint towards urban issues in vTaiwan and thus 
offers fairer and more empowering decision-making. Yet, such quality of fairness and 
empowerment is highly affected when Taiwanese politicians and moderators within their 
specific institutional contexts override and erase controversial viewpoints on the Uber issue 
which were prioritised and determined by the algorithmic interactions with users. Again, as 
the political actors play out in the particular institutional context, this process of algorithmic 
decision-making in vTaiwan should be seen in contrast to Decide Madrid which produces 
more empowered decision-making by giving users ‘participatory powers’ through the 
capacity to materialise participatory budgeting proposals into actual projects.  
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Therefore, the degree of empowerment offered by Decide Madrid and vTaiwan, rather than 
existing a priori, is forged by contextually unfolding and changeable human-algorithm 
relationships situated within broader political and urban contexts. The specific degrees of 
empowerment provided by Decide Madrid and vTaiwan is both predetermined and 
re-determined by the shifting of political resources and interest allocated by a given 
government, but also by the (re)creation of participatory calculus through software engineers 
over time. As I have demonstrated, both design, dynamic UI and algorithmic decision-making 
assemblages have developed their own patterns of stability and instability, thus each of them 
can distinctively affect the quality of digital empowerment offered in a different way. 
Whereas the degree of empowerment can be stabilised for a longer period once it is arranged 
by politicians and policymakers within the design assemblage, the possibilities of digital 
empowerment play out in a rather ‘vacillating’ manner in which users can only be 
empowered under very strict circumstances where both algorithms and users which constitute 
the dynamic UI have to create an enabling environment for users to feel engaged and make a 
collective and informed decision in voting and commenting.  
 
What does my account of digital empowerment within Decide Madrid and vTaiwan imply for 
developing ethical guidance in the digital age? Here, I engage with the broader idea of 
posthuman ethics (Amoore, 2013, 2019) in order to try and rethink digital empowerment 
within and beyond the context of digital political participation. Drawing from Katherine 
Hayles’ (1999) work on the posthuman, Amoore (2019, p. 3) explains posthuman ethics is ‘a 
composite subject in whom the doubts of human and non-human beings dwell together, 
opening onto an undecidable future, where one is permitted to ask new questions on the 
political landscape’. 
 
Taken from what Amoore (2013, p. 168) understands as ethics is to acknowledge ‘the 
unknowability of the future’ and thus to live with them by questioning, reinventing or 
resisting in the surveillance context, here, ethics in the situated lens is to harness the 
indeterminate potentialities as a way to question, recreate or reject the DPPPs. One 
characteristic of my approach, as informed from the Deleuzian’s assemblage thinking, is that 
I have tried to emphasise potentialities which are as-yet-emerged as being part of the 
make-up of assemblages. The idea of indeterminate potentialities matters because it crafts out 
room for users to question and (re)invent the current design, algorithmic decisions of digital 
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technologies.  
 
Within the context of digital political participation, an ethical approach should seek to open 
up the assemblages of DPPPs in order that users can question and recreate participatory 
calculus within the design assemblage, to reengage with the dynamic UI to make informed 
decisions and to reconstruct the rules in algorithmically mediated political decision. There are 
other non-majoritarian means of conducting participatory democracy. Discussion can be 
initiated with users and other stakeholders (in particular those who might be affected and 
excluded from digital political participation) on exploring the alternative ways of design 
DPPPs. I will return to this point in Section 7.1.2, where I explain how this idea of ethics can 
be taken into account more practically in producing ethical guidelines concerning AI 
decision-making. 
 
Return to Amoore’s (2019, p. 3) idea of posthuman ethics as ‘an embodied posthuman form 
of doubt matter in relation to an age where collaborations of humans and algorithms are 
making ethico-political worlds’, I wonder if users are learning to problematise and even 
recreate the DPPPs, are they not also imagineering a potential democratic future lying beyond 
what can be anticipated by the current design and operation of the DPPPs; thus are they not, 
in some ways, ‘posthuman’? Thus, is digital empowerment not just a matter for humans but 
rather ‘posthuman’? Who should be held accountable for the low degrees of the DPPPs?  
  
 
7.1.2 Learn from the differences between Decide Madrid and vTaiwan: practice and policy  
This section addresses how I use the situated lens to answer my research question of how 
Decide Madrid and vTaiwan differ in their ability to effectively facilitate enhanced user 
empowerment. My usage of this situated lens allows me to conduct a comparative study of 
Decide Madrid and vTaiwan. Such a comparative study reinforces my argument that digital 
empowerment is contextually embedded, as it shows how empowerment is differentially 
affected by flows of government allocations of political legitimacy, the (re)creation of 
participatory calculus and the dynamic UI situated within the political contexts. These 
common factors shape the quality of digital empowerment across the contextual differences 
which exist between Decide Madrid and vTaiwan. What is more, I assert that such a 
comparative approach has important implications in both policy and practice. Learning from 
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the differences in terms of degrees of empowerment between Decide Madrid and vTaiwan, I 
will offer some insights on how ethical guidelines for the use of AI-powered devices used for 
political participation may be formulated, and on what makes for fair political decisions in 
digital urban governance. 
 
By making comparisons between the two DPPPs, I was able to show their differences in 
degrees of empowerment, to offer a sense of the different possibilities they suggested for 
digital empowerment and thus to highlight the contextual specificity for ensuring a better 
practice of digital empowerment. For instance, in the design assemblages of Decide Madrid 
and vTaiwan, I have shown that it is the specific institutional commitment that Madrid City 
Council has a higher degree of empowerment over vTaiwan due to allocating a specific set of 
political commitments and resources (an annual 100 million Euro municipal budget and 
administrative support) which ‘secured’ a four-year-term political legitimacy for the 
participatory practices. Decide Madrid’s degree of empowerment is also reinforced by 
offering a wider range of participatory options for users to act upon. Whilst users’ actions in 
Decide Madrid have a higher impact on policymaking processes, by contrast, vTaiwan has no 
guarantee that users’ comments and decisions will be incorporated into the policymaking 
processes.  
 
In the dynamic UI assemblages of the two DPPPs, a comparative study again stresses the 
importance of contextual specificity for a better quality of digital empowerment. Both DPPPs 
here offer different possibilities of digital empowerment because of the different effects their 
algorithms produce to visualise the UI differently to different users and at different times. 
Whilst Decide Madrid’s UI can encourage users to make collective proposals by offering and 
visualising information on other similar proposals, vTaiwan can offer more possibilities of 
digital empowerment. Due to effects of gamification, vTaiwan’s UI can provide users with a 
sense of engagement by visualising users as an avatar which can move from one Opinion 
Group to another alongside users’ actions. vTaiwan’s UI thus can provide users with the 
ability to make informed and collective votes by visualising different perspective (different 
Opinion Groups and inter and intra-Group Common Opinions) on the topic in discussion. 
Additionally, when it comes to the further limitations of DPPPs on digital empowerment, due 
to the imbalance of participatory powers amongst users, vTaiwan has a more serious issue 
then Decide Madrid. As opposed to Decide Madrid, the greater degree of centralisation of 
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participatory power within a few actors (the relatively greater prevalence of princelings) in 
vTaiwan suggests more limitations in digital empowerment. 
 
Also, the comparative study has demonstrated the necessity of paying attention to the 
existence of contextual fluidity and volatility in terms of both algorithmic interactions with 
user and the institutional policymaking processes in which urban issues are either excluded or 
legitimatised (the assemblage of algorithmic decision-making). The situated lens, drawing on 
the theories of participatory democracy (Fung and Wright, 2001; Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014), 
indicates to the quality of such algorithmically informed political decisions is not a priori fair 
or empowering. Contingent events (contextual fluidity), form ‘post-filtering’ to living 
algorithmic interactions with emergent user data, can affect the quality of the political 
decisions. For instance, vTaiwan’s algorithmic decision-making assemblage, despite its 
capacity to highlight controversial dimensions of an urban issue via Machine Learning (such 
as in the case of the Uber consultation), is subject to ‘post-filtering’ (i.e reinterpretation) by 
moderators and policymakers in the subsequent face-to-face consultation and ensuing 
policymaking processes. vTaiwan’s model thus does not guarantee a high level of empowered 
political decisions, as what have been sorted as important by users and algorithms can be 
subject to eradication or reinterpretation by policymakers and moderators at a later phase. 
The on-going protests on Uber in Taipei City evidences the fact that key stakeholders — taxi 
drivers and Uber drivers — do not think such political decisions are fair and empowering 
enough. Decide Madrid’s algorithmic assemblage, on the other hand, indeed commits to turn 
urban issues that are selected by the majority of users into action plans. Yet, the question for 
Decide Madrid is whether its majoritarian model produces a fairer political decision than 
other algorithmic models.     
 
Learning from the aforementioned difference in digital empowerment between the two 
DPPPs from different technical, political and cultural contexts, we can potentially sketch out 
a guideline for digital empowerment evaluation. Importantly, by collating what Decide 
Madrid and vTaiwan have done well in empowerment, a comparative study stresses that 
ensuring best practice regarding digital empowerment is to work through contextually 
embedded factors: (1) a sufficient allocation of political legitimacy; (2) a provision of an 
adequate empowered capacity for users; and (3) an enabling UI which allows users to feel 
engaged and make informed and collective decisions. These factors have the potential to be 
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further developed into a detailed set of indicators for governments which want to evaluate 
and monitor the outcomes of their digital political participation. Finding best practice 
guidelines stemming from an understanding of contextually embedded factors of digital 
empowerment is crucial because it not only goes beyond the political discourse of ‘good 
practice in digital participation’ as being the possession by a user of a set of participatory 
skills and capacities (Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal, 2008; Isin and Ruppert, 2015) but 
also offers a new way for practitioners and policymakers to assess the degree of citizen 
empowerment within specific political and technological contexts. Having such an evaluative 
framework remains crucial as there is currently a lack of policy tools for evaluating the 
performance of DPPPs in citizen empowerment. Due to the experimental and emergent nature 
of the DPPPs, both Spanish and Taiwanese policymakers told me that so far there has not 
been developing a method for them to assess the performance of DPPPs. This issue is also 
indicated in the recent report on digital democracy by Nesta (Simon et al., 2017, pp. 94–95):  
other metrics and analysis of the impact of new digital democracy tools are 
also lacking. There is little consideration, for example, of the costs vs. the 
benefits of such tools, or indeed evaluations of the impact of greater citizen 
engagement in democratic decision-making.  
  
On another level, considering the design processes of the DPPPs as open-ended through the 
situated lens has significant potential for policymakers, who will be more able to produce 
policy guidelines around AI devices used for making political decisions. In doing so, we will 
be closer to understanding what constitutes a fair political decision made through AI devices, 
which at present remains a difficult challenge for policymakers and software engineers.  
 
Here, I argue that what constitutes a fair political decision should be open to public 
consultation. Stakeholders, from users to software engineers, should have a say on what they 
think of the algorithmic-human process of making political decisions. As the situated lens 
considers the processes of algorithmic decision-making as open-ended, room can be created 
for users and other affected stakeholders to doubt, raise ethical concerns and intervene in the 
ways in which AI devices are designed in making political decision. Room can be generated 
for stakeholders and policymakers to discuss alternative possibilities of configuring the 
political decisions through AI. Amoore (2019) has argued that it is important for subjects to 
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doubt and inquire into what is provided by new AI devices as these doubts can help ‘map out’ 
both new possibilities and risks of AI in our everyday life. By sketching out such 
potentialities for making political decisions via AI, such a ‘map’ offers valuable material for 
policymakers to create a better understanding of AI decision-making. In the context of DPPPs, 
it would allow affected stakeholders to raise concerns and question the design features in 
digital political participation (such as participatory calculus and majoritarian rules) because 
they inevitably preclude a wide range of empowered capacities and non-majoritarian means 
of making decisions. Participatory workshops can be conducted with stakeholders to integrate 
their concerns into the design processes of DPPPs. In this way, users will be given chances to 
become what I previously term as ‘empowered posthumans’ as their knowledge of AI evolves 
through learning from other stakeholders within participatory workshops.   
 
7.1.3 Reapproaching digital urbanism 
By examining DPPPs through the situated lens via integrating empowerment theory with 
assemblage thinking, I was able to then locate my analysis of DPPPs within wider studies of 
digital urbanism to show how this analysis may inform and develop such studies. The 
situated lens casts a new comparative perspective on digital urbanism by identifying the 
contextual similarities between the two DPPPs as the assemblage of design, UI and 
algorithmic decision-making. It opens up the ‘block-boxed’ algorithmic processes embedded 
within the two DPPPs by taking seriously the development of empirically grounded analysis 
of the fluidity in algorithmic calculations located within wider environments. The situated 
lens, thus, provides a way to go beyond a focus on platforms as vehicles for capital 
accumulation and economic value extraction (Leszczynski 2019, p. 2; Barns, 2018) by 
pointing out what ‘other’ variations of platform urbanism can offer. It is in this sense that the 
situated lens provides a solid and critical analytical lens for researchers to study digital 
urbanism as the composing of the assemblage of design, UI and algorithmic decision-making. 
  
I will now outline some major contributions that the situated lens can make for driving 
forward the field of digital urbanism. Firstly, my study of the two DPPPs opens up what has 
been previously investigated within platform urbanism by going beyond a focus on capital 
accumulation and economic value extraction (Leszczynski 2019, p. 2; Barns, 2018). Here, 
both Decide Madrid and vTaiwan can be seen as examples of urban platforms using ‘open’ 
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modalities (Barns 2018, n.p.) because they release algorithms under open-source licences on 
the website Github which are available for downloading, modification and reuse. Sarah Barns 
(2018) points out the significance of open modalities in which platforms utilise open data and 
create spaces for citizen dialogue about cities; Leszczynski (2019) indicates how everyday 
life practices and participatory platforms are interwoven. By focusing on and examining the 
impacts of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan in urban policymaking, I show how previous 
understandings of digital urbanism with regard to algorithmically-powered platforms have 
been limited by their lack of diversity in research subjects. As I have drawn out in Section 
3.3.3, within urban studies, there remains a profound need to expand the scope of research to 
other ‘alternative’ types of data production which are placed into relationships with 
algorithms: in smart urbanism, this implies the need to study municipal-led open data 
platforms (Luque-Ayala and Marvin, 2015). Therefore, my thesis provides a way to highlight 
how the existence of DPPPs can supplement and enrich our current understanding of digital 
urbanism.  
 
Secondly, engaging with the recent debate over whether to ‘open up’ or to ‘bracket’ 
black-boxed processes of algorithmic calculations that are embedded within platforms (Field 
et al., 2020; Kitchin, 2017), the situated lens offers an approach which avoids making an 
argument which does not pay specific attention to technical details and without fetishizing 
algorithms. The situated lens highlights algorithmic calculations in the broader political and 
urban environments on which their operation and effects depend. Such a ‘situated’ analysis 
avoids an undue focus on the technological details of each platform, which Kitchin (2017, p. 
25) described as algorithmic fetishism. Also, this situated lens does not reproduce the 
argument that users and more generally ‘humans’ are essentially passive and have only 
limited capacities to resist new regimes of algorithmic governance (Coletta and Kitchin, 2017; 
Leszczynski, 2016; Amoore, 2013; Cheney-Lippold, 2011; Gabrys, 2014). The use of the 
situated lens has evidenced that algorithmically-mediated processes making political 
decisions inside DPPPs are not just composed of algorithms alone but of algorithms operating 
in living interactions with data inputted from users, as well as policymakers and moderators 
in the later stages of wider policymaking processes. As indicated by Decide Madrid and 
vTaiwan, not only do algorithms not act in an entirely ‘automatic’ manner, their calculations 
contain a complicated interplay between a certain level of contingency, a transformative 
change dependent on user input and their inherent design. In doing so, it hopes to open up 
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what previous understandings of algorithmic governance in digital urbanism by offering a 
nuanced, empirically-grounded understanding of under-studied yet important cases, such as 
the two DPPPs I have studied here.  
 
The situated lens shows that algorithms have different impacts in (urban) policymaking 
processes, and more broadly on urban governance. On one level, algorithms can reinforce the 
majoritarian rule by producing political decisions selecting which urban subjects matter via 
interaction with users via algorithmic decision-making assemblages (what Deleuzian would 
call re/territorialisation). On another level, the case of vTaiwan-Uber has shown that what has 
been territorialised within its assemblage can be deterritorialised and thus turned into an 
on-going protest against the results of algorithmic decision-making. Here, this project 
reminds us to look at the different forms of resistance which can occur with the help of (or be 
focused on opposing) digital technologies (Rose, 2017, pp. 782–783; Dalton, 2019). Via a 
‘situated’ understanding of DPPPs, we can understand the politics of digital urbanism as 
being less about algorithms automatically in control of users and urban spaces as has been  
claimed by scholars of ‘algorithmic governance’ and more about the co-existence of 
resistance and empowerment within practices of citizenship.  
 
Thirdly, drawing on theories of participatory democracy, which offer a reference point in 
discussing on what constitutes a fair political decision-making (Fung and Wright, 2001; 
Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014), the situated lens questions the two assemblages of algorithmic 
decision-making located within Decide Madrid and vTaiwan by highlighting differences in 
the fairness and quality of political decisions which they produce. By paying attention to the 
decision-making processes in which political decision are (re)configured by algorithms, users, 
policymakers and moderators, the situated lens is able to point out the exclusions on 
particular voices on urban issues which are produced during such processes. Decide Madrid 
does not consider minority viewpoints on urban issues when making the decisions, such as 
spending money through the participatory budget; whereas vTaiwan filters out controversial 
viewpoints on Uber issue during the stakeholder consultation phase. These exclusions are 
evidence which suggests we should question the fairness of political decision-making which 
emerges through the two DPPPs. This is seen especially in the on-going protest on Uber 
legalisation in Taipei City, which has strongly articulated disagreement against the political 
decisions made through vTaiwan.  
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These exclusions raise a pressing question for digital urban policymaking: can DPPPs 
actually resolve controversial urban issues or do they simply move them elsewhere? Is it 
possible for DPPPs to make political decisions which have been considered as fair by 
affected stakeholders, despite its lack of deliberation? It seems that vTaiwan does not serve to 
mitigate but rather to inflame debates over the legalisation of Uber in Taipei and other 
Taiwanese cities. The on-going protests between Uber company, Uber drivers and Taxi 
drivers have meant the Taiwanese government has had to spend more time and resources in 
negotiations with stakeholders outside of vTaiwan (Strom News, 2019; Technews, 2019)5657. 
This instance indicates a significant question that DPPPs raise for urban governance: how can 
we better handle urban controversies through the usage of algorithmic devices?  
 
Lastly, by pointing towards the need to conduct a comparative study of cross-cultural issues, 
my work has contributed to digital urbanism by identifying the contextual similarities of 
algorithm-human alignments between Spanish and Taiwanese experiences of digital urbanism. 
Identifying such contextual similarities infers that digital urbanism, as evidenced by this 
comparative study, is constituted by the three assemblages: design, UI and algorithmic 
decision-making. As McFarlane (2010, p.726) and Robinson (2015, p.188) advocate, taking a 
comparative approach to studying different cities can bring a new perspective or challenge the 
current theorisations of the urban. Here, this comparative understanding of digital urbanism is 
important as it may be applicable to examine other variations of digital urbanism through the 
identification and comparison of other relevant assemblages, which may be different to those 
of the DPPPs under study here. This comparative study is more important in the context of 
digital urbanism where Marvin and Luque-Ayala (2015) have noted that there is very little 
empirical research comparing the varied forms of smart urbanism across different 
geographical locations, for most studies have tended to focus on a single case study of smart 
urbanism occurring within Anglosphere, European or Latin American contexts. Besides, this 
comparative approach helps to reorient the ‘core’ of digital urbanism by encouraging moves 
beyond focusing on examples of platforms operating in the Anglosphere. Looking beyond the 
Anglosphere, the situated lens demonstrates that there is more than one type of digital 
urbanism. By acknowledging the richness of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan, the situated lens 
 
56 https://technews.tw/2019/04/24/uber-invalid-protest/, access at 01/10/2019 
57 https://www.storm.mg/article/897140, access at 01/10/2019 
220 
 
shows that understandings of digital urbanism do not have to be confined studies of 
indicators-based data dashboards, Airbnb, Uber (and other navigation applications), sensors, 
control rooms, CCTVs and others (Batty et al., 2012; Gabrys, 2014; Kitchin, 2014; Kitchin, 
Lauriault and McArdle, 2015; Marvin and Luque-Ayala, 2017). 
7.1.4 Limitations of the situated lens    
The major limitation of using my approach, particularly regarding the use of Deleuzian 
assemblage thinking, is its orientation on the ‘presence’ and the ‘becoming’ of the human and 
nonhuman alignments, with an attention to both the instability and stability of such alignment. 
This focus could potentially downplay some of the historical and economic perspectives of 
actors in shaping the stability and instability of human-nonhuman alignments in the present 
and in the near future. In the context of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan, one can ask: how do 
pre-existing economic and political factors within cities like Madrid and Taipei influence 
policy on public participation as expressed by the creation and decline of Decide Madrid and 
vTaiwan? How long can a DPPP continue to maintain its degree of digital empowerment? 
These are important questions.  
 
From a historical perspective, Abers (2000) reminds us that it is critical to question whether a 
given participatory process offers and redistributes real decision power to newcomers and 
those who are previously excluded from taking part of public participation. Her research has 
studied the empowerment potential of a non-digital version of the participatory budget in 
Brazil for 10 years. To answer this question would require researchers to either to trace the 
historical perspective of a single DPPP back in time or to continue to follow a DPPP who 
actively survive for a reasonably long time (5-10 years) to monitor the ways in which both 
users are actively taking part in making decisions which have a real impact in policymaking 
processes. In particular, there is another critical question in terms of ‘who’ have been 
participating in these processes. If it has always been the same group of participants which 
hold power over other participants and those who are excluded from participatory processes, 
then under such circumstances the effect of a given DPPPs on empowerment is largely 
restricted. Abers (2000) has pointed out such a situation is ‘clientelism’, whereby the 
outcome of participatory processes is largely controlled by small and similar groups (which I 
term as ‘princelings’). Therefore, more evidence is needed to monitor whether digital 
participation reproduces traditional power hierarchies in Taipei and Madrid City, or if it shifts 
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the power from the old ‘clients’ to new groups, on a long term basis.  
 
From an economic perspective, it is of note to point out that Decide Madrid may have been 
influenced by or have an impact on the wider austerity context in Spain, as Madrid City 
Council used 2% of its annual budget (100 million Euro) on Decide Madrid’s participatory 
budgeting process between 2017-2019 (60 million for 2016). The annual 100 million Euro 
budget was derived from the existing budget for investment, common good and welfare, 
which was agreed by the coalition of the Socialist party and Ahora Madrid in the municipal 
assembly (as Mike the policy advisor for Decide Madrid told me). However, there was not 
enough information for me to argue that Madrid City Council can use its spending on Decide 
Madrid as a means of asking for more budget from the Spanish government (as the Spanish 
government has gained more power in distributing and supervising budgets to local 
governments during the time of austerity — see Pino and Pavolini, 2015). Nor did I have 
enough evidence to argue that massive spending on Decide Madrid’s participatory budgeting 
processes actually served to deepen inequality in Madrid. When I was in Madrid, civil 
servants from Madrid City Council liked to highlight the fact that the Spanish economy was 
bouncing back (this can be also seen in a Financial Times article58 showing the strong and 
steady economy recovery in Spain since 2015). Therefore, more studies would have to be 
conducted to answer the questions: to what degree did this massive invention on Decide 
Madrid’s participatory budgeting initiatives have a direct impact on inequality and political 
situation? Did Decide Madrid demonstrated a ‘better way’ of spending public money? 
7.2 Future study 
Now, I suggest two areas for future research in digital urbanism and digital democracy, which 
I have identified from my collection of the ‘fragmented’ evidence during my fieldwork. 
These two areas thus can be seen as an extension of my PhD thesis.  
 
7.2.1 Exploring the politics of digital urbanism: resistance and centralisation/territorialisation     
Digital technologies, including social media and digital platforms, increasingly mediate our 
everyday lives and political practices in various ways. They enable us to order everyday 
 
58 https://www.ft.com/content/12155b0c-3f56-11e9-b896-fe36ec32aece, access at 07/12/2020 
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necessities (food, commodities, taxi and so on), support a petition, apply for a job, and other 
activities, which seems to obscure the role of cities. However, as I have argued in Chapter 6, 
digital urbanism, because of its inherent modes of exclusion which manifest design and usage, 
will always provoke or generate unintended consequences, such as conflicts which are 
unresolved within the DPPP and emerge as forms of resistance in urban spaces.  
 
These new forms of resistance in urban spaces make ‘what is excluded’ from algorithmic 
calculations or/and from being presented in DPPPs visible (see Chapter 6, the case of 
Taxi/Uber protest). Recognising the presence of resistances suggests that for future research, 
it would be important to explore a variety of forms of resistance playing out in urban spaces 
as part of a wider politics of digital urbanism. Here, the situated lens serves as a useful 
approach as it can unpack the politics of digital urbanism by revealing ‘lost’ possibilities 
within a given digital technology/platform concerning the becoming potentialities that digital 
urbanism can offer’ as McFarlane (2011) indicates, the potentialities of urban life are more 
than what is materialised within any particular (urban) assemblage (what Deleuze terms as 
‘deterritorialisation’). Understanding digital urbanism via the situated lens, then, points to a 
more nuanced and critical view which shows how both political possibilities and forms of 
resistance against DPPPs play out in urban spaces. Rose (2017) has specifically pointed out 
the importance of paying attention to ‘untheorised’ posthuman agencies of resistance which 
persist in digitally-mediated cities. Also, Dalton’s (2019, p. 7) work has employed Deleuzian 
assemblage thinking to highlight how housing data can be both centralised and dissolved into 
‘multiple data resistances, counter-narratives and possibilities for new, alternative 
formations’ . 
 
From here, I intend to further explore the politics of digital urbanism. Do these forms of 
politics consist of both resistance (as ‘deterritorialisation’) and the legitimation or 
centralisation of specific forms of knowledge and power (‘re/territorialistaion’) as DPPPs 
operate via interactions with users, data and wider environments? Can we say more about the 
relationship between deterritorialisation and resistance? Does any given deterritorialisation 
necessarily cause a form of resistance or some other effect?   
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7.2.2 Affective democracy  
One area of future research emerges from my analysis on the digital political participation is 
the ways in which users’ emotion and knowledge of political issues under discussion in 
Decide Madrid and vTaiwan are influenced by algorithms, as well as to what degree users are 
influenced by algorithms to conduct other activities outside of both DPPPs. These questions 
are important because they aim to further examine the degree of digital empowerment in 
relation to users’ emotion, learning capacity and activity, which can be considered as affective 
democracy.  
 
It appears that our democracies are becoming more affective by the everyday usage of social 
media. Emerging from my research, it is clear to see the influence of social media (Twitter, 
What’s App/Line and Facebook) on the digital participatory actions of Decide Madrid and 
vTaiwan. However, I did not have enough data due to methodologically difficulty and limited 
time and manpower. For Decide Madrid, initial research has shown the positive connection 
between online activities on Twitter and Decide Madrid. Those proposals from Decide 
Madrid, if mentioned or hashtagged in Twitter, would be more likely to gain support for 
Decide Madrid. In the case of vTaiwan, some practitioners informally told me that most users 
who knew and took part in vTaiwan were already friends on Facebook or connected via some 
online forum. What this means is that our everyday practices on social media in terms of who 
we make friend with, browsing and liking various posts, are becoming parts of constituting 
everyday democracy. Formal practices of democracies, from presidential elections to 
participatory democracy such as Decide Madrid and vTaiwan, are infiltrated by online 
everyday practices and algorithms on social media.  
 
Here, I propose the idea of affective democracy to indicate a situation where digital interfaces 
and algorithms are able to manipulate and create different affective states of users, from 
frustration to pleasure, which then affects users’ democratic practices and activities. Here I 
see democracy as both formal (voting in political election) and informal (as a way of life, as 
lived conditions and learning experiences for individuals to openly communicate between 
different interests for social growth, see John Dewey 1916). Both informal and formal 
practices of democracy are mutually interrelated and influenced.  
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By understanding democracies in this way, I speak to the notion of affect under the 
interpretation of James Ash. Ash (2010) has demonstrated that interface design can affect 
various emotional statuses and activities of users in videogaming. In his other work (2015), 
Ash develops an approach out of the Deleuzian concept of affect to explore the affect of 
digital technologies, which influence both emotion and action of users. For Ash (2015, p. 85), 
the idea of affect here does not only refer to emotional states of users which are influenced by 
digital technologies but also ‘as force that has the capacity to transform the corporeal and 
material basis of the human body’. Understood affect in this way, I will explain how I come 
up with the idea of affective democracy, both from my fieldwork and a brief review on recent 
research and news.  
 
An emerging affective democracy 
 
The influence of social media appears to turn our democracies into a more ‘affective’ 
situation whereby social media impacts users’ emotion, political knowledge and political 
actions. Recent studies have argued that algorithms on Twitter and other social media 
deliberately interfere with both formal and informal democratic practices. Ferrara et al. (2016) 
indicate that algorithms on social media such as Twitter can influence the result of the 
political election by crafting and making up support for a particular candidate, as well as by 
spreading abusive languages or misinformation of its counterpart opponents. This results in a 
more entrenched political polarisation and wide-spreading misinformation at an 
unprecedented scale (Deb et al., 2017). In particular, the New York Times59 showed that the 
2019 general election in the UK was likely to have been manipulated by widespread 
misinformation emanating from various sources, from the Russian government to the 
Conservative and Labour parties and their political candidates. Memes and exaggerated 
contents are quickly created, posted and circulated by algorithms embedded within Twitter 
and Facebook to attract users’ attention. The problem here is that the content of posts contains 
a large level of misinformation and lies about key political agenda and issues, which appears 
as objective facts and information to voters and potentially influence their perception and 
understanding of political issues. As a consequence, these posts are likely to inflame outrage 
reactions against their political counterparts.  
 
59 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/10/world/europe/elections-disinformation-social-media.html, access at 
03/01/2020 
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Issues stemming from the widespread prevalence of dis/misinformation is also considered as 
a very significant threat to Taiwanese democracy. A Swedish research project, V-Dem 
(Varieties of Democracy), has revealed that since 2011 Taiwan has been saturated by the 
largest amount of misinformation within a sample of 180 countries; this was deliberately 
released by the Chinese government (Lührmann et al., 2019). The study suggests that such 
misinformation is likely to have a negative impact on Taiwanese’s democracy (Lührmann et 
al., 2019, p. 35). The Guardian60 points out that the unprecedented scale of misinformation, 
such as ‘pro-Beijing content’, in Taiwan can possibly manipulate voter’s opinion and 
understanding of important political agendas, and distract their attention from serious debates. 
Recognising the potential impacts of misinformation in political elections in the US, 
Facebook has set up a ‘war room’ in its Taipei Office on the 1st of January in 2020. This ‘war 
room’ involves members examining and working on public relations policy, political 
advertisements, the content of posts, and system safety on a 24-hour basis. This war room 
will keep in touch with legal institutions and election commissions in Taiwan (Focus Taiwan 
News, 2019). However, despite the claims on the significant consequences of online 
misinformation on formal and informal practices of democracy, there is a lack of evidence on 
what degree it has changed and manoeuvred voter’s opinion, emotion, and actions.  
 
Here, I propose that the notion of affect (Ash, 2015) is useful to further explain and 
unentangle the current situation of democracies which are largely influenced by 
‘misinformation’ and other abusive events, which are disguised and entwined with our 
everyday usage of social media. It shows a way of explaining ‘affective democracy’ by 
answering the question that to what degree algorithmically configured information transforms 
and manoeuvres users’ emotion, political opinion and actions. The idea of affect can highlight 
both the emotional and bodily transformation of users in response to digital technologies, 
such as the interface design of videogaming (Ash, 2010) and iPhone (Ash, 2015). In 
particular, it emphasises the ‘non-cognitive’ or the reflex reaction of users, which seems to be 
a character in using digital technologies. It allows us to explore ‘affective democracy’ by 
examining the political implications of such ‘non-cognitive’ affect on users. Users may, in 
turn, to write and express their political opinion, debate with others online and offline (i.e. 
 
60 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/30/taiwan-presidential-election-referendum-on-ties-with-chin
a, access at 03/01/2020 
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learning to participate, interact and readjust with different viewpoints in a controversial issue, 
see Dewey 1916), and conduct political activities in relation to formal practices of democracy 
(i.e. voting or joining and helping out political campaigning for political parties). 
 
Temporality  
One character of affective democracy appears to be its temporality in terms of how long it 
takes a hashtag to become viral and travel at a ‘global’ scale, how long it takes users to 
understand, to make a decision (from supporting to voting on citizen proposals or comments), 
and to take actions to take part in a political issue. Whilst I do not have enough information to 
understand and elaborate the temporality of DPPPs, I find this theme interesting because 
when I was conducting my fieldwork, practitioners and data scientists showed me that digital 
participation follows a centralised temporality where very often a citizen proposal, hashtag or 
a picture got ‘viral’ or ‘popular’ very quickly within a very short period. In other words, most 
participative actions are centralised around more or less a similar time period across different 
physical spaces. This centralised temporality suggests users may make a very quick decision 
within a more existing mood and emotion, yet there is not sufficient evidence to show what 
implications of such centralised temporality in affective democracy in terms of users’ 
decision-making and political actions (voting in political elections, supporting a political 
campaign/rally/protest). This centralised temporality has the potential to give details to what 
Andy Merrifield (2013, p. 63) understands as a new centrality of urban politics ‘which 
represented the culmination of encounters, a new capacity for concentration, a tipping point, 
mediated by social media, which helped marginality centre itself and helped it do so 
horizontally.  
 
Method 
I highlight a methodological issue of unpacking ‘affective democracy’ is the difficulty of 
getting hold and analysing of data of online activities. Not only governmental institutions or 
software providers were less likely to disclose such data for their sensitivity and privacy but 
also it would require digital methods to systematically and meaningfully analyse the bulk of 
data, which presents as a challenge for a single social scientist. This is because most methods 
to explore online activities are usually conducted by a research team. Yet, I note that 
traditional methods such as ethnography and interviews will be still useful in discovering 
user’s feeling and perception in relation to algorithmically configured information.  
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A variety of methods are deployed by researchers to examine and identify fake accounts and 
news. Non-digital method such as crowd-sourcing via recruiting users/annotators is employed 
to detect misinformation or fake accounts (Ferrara et al., 2016). Digital methods, entailing 
harnessing machine-learning algorithms to discern the different behavioural patterns of 
accounts, and digital network-analysis which visualises the community structure of accounts, 
are utilised to differentiate algorithmic bot-accounts from human accounts. Other methods 
include finding the ‘masters’ of creating fake accounts through analysing fake accounts’ 
targets, contents and temporality (Ferrara et al., 2016, p. 103), or ‘ground-truthing’ of users’ 
click history and timing information, which are served to differentiate human-accounts from 
algorithm or bot-accounts. Additionally, Kitchin (2017) also notes that traditional methods, 
such as interviews and participatory observation, are still useful when being deployed to 
understand users’ emotional, cognitive and physical reactions to interface and algorithmically 
configured information.  
 
7.3 Entanglements between algorithms and cities  
One of the biggest challenges in my PhD thesis is to unpack previously-unknown 
entanglements between algorithms and cities. Even though I had an experience of using 
Geography Information Science and learning to code via Visual Basic language when I was 
an undergraduate, understanding algorithms and dynamic UI present a huge methodological 
challenge for me. However, due to a combination of good luck and my methodological 
approach enabled me to gather help from data scientists, software engineers, policymakers 
and civic hackers who embrace the ethos of transparency and explainability in how they 
program, I was able to gradually tinker and grasp a partial view into the ‘black-boxed’ 
processes in terms of algorithmic calculations and visualisations of UI. What is interesting is 
that these rare chances would not be made possible if I were not doing ethnographic 
fieldwork in the cities. I have encountered the urban potentialities as a researcher in 
numerous conferences, workshops and meeting across Durham, Newcastle, Taipei, Madrid, 
Barcelona, Tokyo and London. In some ways, the development of my thesis and my 
understanding of algorithms is a solid example of how the process by which urban 
potentialities surface out relies in part on the capacity of contingent events to ‘surprise’ me; of 
course, not every surprise is positive. Cities can give a life for a DPPP like vTaiwan and 
Decide Madrid, and thrive together. Cities can also take the liveliness of a DPPP away. My 
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thesis, then, sits between the liveliness and falling-away of Decide Madrid and vTaiwan, 
between Madrid and Taipei City.  
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Appendix 1 
The events/meetings I attended in Madrid (derived from the fieldnote) 
Type  What Date/Time 
Skype meeting Skype meeting with 
Paraguay, national level 
16-10-17 
16:00 
Skype meeting with Jalisco X 
Skype meeting with 
developers  
26-09-17 
18:00 
27-10-17 
06-11-17 
17:00 
Skype meeting with a 
conference about Decide 
Madrid in Quito 
 
18-10-17  
17:45  
The interview from 
mysociety (UK) 
02-10-17 
16:15  
Visit a district- Ciudad Lineal To introduce Decide Madrid  04-10-17  
10:00 
Comision  9:30 a pre-meeting between 
political parties and 
councillors before the 
plenary  
 
20-10-17 
Plenary session For single-ticket 27-09-17 
Usability test  Usability test for Decide 
Madrid  
28-09-17 to 29-09-17 
taking a usability test for 
Wikum. 
13-11-17 13:00 
Simulation of counting the 
physical votes  
they are testing the voting 
(with photos) 
17-10-17 
10:00  
 
Physical meeting 
  
About democratic cities and 
Consulcon conference  
02-10-17  
10:00 
A training session for the 05-10-17 
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volunteers who are going to 
help the la mesa for the 
upcoming votacion in next 
week.  
 
12:00 
To Once with Paula and 
Chema to promote Decide 
Madrid 
 
06-10-17 
18:00  
A meeting with the authors 
of the 100% sustainable 
Madrid proposal from the 
citizen proposal. 
07-11-17 
 
11:00 
meeting with people of local 
forums 
20-11-17  
16:30 
Meeting with people from 
Seoul Community Support 
(NGO) 
22-11-17 
10:00 
Public consultation about 
reflection on PB process 
23-11-17 
17:54 
Interdisciplinary meeting Visit the Government of 
Equity, Social Rights and 
Employment for the 
Sectorial Council for Older 
People 
18-10-17  
12:00 
 
Physical Voting for 11 plazas Start the process of physical 
voting. 
21-10-17 
10:00-19:00 
22-10-17 
10:00-19:00 
Count the physical voting 23-10-17 
 
Press conference  24-10-17 
 
Award winners of the 11 
Plazas 
 
Workshop Collective Intelligence for 
the democracy  
06-11-17- 
17-11-17 
Workshop in Villaverde  27-11-17 
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About Decide Madrid  
Codingmadrid 28-10-17  10:00 
 
Conference  Consulcon 16-11-17 to 17-11-17 
Democratic Cities  17-11-17 to 18-11-17 
 
The events/meetings I attended to in Taipei 
Type  What Date/Time 
Monday working in progress 
meeting within the Cabinet 
office  
Meeting with team 
members from PDIS  
Every Monday, from 12:00 
Report on the progression  
vTaiwan little hackathon  To make progress on the 
participation (discussing 
working with policy-makers, 
civic hackers and other 
stakeholders) and to discuss 
various issues related to 
vTaiwan  
Every Wednesday evening  
G0v Hackathon  A big hackathon which 
gathers a variety of 
participants (software 
engineers, policy-makers, 
domestic researchers and 
international journalists and 
researchers), approximately 
around 100 participants   
 
Take place on Saturday in 
the first week of every two 
months. Been there twice 
on 13/01/2018 and    
Non-public discussion  Discussion around vTaiwan 
and other offline 
participation within the 
team of PDIS. Such as the 
design process, method,  
procedure and contents. 
Sometimes with civil 
servants.  
Happening from time to 
time 
Participatory officer training To introduce the concept of 22-23/01/2018 
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camp  open government, 
collaborative participation 
and ‘participatory officer’ to 
civil servants 
 
Offline participation on 
various issues 
Such as transitional justice, 
allowing dogs to enter the 
national parks, charging a 
fee for Taiwanese expats or 
with dual nationality to use 
national health insurance 
and so on. 
Once a while, 05/01/2018 
and 25/01/2018  
A small conference about 
cities and participation with 
Japanese visitors  
 21/03/2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
244 
 
Appendix 2 
The list of interviewees for Decide Madrid  
Interviewee (in 
pseudo names)  
Position in Decide Madrid  Number of 
interviews  
Date 
Daniel  Civic hacker in Madrid  1  28/11/18 
Peter  Senior officer in Madrid City 
Council 
1 19/06/17 
 
Mike Key practitioner (heavily involved) 
in the team of Decide Madrid  
11 19/06/17 
26/09/17  
02/10/17 
12/10/17  
18/10/17 
27/10/17  
07/11/17  
10/11/17  
20/12/17  
05/07/18 
20/11/18 
Paul  Researcher in Medialab 2 15/12/17  
28/11/18 
Sandra  Researcher in Medialab 1 18/06/19 
Young Researcher in Medialab 1 19/06/17 
Ben  Officer in International 
Relationship in Madrid City 
Council 
1 14/12/17 
Victor  Former practitioner in labodemos 1 19/12/17 
Jean  Former practitioner in Decide 
Madrid  
1 (also 
communicating 
via email) 
22/11/2018 
Victoria  Officer in Public Relationship in 
Madrid City Council 
2 26/09/17 
20/12/17 
Pauline  Civil Servant in Madrid City 
Council 
2 05/10/17 
15/12/17 
Ann Digital Manager of Decide Madrid  Informal 
conversation 
 
Andy Software Engineer (interface) of 
Decide Madrid  
communicating 
via email 
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Bertie  Software Engineer of Decide 
Madrid  
2 28/10/17 
06/12/17 
Richard  Software Engineer of Decide 
Madrid  
2 05/12/17 
24/11/18 
Lily  Researcher in Medialab 1 29/09/17 
Danny  Software Engineer in Madrid City 
Council 
1 (also 
communicating 
via email) 
26/11/18 
Neo  Software Engineer communicating 
via email 
 
Jonny  Software Engineer  communicating 
via email 
 
Joseph Activist in Madrid  1 24/11/18 
Total   35  
  
 
A list of interviewees for vTaiwan 
Interviewee (in 
pseudo names)  
Position in vTaiwan-Pol.is Number of 
interview  
Date 
Felicity  Senior officer in the Cabinet Office 
(also communicating via email) 
4  05/01/18  
19/01/18  
19/02/18  
15/03/18 
Judy  Senior officer in the Cabinet Office 1 29/01/18 
Gwen  Key practitioner and participant  2 26/02/18 
28/06/18 
Chandler  Software Engineer (also 
communicating via email) from 
Pol.is Inc 
1 15/10/18 
Derek Senior officer in the Cabinet Office 1 22/03/18 
Bryon Civic hacker and former participant 
in vTaiwan  
1 06/03/18 
Matthew   Software Engineer in the Cabinet 
Office 
1 03/03/18 
Diana  Consultant from Pol.is Inc 1 25/09/18 
John Former software engineer in the 
Cabinet Office 
1 10/02/18 
Vivian    Civic hacker and former participant   1 28/03/18 
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Tim  Participant in vTaiwan 1 28/03/18 
Will Civic hacker and former participant 
in vTaiwan   
1 18/12/18 
Three Technicians   Software Engineers in the Cabinet 
Office 
1 27/01/18 
Sue  Senior officer in the Cabinet Office 1 23/03/18 
Fanny  Contracted officer in the Cabinet 
Office 
2 12/01/18  
29/03/18 
Yang Participant in vTaiwan 1 14/03/18 
Linda Participant in vTaiwan 1 08/03/18 
Roy Participant in vTaiwan 1 29/01/18 
Lin Former participant in vTaiwan 1 22/03/18 
Gary Senior Officer in the Taiwanese 
government  
1 29/03/18 
Total   25  
 
